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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts of laws in time' are as old as written laws them-
1. A "conflict of laws in time" arises when certain events take place at the "limit" of the
temporal duration of two successive and incompatible laws (at the time, in other words, when the
latter abrogates or amends the former), in such a fashion that it is unclear by which of the two laws
those events ought to be governed. Paul Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire (Conflits des Lois duns le
Temps) § 1, at 3 & 4 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter Roubier, Transitoire]. See 1 Arturo Alessandri
Rodriguez & Manuel Somarriva Undurraga, Curso de Derecho Civil: Parte General & Las Personas
§ 326, at 246 (1945); 1 Csar Augusto Abelenda, Derecho Civil: Parte General § 165, at 153 (1980);
Eugae-Louis Bach, Conflits de Lois dans le Temps, In 2 Dalloz Guide Juridique 144-1, 144-1 [§ 1]
(1992) [hereinafter Bach, Conflits 11]; Eugane-Louis Bach, Conflits de Lois dans le Temps, in 3
Dalloz Rdpertoire de Droit Civil [§ 1], at 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter Bach, Conflits J]; Eug6ne-Louis
Bach, Contribution a I'ttude du Problame de l'Application des Lois dons le Temps, 68 Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 405, 406-07 [§§ 2-3] (1969) [hereinafter Bach, Contribution]; I C.
Massimo Bianca, Diritto Civile: la Norma Giuridia-I Soggetti §§ 84-85, at 119 (1982); Thierry
Bonneau, La Cour de Cassation et I'Application de la Loi dens le Temps §§ 3-4, at 2 (1990); 1
Guilliermo A. Borda, Tratado de Derecho Civil: Parte General § 165, at 180 (1987-88) [hereinafter
Borda, Tratado]; Guilliermo A. Borda, Portde et Limitations du Drolt 7ansitoire, in 2 M61anges en
l'Honneur de Paul Roubier 75, 88-89 [§ 9] (1961) [hereinafter Portee]; Michael E. Coney, Temporal
Conflicts of Law: A Theory of Retroactivity 1 (1977) (unpublished Master of Civil Laws thesis,
Louisiana State University Law Center) (on file with Professor Emeritus Robert Anthony Pascal, LSU
Law Center); Gdrard Comu, Droit Civil: Introduction-Les Personnes-Les Biens §§ 365 & 368,
at 124 (4th ed. 1990); Pierre-Andr6 CtA & Daniel Jutras, Le Droit Transitoire Relatif a la Riforme
du Code Civil, In La RWforme du Code Civil [Quebecois] § 6, at 939 (1993); Frangoisc Dekeuwer-
Dfossez, Les Dispositions Transitoires dens la Ldgislation Civile Contemporaine § 1, at 2 (1977);
Ignacio Galindo Garfias, Derecho Civil: Primer Curso: Pate General § 69, at 160 (10th ed. 1990);
Eduardo Garcia Miynez, Introduccion al Estudio del Derecho § 198, at 388-89 (38th ed. 1986);
Jacques Ghestin & Gilles Goubeaux, Traitd de Droit Civil: Introduction G6ndrale § 330, at 293 (3d
ed. 1990); Fayez Hage-Chahine, Les Conflits dens l'Espace et dens le Temps en Mati~re de
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
selves.2 The ancient Greeks undoubtedly were aware of these conflicts, for
several of their greatest thinkers, Plato included, devoted parts of their works on
political theory to proofs that new laws must always be directed toward "the
future."3 The Romans were no strangers to these conflicts either. During the
Prescription §§ l& 2, at 2 & 3 (1977); Frangois Heleine, Petit Vade-Mecum Des Atapes de
Ddroulement des Rfgles de Confllt de Droil Transitoire, 96 La Revue du Notariat 367, 367-68
(1993); Jacques Heron, ttude Structurale de l'Appllcation de la Loi dans le Temps, 84 Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 277, at 278 [§ 1] (1985); Patrice Level, Essai sur Les Conflits de Lois
dans le Temps: Contribution A le Th6orie Generale du Droit Transitoire § 1, at 1 (1959); 1 Philippe
Malaurie & Laurent Ayn6s, Cours de Droit Civil: Introduction A l'ttude de Droit § 631, at 203-04
(2d ed. 1994); 1 Gabriel Marty & Pierre Raynaud, Droit Civil: Introduction G(enerale A l'Etude du
Droit § 105, at 184-85 (2d ed. 1972); 1 Henri Mazeaud et al., Legons de Droit Civil: Introduction
A i'Itude du Droit § 137, at 212-13 (Fran;ois Chabas rev., 10th ed. 1991); Giuseppe Ugo Rescigno,
Disposizionl Transitorie § 2, in 13 Enciclopedia del Diritto 219, 221-22 (1964); 1 Georges Ripert
& Jean Boulanger, Traitd 1ldmentaire de Droit Civil de Planiol § 227, at 109 (5th ed. 1950); 1 Rafael
Rojina Villegas, Compendio de Derecho Civil: Introduccion, Personas & Familia 41-42 (21st ed.
1986) [hereinafter Rojina, Compendio]; I Rafael Rojina Villegas, Derccho Civil Mexicano:
Introducci6n y Personas 269, 269 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter Rojina, Derecho]; Boris Starck, Droit
Civil: Introduction § 476, at 197 (1972); Paul Tavernier, Recherches sur l'Application dans le Temps
des Actes et des Rgles en Droit International Public 16-17 (1970); 1 Victorio Pescio Vargas, Manual
de Derecho Civil: Titulo Preliminar del Codigo Civil § 95 (1978); Amoldo Wald, Curso de Direito
Civil Brasileiro-Parte Geral § 44, at 109 (4th ed. 1975). See also 1992 S.Q. ch. 57, reprinted in
Marjolaine Gaudet, Codes Civils Compares et Dispositions Transitoires XXXV (1993) ("The object
of the provisions of this Title is to govern conflicts of laws of legislation resulting from the coming
into force of the Civil Code of Quebec .... ").
In Louisiana, as in all other American jurisdictions, questions regarding which of two successive
laws to apply are almost always treated under the rubric "retroactivity of laws." This rubric is
technically deficient, for, as we will see, many of the intertemporal conflicts phenomena that are
collected under it involve not retroactivity, properly so called, but rather other temporal effects, for
example, immediate effect or postactivity. See infra text accompanying notes 129-137 and at pp. 56-
60. To lump these phenomena under the rubric "retroactivity" makes no more sense than to lump
all sources of juridical relations under the rubric 'juridical act." See La. Civ. Code art. 1757
(obligations arise not only from juridical "acts" but also from juridical "facts").
2. The reference here to written laws is not an accident: by making the reference, I intend
to signal an important limitation on the scope of this paper. By "written laws," I mean, of course,
"legislation" broadly conceived, so as to include not only statutes, but also administrative regulations
and court rules, see I Jean Chevallier & Eugtne-Louis Bach, Droit Civil: Introduction A I'ltude du
Droit 13 (10th ed. 1989); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 232, at 199; 1 Marty & Raynaud,
supra note 1, § 78, at 145-46; Alex Weill & Frangois Terre, Droit Civil: Introduction Generale §
124, at 126-27 (4th ed. 1979), as opposed to "custom:' which is not written, see Weill & Terr,
supra this note, § 74, at 88; 1 Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Trait6 16mentaire de Droit Civil
§ 10, at 5 (12th ed. 1939), and 'jurisprudence:' which is not law, see La. Civ. Code art. 1 cmt. (b).
Though changes in custom or in jurisprudence can present interesting intertemporal conflicts
problems, see Roubier, Transitoire, supra note I, § 7, at 23-29, those problems are not, at present,
my concern. This paper is concerned exclusively with interemporal conflicts problems produced by
changes in legislation.
3. Plato, Theaetetus 178, reprinted in 7 Plato in Twelve Volumes 135 (Harold North Fowler
trans., 1967) ("For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous
in after time; and this is rightly called the future."). Plato's argument is explained and critiqued in
I Ferdinand Lassalle, Thdorie Systimatique des Droits Acquis: Conciliation du Droit Positif et de
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Republican Period, Cicero, in what would become one of his most famous
orations, denounced Verres, a former Urban Praetor, for having applied certain
provisions of his Edict to a case that had arisen during the term of his predeces-
sor." And a few centuries later, the Co-Emperors, Theodosius and Valentinian-
Caesar, issued a constitution to the Praetorian Prefect affirming the "certainty"
of the principle that "laws... regulate future matters and have no reference to
such as are past, unless express provision is made for past time." More
recently, but still a good while back (at least by American standards of
measuring time), the drafters of Louisiana's first Civil Code devoted several
articles to the topic, the cornerstone of which provided that "[l]egislation
provides only for the future; it can have no retroactive effect."6 Conflicts of
laws in time, then, are nothing new.
What is new is the frequency with which these conflicts arise. During the
course of this century alone, the increase in the number of judicial cases that
involved such conflicts has been dramatic: whereas the Louisiana courts handled
only fifty or so such cases between 1900 and 1910, they handled over twelve
hundred of them between 1988 and 1998." The cause of this development is no
mystery: the exponential growth in new legislation during that same period."
Since the end to this explosion of legislation is nowhere in sight, the number of
intertemporal conflicts cases can only be expected to rise.
Because intertemporal conflicts of laws are and will continue to be common-
place, it is imperative, now more so than ever, that Louisiana's "intertemporal
conflicts law" be adequate to the task. By intertemporal conflicts law, I mean
that body of legal principles whose sole purpose is to govern the resolution of
Ia Philosophic du Droit 25-26 & n.1 (J. Bernard et al. trans., 1901). See also Wald, supra note i,
1 44, at 109-10 (noting the Socratic-Platonic argument).
4. 1 Cicero, The Verrine Orations bk. 1, chs. 41-43, at 233-43 (L.H.G. Greenwood trans.,
1966). Cicero's condemnation of retroactivity is noted in Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 6, at
5; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 8, at 30-31; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 109-10, & § 45,
at 115-16.
5. The Code of Justinian bk. 1, tit. 14, law 7, par. 1, in 12 S.P. Scott, The Civil Law 87
(1932). The constitution of Theodosius and Valentinian-Caesar regarding retroactivity is noted in
Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 6, at 6; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 9, at 32-35; Wald,
supra note 1, § 45, at 115-16.
6. Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans prelim. tit. art. 7 (1808).
7. These figures, I must confess, are rough estimates. They reflect the results I obtained by
posing the following query on Westaw: "da(aft _ & bef ___) & ((retroactiv retrospectivl
prospectivl) Is (law legislation act section article paragraph provision))" This query is, at once, too
broad (it retrieved some cases that didn't present retroactivity-of-laws issues) and too narrow (it
missed some cases that presented retroactivity-of-laws issues). Even so, the query is sufficient to
serve my purpose here, namely, to provide some basis for comparing the frequency of intertemporal
conflicts cases at the beginning of this century with the frequency of those cases at the end of this
century.
8. Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 2, at 2-3; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 331,
at 294; 1 Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 1, § 631, at 204. See also Bonneau, supra note 1, § 1, at
I ("[TJhe mutation of contemporary society is effectuated at a cadence of extraordinary rapidity. It
is that which one calls 'the acceleration of history.").
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conflicts of laws in time (or, if one prefers, to manage transitions between
successive laws) and whose domain extends across all of the various fields of
laws without restriction.9 In Louisiana, these principles are to be found in
Article 6 of the Civil Code'0 and Section 2 of Title 1 of the Revised Statutes"
and in the jurisprudence and the doctrine that have grown up around them.'"
9. The expression "intertemporal conflicts law" or "intertemporal law" is just one of two
expressions that civil law scholars typically use when referring to this body of legal principles. The
other is "transitory" law. The trouble with this alternative expression is that a good number of
authors use it in a rather different sense, namely, to refer to the special "transition rules" that may
be found in this or that particular piece of legislation. To avoid confusion, it seems better to use the
other expression.
10. "In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively
only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is
a legislative expression to the contrary." La. Civ. Code art. 6.
11. "No Section of the Revised Statues is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated." La. R.S.
1:2 (1987).
12. Some readers, in particular, those who are products of the American system of legal
education, may be surprised that I have not included here the various provisions of the federal
constitution that restrain the legislature's power to tamper with already-established juridical interests,
in particular, the Contracts Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as the
comparable provisions of the state constitution. In the American legal mind, the law of "retroactivity
of laws" is inextricably tied to these constitutional provisions.
Though these constitutional provisions admittedly have some connection with the temporal effects
of new legislation, they are not, however, part of the intertemporal law, properly so called. Two of
the provisions-the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause--are of limited scope: the former
applies only to new laws that pertain to "contract law"; the latter, only to new laws that pertain to
"property law." And none of the three--not even the Due Process Clause-has as its sole purpose
the resolution of conflicts of laws in time. The real thrust of each of these provisions is in other
directions (for example, the protection of private property against governmental encroachment); to
the extent that they regulate successions in laws at all, they do so indirectly and only as an incident
to their primary functions.
Still one might object that, in an American jurisdiction such as Louisiana, the intertemporal law,
properly so called, cannot truly be understood in isolation from these "time conscious" constitutional
provisions. That law and these constitutional provisions, the argument might run, form an ensemble
or network, the various parts of which are interdependent and complimentary: each presupposes the
existence of the other and of the limitations on temporal effects created by the other.
Because that is so, the argument might continue, it is impossible to gain a clear understand-
ing of this or that part, for example, the intertemporal law, without examining the whole in
its entirety.
As late as 1987, one could have said, with complete confidence and without qualification, that this
objection lacked merit. Before that time Louisiana's intertemporal law was not at all dependent upon
the "time conscious" provisions of the federal or state constitution. The intertemporal law developed
independently of these constitutional provisions-indeed, preceded them historically, for they formed
part of Louisiana's civil law before Louisiana was assimilated into the United States. It is
inconceivable, then, that the persons who originally developed that law "presupposed" either the
existence or the effects of these constitutional provisions. And so that law stood alongside the
constitutional provisions as a separate and completely independent source of temporal-effects
directives. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the courts routinely analyzed separately issues arising
under the intertemporal law, on the one hand, and issues arising under these constitutional provisions,
on the other.
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The question that I wish to explore is whether this law is "up" to doing the
job. My thesis is that it is not. The problem, in short, is that the current
intertemporal conflicts law exhibits a number of serious deficiencies of juridical
technique."3 The legislation in which that law is grounded is, in part, to blame,
for it reflects several lapses of formulative technique, among them apparent
antinomies, equivocation, and inefficacy. The lion's share of the blame,
however, must be allocated to the interpretation that the courts have placed on
that legislation. The jurisprudence is guilty not only of innumerable lapses of
formulative technique, such as indeterminacy, disharmony, inefficacy, and
inaccuracy, but also of several lapses of political technique, in other words, the
results to which the jurisprudential rules lead are, in many instances, politically
undesirable. To put it bluntly and in terms that no one can possibly misunder-
stand, Louisiana's current intertemporal conflicts law is "broke," so broke, in
fact, that it needs to be "fixed," the sooner the better.
The plan for this paper is as follows. Part II contains what, in my
judgment, is an indispensable prologue to the evaluation of intertemporal
conflicts law rules, namely, an expos6 of the extra-legal "foundation" for
and "function" of that law. Part HI provides a detailed exposition of
Louisiana's current intertemporal conflicts law. In that Part, I examine not
only the legislation in which it is grounded (Subpart A), but also the
interpretation that the jurisprudence has placed upon that legislation(Subpart
B). Part IV sets forth a thorough critique of that law, one that points up
its numerous deficiencies of formulative and political technique. In Part
V, I summarize my conclusions regarding those defects and, on that basis,
The situation changed somewhat in 1987. In that year the legislature, acting on a recommendation
of the Louisiana Law Institute, revised all of the articles of the Preliminary Title to the Civil Code,
including that which pertained to the temporal effects of laws. To judge from the comments to the
new legislation, the drafters admittedly did view the intertemporal law against the backdrop of the
"time conscious" constitutional provisions and, beyond that, were counting on those constitutional
provisions to supplement and, to some degree, to correct the intertemporal law. See, eg., La. Civ.
Code art. 6 cmt. (c) ("According to a well.settled rule of statutory interpretation, procedural and
interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively unless they violate vested rights or
obligations of contracts.").
That does not mean, however, that the intertemporal law and the "time conscious" provisions of
the federal and state constitutions are now so interdependent that one can't understand one apart from
the other. Whatever the drafters of the revised intertemporal law may have had in mind, it was not
to combine the two into a single body of law or to make each of them dependent on the other. To
judge from the text of the new legislation and the very same comments that allude to the constitution,
the drafters evidently intended to retain the prior analytical distinction between the intertemporal law,
on the one hand, and the "time conscious" constitutional provisions, on the other, so that, in any
given "intertemporal conflicts" case, the analysis of issues raised under the one would have to be
conducted separately from the analysis of issues raised under the other. The post-revision
jurisprudence has certainly maintained this distinction. See, eg., Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714
(La. 1994).
13. For the definition of this term of art as well as of the terms of art used to designate the two
components ofjuridical technique, namely, "formulative" technique and "socio-political" technique,
see Infra note 113.
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begin to sketch a picture of the intertemporal conflicts law of which Louisiana
now stands in need.
I1. FOUNDATION AND FUNCTION OF INTERTEMPORAL CONFLICTS LAW
Before one can begin to critique this or that body of intertemporal conflicts
law, one must, of course, understand why we need (or at least want) an
intertemporal conflicts law or, to put it another way, just what that law is
supposed to accomplish for us. To gain this understanding, one must ask and
answer two fundamental questions. The first concerns the "foundation" of
intertemporal conflicts law, 4 that is, what are the interests, values, sentiments,
and aspirations, be they social or individual, that are at stake in intertemporal
conflicts and that demand to be recognized through and protected by this law.'5
The second concerns the "function" of intertemporal conflicts law, 6 that is,
what is this law to do with these interests, values, sentiments, and aspirations."
This part of the paper is devoted to an exploration of these questions.
A. Foundation: Identification and Representation of Interests
Most judges, lawyers, and even legal scholars, when they contemplate
conflicts of laws in time, are prone to view the interests at stake in those
conflicts from the sole standpoint of those whom the application of the new law
would adversely affect. From this perspective stems the common notion that the
raison d'itre of intertemporal law is to provide "juridical security" for those who
have acted in reliance on the old law. Consider, for example, the Louisiana
14. Level, supra note 1, § 77, at 138. On the "foundation" of law in this sense, see Jean
Dabin, La Philosophic de l'Ordre Juridique Positif § 21, at 74 & n.1, & at 78-79, & § 22, at 79-83
(1929) [hereinafter Philosophic]; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, §§ 9-29, at 15-52.
15. Level, supra note 1, § 77, at 138 & n.108 ("the foundations" of intertemporal conflicts law
are "the extra-juridical elements that.., serve as the bases-the 'infrastructure'-of the rule of
conflict, even though the characteristics of these elements are not necessarily unique to the transitory
law"); see generally I Frangois G6ny, Science & Technique en Droit Priv6 Positif § 39, at I11l
(1914) [hereinafter I Giny, Science & Technique] (noting that all legal rules are grounded in
"emotions, sentiments, or tendencies (desires, inclinations, passions), beliefs or wishes, instincts or
habits, in short, psychological realities that translate themselves into needs or interests (economic,
moral, religious, etc.y').
16. On the "function" of law in this sense, see Dabin, Philosophic, supra note 14, § 23, at 84-
95; Claude Du Pasquier, Introduction A la Thiorie G~ndrale et A la Philosophic du Droit §§ 10-11,
at 19-20 (5th ed. 1979); 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, §§ 5-10.1, at 20-29.
17. See Level, supra note i, § 77, at 138 & n.108; see generally Du Pasquier, supra note 16,
§§ 10-11, at 19; 1 Gdny, Science & Technique, supra note 15, § 39, at 111; 1 Marty& Raynaud,
supra note 1, § 29, at 50-51; Mazeaud et al., supra note I, § 5, at 20; Paul Roubier, Thdorie
G6n6rale du Droit § 33, at 283-90 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter Roubier, Thiorie]; Starck, supra note
1, §§ 30-42, at 10-15.
18. On the "juridical security" justification for restrictions on the plenary application of new
laws, see I Augusta, supra note 1, § 165, at 154; 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 331,
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Supreme Court's explanation of the purpose behind Louisiana's anti-retroactivity
rule:
There would be no security for private persons if their rights, their
fortunes, their personal status, the effects of their acts and of their
contracts, could be questioned or modified or suppressed at any moment
because the law-maker had changed his mind.19
at 248; Bach, Conflits II, supra note 1, § 11, at 144-3; 1 Bianca, supra note 1, § 85, at 119; Gabriel
Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 Thiorique et Pratique de Droit civil § 12, at 15 (Julien Bonnecase, Supp.
111925) [hereinafter Bonnecase]; I Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 138, at 156; 1 Ambroise Colin
& Henri Capitant, Cours tldmentaire de Droit Civil Fran;ais § 50, at 51-52 (Lkon Julliot de La
Morandiare ed., 11th ed. 1947); Adriano De Cupis, Istituzioni di Diritto Privato § 8, at 16 (2d ed.
1980); Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 129, at 159; Rafael de Pina & Rafael de Pina Vara,
Diccionario de Derecho 314, 314 (15th ed. 1988) (entry for "irretroactividad); I Rafael de Pina,
Elementos de Derecho Civil Mexicano: Introduction-Personas-Familia 110 (7th ed., 1975); Galindo,
supra note 1, § 72, at 163; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 339, at 300; H6ron, supra note 1,
§ 33, at 300-01; 1 Louis Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Fran;ais § 80, at 60 (3d ed., 1938);
Level, supra note 1, §§ 78-79, at 139-41; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 187; 1
Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 138, at 213; 1 Pescio, supra note 1, § 103, at 334; 1 Planiol &
Ripert, supra note 2, § 240, at 100; 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 260, at 123; Roubier,
Transitoire, supra note 1, § 50, at 223; Starck, supra note 1, § 479, at 198; Tavernier, supra note
I, at 171 & 173; 1 Arturo Valencia Zea, Derecho Civil: Parte General y Personas § 84, at 184 (12th
ed. 1989); Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at I 1; Weill & Terri, supra note 2, § 165, at 169; Diccionario
Jurfdico Mexicano vol. 1-0, at 1825 (2d ed. 1988) (entry for "irretroactividad de ]a Icy").
19. Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff's Risk Management Fund, 664 So. 2d 81, 84 (La. 1995)
(quoting I Marcel Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law § 240, at 173 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959)).
See I Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 331, at 248 (paraphrasing Planiol with approval); I
Pescio, supra note 1, § 103, at 334 (quoting Planiol with approval); I A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana
Civil Law System: Coursebook § 40, at 67 (1977). See also Bach, Confils II, supra note 1, § 11,
at 144-3 ("[I]nsecurity would hang over the social body if, after the subjects of the law had acted
conformably or contrarily to the law that was imposed on them, their conduct could be appreciated
... by the application of a later law whose existence one could not have known of nor maybe even
foreseen."); I Bianca, supra note 1, § 85, at 119 ("The principle of non-retroactivity corresponds to
an elementary requirement of certainty on the part of those at whom the norm is directed. They
ought to be able to count on the legal discipline in force so that they can know what the juridical
effects of their acts will be."); De Cupis, supra note 18, § 8, at 16 ("the principle of non-retroactivity
... satisfies a need for certainty and juridical stability"); Hdron, supra note 1, § 33, at 300 ("Security
is compromised because the new law destroys the effects of the old law, the only one that the
subjects of the law could have known...."); I Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 138, at 213
("Individuals regulate their activities and accomplish the acts of juridical life by taking account of
the legislation in force at the times at which they act. It is necessary, then, that each know the
conditions that he must respect and the rules that he must follow, so that the envisioned act will be
regular and valid.'); I Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 260, at 123 ("Juridical activities would
no longer be freely deployed if it was necessary to take into account not only the current law, but
also a future law that cannot be known."); Weill & Terrd, supra note 2, § 165, at 169 ("There would
be, in fact, no security for particular persons if, although a law is in force and they have conformed
themselves to its dispositions, one could put in question the acts passed by them in conformity with
the legal prescriptions.").
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This explanation, of course, tells only half the story, for while it correctly notes
that the application of the new law would undermine security, it doesn't explain
why that's undesirable. The other half of the story, however, is hardly a
mystery. Juridical security is important for at least four interdependent, yet
conceptually distinct, reasons.
First, juridical security is a basic requirement of "justice,""0 one of the
principal values on which the legal order is (or ought to be) based.2 Justice
suffers, nearly everyone would agree, when the government "changes the rules
on the players in the middle of the game" or, to speak less metaphorically, when
individuals find that their acts, though perfectly legitimate when they were
performed (under the old law), now carry with them various undesirable
consequences (under the new law) of which they had no prior notice.22 But just
why subjecting an actorpost hoc to new rules that carry negative consequences
smacks of injustice is difficult to explain. Perhaps it's because implicit in every
command (of which law is one example) is a representation by the commander
that if the commandee obeys the command, then he will be rewarded in some
fashion, at the very least, through the "negative" reward of avoiding sanctions.
To deprive the commandee of that reward after he has faithfully complied with
the command is to "deny him his due," which, of course, is the antithesis of
justice.'
20. 1 Augusto, supra note I, § 165, at 154; 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 50, at 52;
HWron, supra note 1, § 34, at 301; Level, supra note 1, § 78-79, at 139-41; 1 Marty & Raynaud,
supra note 1, § 106, at 187; Codigo Civil de Venezuela [Ann.] art. 3, nn. 47, at 149 (1989).
21. On the role that the value ofjustice plays in the legal system as a whole, see generally Jean
Dabin, Thorie G6ndrale du Droit §§ 337-350, at 386-400 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter Dabin, Thlorie];
I 06ny, Science et Technique, supra note 15, § 16, at 49-50; Roubier, Thdorie, supra note 17, § 23,
at 211-26, & § 37, at 325-28.
22. 1 Augusto, supra note i, § 165, at 154 ("a natural and empirical sentiment of justice
imposes the necessity that the laws reign over only the juridical relations that spring up in the
future"); I Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 50, at 52 ("IT]his altogether rational principle of non-
retroactivity is... conformed to the most elementary equity .... "); Level, supra note 1, § 79, at
141 ("[Jlustice and the good are not satisfied when an act is found to produce unforeseeable
consequences, which could not possibly be lacking in the case of retroactivity."); I Marty &
Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 187 ("It [the foundation of the anti-retroactivity rule] is first ofall
a consideration ofjustice: while the new law was not yet promulgated, the interested parties knew
only the old law; it was in consideration of this old law that they acted. If one were to make the
effects of the new law extend back before its promulgation, then one would betray the confidence
that the parties placed in the only law that they knew.'); Codigo Civil, supra note 20, art. 3, § 47,
at 149 ("The principle of anti-retroactivity of the laws is imposed as a requirement of the dictates of
justice, equity, and prudence, inasmuch as no one could be obliged to perform the act of social life
without submitting himself at that moment to actualizing the rules of law sanctioned by the
Legislative Body .... ).
23. Justinian, Digest 1.1.10, reprined in 2 The Civil Law 211 (S.P. Scott trans. & ed., 1973)
("Justice is the constant and perpetual derise to give to every one that to which he is entitled. (I)
The precepts of the law are the following: to live honorably, to injure no one, to give to every one
his due.") (attributed to Ulpian). See also Dabin, Thtorie, supra note 21, § 302-310, at 349-59; Du
Pasquier, supra note 16, § 221, at 216; 1 Jacques Leclercq, Le Fondement du Droit et de la Socidt6
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Second, juridical security is important for the psychological health of
individuals. As one scholar has observed,
from the psychological point of view..., retroactivity is manifested
under the form of frustration. Certain conduct had received a certain
quality by virtue of the regime then in force. Putting into question by
.. the new law of that which seemed to be settled by the effect of the
old laws ... brings about a certain deception among individuals.
[O]n the psychological plane.., the action of the law on the past risks
giving rise among individuals to a sentiment of frustration or deceived
hope.
24
One need not have a degree in psychology to understand that this sentiment is
inimical to psychological well-being.
Third, juridical security is important for social stability.'s Plenary
application of new laws erodes confidence in and therefore respect for the rule
of law itself.
[F]or the law to keep the confidence of the citizens-this confidence
that forms the best part of its force-it is indispensable that acts passed
under its aegis subsist.., no matter what may happen later on. If it
were otherwise .... juridical life would be deprived of security, so
much so that, at the end of the account, the authority of the law itself
would be ruined. No one would believe in it any longer. The regime
of the arbitrary would be substituted for that of the legal order.26
§ 27, at 157-58 (1947) [hereinafter Fondement]; Roubier, Thdorie, supra note 17, § 23, at 213-14;
2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica pt. 2 of 2d pt, Q. 58, art 1, at 1434-35 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans. 1947).
24. Level, supra note 1, § 36, at 59. See also I Augusto, supra note 1, § 165, at 154 (if past
relations, rights, and duties were completely vulnerable to new laws, "one would live under the sign
of fear"); Heron, supra note 1, § 33, at 300 ("does one not have occasion to be irritated when one
is subtracted from the general rle so as to be made the object of an arbitrary decision?", which is
the effect of evaluating past behavior under a new standard); Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, §
50, at 224 (retroactivity, rather than "appeasing and diminishing the conflict born from the change
of legislation, carries it "to a point that's particularly agonizing and irritating").
25. Bonnecase, supra note 18, § 12, at 25; de Pina & de Pina, supra note 18, at 314; Galindo,
supra note 1, § 72, at 163; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 339, at 300; Heron, supra note 1,
§ 33, at 300; 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 80, at 60; Level, supra note 1, § 79, at 142; Weill &
Terre, supra note 2, § 165, at 169-70.
26. 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 80, at 60. See de Pina & de Pina, supra note 18, at 314
(paraphrasing Josserand with approval); 1 de Pina, supra note 18, at 110-11 (same). See also Ghestin
& Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 339, at 300 ("By permitting acts accomplished in conformity with the
law then in force to be contested, retroactivity risks enfeebling in a general fashion respect for legal
rules."); H6ron, supra note 1, § 33, at 300 ("[R]espect for the law finds itself enfeebled, since a party
can hope that his disobedience [of today's law] will be profitable to him tomorrow or, conversely,
can fear that his submission to it will soon bring reproach...."); Weill & Terre, supra note 2, §
165, at 169-70 ("If an individual who has obeyed the order of the law could be disquieted under the
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A loss of respect for the rule of law brings with it, of course, a concomitant
decline in obedience to the law. This danger is particularly pronounced with
respect to those who experience the "sentiment of frustration or deceived hope"
that was described earlier.27  Individuals who feel they've been
deceived-cheated-by an unanticipated change of laws are more likely than
others to believe themselves justified in blocking or at least frustrating the reform
represented by the new law. If the deceit is particularly obnoxious, they may
even agitate by extra-legal means for more fundamental social, political, or
economic change and, in extreme cases, by resort to arms.28
Fourth, juridical security is important for economic well-being. 2' As one
scholar has explained,
[T]he rule of non-retroactivity... is justified, in a word, by a clear
economic interest. Human transactions, in fact, need security if they're
to be developed and extended. When someone accomplishes a juridical
act, he has the right to demand that the validity of his act will always
be appreciated in conformity with the laws under which he accom-
plished it. It is necessary that his projections not be tricked by a change
in the will of the legislator. Without this [assurance], he will hesitate
to act; prudence will counsel him to abstain.30
One can put the same point another way. Uncertainty regarding the legal
consequences of economic activity (an uncertainty that plenary application of the
pretext that a later law [requires it], the law would lose all its force... .); see generally Bach,
Conflits II, supra note 1, § 11, at 144-3 (plenary application of new laws carries with it "the risk of
arbitrariness against which the rule of law must. . . be safeguarded"); Bonnecase, supra note 18, §
12, at 25 (Retroactivity "only sows disorder because it makes social life and social relations rest on
the most absolute instability. To make laws retroact is manifestly to go against the very end of the
law, since the law has no other function and no other reason for being than to realize social harmony.
Now, one who says 'social harmony' says before all 'stability.' If it is impossible for anyone to
know what the juridical requirements of tomorrow will be with respect to the past, the whole entire
society is endowed with a kind of paralysis....)"; Diccionario, supra note 18, at 1825 (plenary
application of new laws is "anijuridical" in the sense that it is inconsistent with the basic
"orientation" of the law, which is "to eliminate arbitrariness in social relations").
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28. See Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 339, at 300 ('On the social plane, the principle
of non-retroactivity is a factor of order .... It [retroactivity] is in any case socially inopportune by
virtue of the foreseeable chain reactions to which it can lead and by virtue of the hostility to reform
that it risks hardening."); Level, supra note 1, § 79, at 142 (noting the need for a careful
"management of the concrete elements of the past that assures the cohesion of the social milieu--a
factor of order-, outside of which no reform can bring about any benefit").
29. 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 50, at 51; 1 Valencia, supra note 18, § 84, atn.l.
30. 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 50, at 52. See also Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, §
165, at 169-70 ("If an individual who obeyed the order of the law could be disquieted under the
pretext that a later law [requires it]..., no one would any longer dare to execute the orders of the
law for fear of later seeing their acts, though they had been done legitimately, criticized by a new
and unknown law.').
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new law heightens) adds yet another risk of loss that rational economic actors
will factor into their investment decisions. In some instances at the margins, this
risk of loss may be so great as to discourage investment. The global macroeco-
nomic effect of this diminished investment will, at least in the long run, be a
smaller "pie," that is, less wealth-creation than would otherwise (without this
additional risk) have been realized.
There are, however, still other interests at stake in intertemporal conflicts of
laws, interests that, though commonly overlooked, are nonetheless nothing to
sneeze at. These other interests come into view when one shifts one's
perspective from that of those whom the application of the new law would
adversely affect to that of those whom the application of the old law would
adversely affect.
One of these other interests is that of "social progress." As the society itself
evolves, the law-an instrument of social order-evolves (or, at least, should
evolve) along with it, adapting itself to the society's new economic, political, and
cultural circumstances.3 It seems reasonable to assume, then, that new laws (at
least in the usual case) are "better" than the old in the sense that they are "more
adapted to the requirements of modem [societies]" or, at the very least, more in
tune with contemporary sentiments regarding what those requirements are and
how they can best be satisfied. 2 By contrast, the old law, it seems reasonable
31. 1 Dominico Barbero, Sistema Istituzionale del Diritto Privato Italiano § 40, at 96 (4th ed.
1955) ("The incessant evolution of social conditions requires a parallel evolution of the normative
order."); Bonneau, supra note I, § 1, at I ("Created by social forces, it [the law] is born in a
fight. ... Since these forces evolve, the law changes. Thus, the rule of law has an essentially
provisional character. It participates in the evolution of the society."); Dekeuwer-lWfossez, supra
note 1, § 5, at 5 ("Mhe succession of laws in time has a sociological dimension. Some laws are
modified in order to bring them into harmony with more advanced mores."), & § 197, at 234 ("CTlhe
legislator responds to the challenges of post-industrial society: social mutations imperiously require
profound and frequent reforms."); Level, supra note i, § 79, at 141 ("[S]ocial progress ....
demands that the amelioration of the conditions of human beings be obtained in such a way and to
such an extent that the resistance of the traditional frameworks within the social milieu has no role
other than to safeguard the principle of orderly evolution... .); Tavernier, supra note 1, at 173
("Mhe law ought to be able to be adapted to the changing conditions of life... and that is why the
necessity of adaptation must, in certain circumstances, get the upper hand over the requirements of
security... .); Diccionario, supra note 18, at 1826 ("The evolution of ajuridical system requires
new norms that satisfy in a better manner the changing economic, political, and cultural requirements
of a community. These new norms contnibute to the elimination of social practices and institutions
that are considered unjust or inconvenient').
32. 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note I, § 332, at 248 ("the new law should necessarily
be reputed to be better than the old"); Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, § 179, at 19 ("the new law
should necessarily be reputed to be better than the old"); Bach, Conflits II, supra note I, § 23, at
144-5 ("the new law ought to be reputed to be better than the old, since the legislator had believed
the change of law necessary'); I Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 57, at 56 ("Every new law ought
to be presumed better than the old; for, to what end does one modify the law if not to ameliorate
itf'"); Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note I, § 129, at 159 (thCe new law... is, in principle, considered
to be better than the old"); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 354, at 311 (referring to the
"superiority of the new law"); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 188 ("if he [the legislator]
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to assume, is "worse" in the sense that it is (or is perceived to be) maladapted
to modem social requirements and, therefore, dysfunctional to at least some
extent. For these reasons, then, the society has a strong interest in the most
fulsome possible application of the new law and the most limited possible
application of the old.33
Another such interest is that of "social justice." If the government is
properly fulfilling its mission, then each new law should be more "just"
than the old one it replaces or, to put it another way, more conducive to
the realization of the common good.34 "Since it comes later in time, it
must be presumed to be more just than the prior law. If the Legislative
Power had not considered it to be so, it would not have written it.""
Because that is so, "justice requires... that the iniquities contained in the old
law not survive the law that served to sustain them and not make a check, in the
name of [preventing] harm to interests, to the progress realized by the new
has consecrated a reform, it is because the new law is better"); I Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 138,
at 213 ("the new law is supposed to realize an improvement by relation to the old law"); 1 Planiol
& Ripert, supra note 2, § 243 bis, at 101 ("new laws ... are presumed to be better that those that
they replace"); I Silvio Rodrigues, Direito Civil: Parte Geral § 12, at 29 (6th ed. 1976) ("the new
law is supposed to be better than the old-that's why one innovates.. .'); Starck, supra note I, §
489, at 202 ("the new law is, by hypothesis, better than the old (if not, why would the old law have
been modified?y'); Tavernier, supra note 1, at 173 ("Mhe application of the new law ... is
favor(ed] [by the] imperatives of progress, the new law being thought to be better and more adapted
to the requirements of modem [communities]... than the old law."); Weill & Terr, supra note 2,
§ 163, at 168 ("the new law is presumed to be better than the old'), § 165, at 169 ("every new law
.. represents social progress'), & § 171, at 177 (the new law puts an end to "situations that the
legislator has judged to be bad').
33. 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 332, at 248 ("the new law should necessarily
be reputed to be better than the old and, for that reason, be applied immediately"); Bach, Conflits I,
supra note 1, § 179, at 19 ("the new law should necessarily be reputed to be better than the old and
should, as a result, be applied immediately"); Dekeuwer-ldfossez, supra note 1, § 4, at4 (noting the
"necessity of rapidly putting to work norms considered to be better that those that preceded them")
& § 129, at 159 (including among the "imperatives of the transitory law" the need to "assure a rapid
application of the new law, which is, in principle, considered to be better than the old'); 1 Marty &
Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 188 ("if he has consecrated a reform, it is because the new law is
better and there is, then, an interest in applying it to the greatest possible number of difficulties");
Starck, supra note I, § 489, at 202 ("since the new law is, by hypothesis, better than the old ... ,
one could not delay its application for years or decades"); Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 163, at 168
('since the new law is presumed to be better than the old, it is necessary to strive to apply to the
maximum of facts and acts").
34. 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 138, at 156. See also I Augusto, supra note 1, § 168,
at 164; 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 138, at 213; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 111.
35. 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 138, at 156. See also I Augusto, supra note 1, § 168,
at 164 e("te new law... is presumed to be more just by virtue of its being more in accord with the
exigencies of progress and of new social sentiments"); I Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 138, at 213
("the new law is supposed. .. to correspond more to the ideal of justice"); Wald, supra note 1, §
44, at I 11 ("the legislator has a duty to improve the laws--to realize progress in the sense of equality
and justice").
[Vol. 59
J.-R. TRAHAN
law.""3 The only way to assure that that does not happen, of course, is to give
the new law the "greatest ambit of application possible.""
Still another such interest is that of the "unity" of the law.3" "[E]very time
that one maintains the competence of the old law, one thereby consecrates a
duality of legislation: the new law is applied to certain difficulties, the old law
to others."39 This "competition" of laws is undesirable for at least four reasons.
First, it produces "inequality." "If pre-existing juridical situations continued
to be governed by the old law, one would end up with the inadmissible result
that persons in the same situation would be submitted to different rules."4"
Consider, for example, the government's decision in 1979 to replace the old
"head and master" rule, under which the husband alone was authorized to
manage community property, with the "equal management" rule, under which
"[e]ach spouse alone may manage... community property unless otherwise
36. Level, supra note 1, § 79, at 141. See also I Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 169, at 188
('There will be cases in which the injustice that results from the old law would be so shocking to
the new juridical conscience that it would be necessary to procure the disappearance of every vestige
of it from the old regime."); Hdron, supra note 1, § 37, at 37 (noting that, in extremely rare cases,
"[tihe opprobrium thrown onto the old text justifies sacrificing all those who profited from it"); Wald,
supra note 1, § 44, at I I ("The new law ought to have some influence on the ulterior consequences
of facts or of relations of law that were produced during the reign of the prior law, for the sake of
social progress . . .
37. 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 138, at 156 ('lIt is evident... that society has an
interest in the new law's having the greatest ambit of application possible."). See I Augusto, supra
note 1, § 168, at 164 ("no less valid and worthy of respect... is the value of justice, which leads
to conferring on the new law.., a relation with the major part of powers and impotencies, that is,
of rights and duties."); I Mazeaud ct al., supra note 1, § 138, at 213 ("The need ofjustice renders
the application of the new law urgent. This application ought to be as large as possible so that the
situations that the legislator wanted to condemn through the new law will disappear."); Tavernier,
supra note 1, at 173 (the "imperative" to "realiz[e] justice" may require that "certain rules, by virtue
of the end that they pursue, climb farther back into the past than others"); see also de Pina & de
Pina, supra note 18, at 315 ("rigorous and sharp anti-retroactivity would imply, in certain
circumstances, the maintenance of iniquitous situations"); de Pina, supra note 18, at I ll (same).
38. Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 129, at 159 (including among the "imperatives of the
transitory law" the need to "realize the unity of the legislation applicable at any given moment, in
a particular country, to all juridical situations of the same kind"); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note
1, § 106, at 188 (the "duality of legislation" that results from applying the old law to certain cases
"is certainly unfortunate and it is necessary to strive to reduce it to a minimum.").
39. 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 188. See also Roubier, Transitoire, supra note
I, § 70, at 345 ('[S]hortly after several successive laws were to appear on the subject, one would
quickly end up with a competition of laws that would be applied to situations of the same nature and
of an identical name."); Bach, Conflits II, supra note 1, § 23, at 144-3 (paraphrasing Roubier with
approval); I Planiol & Ripert, supra note 2, § 243 bis, at 101 ('the unity of legislation in a country
can be assured only if there's no concurrent application of two laws to similar situations").
40. 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 233, at 11. See also Starck, supra note 1, § 489,
at 202 ("This rule [the immediate application of the new law] is easily justified by the necessity of
equalfty of all before the law .... '); Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note 1, § 129, at 159 ("unity of
legislation is a factor of equality among citizens").
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provided by law." '  Had the old law remained in force with respect to
marriages that had been celebrated while that law was in effect, one would have
ended up with a situation in which some wives (those whose marriages were
celebrated after the new law's effective date) had full management powers over
community while others (those whose marriages were celebrated before the new
law's effective date) had none.
Second, it is "administratively inefficient." Keeping the old law around for
the purpose of governing pre-existing juridical situations greatly complicates the
task (and therefore increases the cost) of discovering and applying the applicable
law. To discharge his or her professional responsibilities competently and
ethically, every judge and every lawyer who is assigned or takes on a case that
falls within a "dual" legal milieu must, of course, be (or become) familiar with
two sets of laws: Not only that, but in each such case, the judge or lawyer must
be careful to determine precisely when the juridical situation from which the case
arises came into being. In those instances in which the parties dispute that
moment in time, the issue must, of course, be tried, consuming still more time,
money, and other resources.42
Third, it foments "transactionalinsecurity." Though it may seem paradoxical
at first, it is nonetheless true that retaining the old law to govern pre-existing
juridical situations can have the effect of undermining public confidence in the
security of their transactions."3 Here's how. The average citizen, who is lucky
if he evenknows the currentlaw, normally proceeds on the perhaps unrealisticbut
nevertheless understandable assumption that the current law is the only law. As
long as he encounters juridical situations that postdate the enactment of the new
law, he'll do fine: his expectations will be fulfilled. But as soon as he encounters
a juridical situation that antedates the enactment of the new law-which will
happen sooner or later-, he could find himself in trouble: his expectations may
well be fiustrated by rules the existence of which he was never even aware. And
from that point forward, he'll always worry about what other surprises the "law
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2346.
42. Bach, Conflits 1I, supra note 1, § 23, at 144-5 ("[T]he unlimited survival of the old law
would lead to practical difficulties.... [l]f one did not adopt the principle of the general application
of the new law, one would too often end up with the result that for juridical relations of the same
nature, different laws would be concurrently competent."); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 356,
at 311-12 ("The maintenance of different regimes by virtue of their date of acquisition ends up
creating a confusion that is prejudicial to juridical order. Uniformity is a factor that's indispensable
for simplification [of the law] and, as a result, for knowledge [of the law]....").
43. See I Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 332, at 248 ("We live.., under the regime
of the unity of legislation. It is inconceivable that different laws can simultaneously regulate juridical
situations of the same nature, because it would constitute a danger for juridical commerce. The
immediate effect is justified .. ., then, by a necessity of juridical security."); Dekeuwer-Dfossez,
supra note I, § 129, at 159 ("the unity of legislation is a factor ... in juridical security"). See also
Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 70, at 345 ("This competition [of simultaneously applicable
laws] would inevitably provoke an inexlricable confusion in juridical relations."); Bach, Conflits II,
supra note 1, § 23, at 144-3 (paraphrasing Roubier with approval).
[Vol. 59
J.-R. TRAHAN
of the past" may hold in store for him. The change from the "head and master"
rule to the "equal managementrule" again provides a useful illustration. Imagine,
if you will, a young lady who from time to time turns up at garage sales in search
of antique furniture. On several of these occasions she buys furniture from
married women who act alone and, as far as she can tell, without the assent of
their husbands. As it turns out, all of these women happen to have been married
after the new law-the equal managementrule-went into effect. Not surprising-
ly, she has never encounteredany problems with any of these transactions, at least
none that stem from the incapacity of the sellers. But then one day she buys
furniture from an olderwoman, one who was marriedwhile the old law-the head
and master rule-was still in effect. Not surprisingly, the young lady doesn't
think to ask if the seller's husband has consented to the sale. A short time later,
however, the husband brings suit against her, seeking to recover the furniture on
the ground that the sale, since he had not consented to it, was invalid. Needless
to say, the young lady will be surprised and, thereafter, considerably less confident
of the powers of her would-be sellers. The trouble, then, is this: the maintenance
of the old law sets a trap for the unwary citizen, one that, once sprung, undermines
confidence in the security of transactions."
Finally, it is inconsistent with the "signs of the times." In the contemporary
period, the unity of legislation, in the minds of most legislators, is both "natural"
and seemingly "ineluctable."4
[O]ne cannot lose sight of the character of modem society, founded on
a regime of legislation, in which legislation is considered, not as a
simple reflection of mores and customs, but as something that has the
power to reform these mores and customs according to an ideal supplied
by clarified public opinion. This submission [of mores and customs] to
the regime of legislation has, for a direct consequence, the unity of law
in a country. The legislator who undertakes to make a certain order,
chosen by him, to reign in juridical relations cannot tolerate the
competition of another law. The legal regime, in a given sovereignty,
tends, by the very force of things, to be a unitary regime, and it is to
assure this unity of the legislation that it is necessary to apply the law
immediately.46
44. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 70, at 346 ("iThere would be a trap for juridical
commerce in the partial maintenance, for certain situations, of soon-forgotten prior laws."); Bach,
Conflits I, supra note 1, § 180, at 19 (paraphrasing & quoting Roubier).
45. Bach, Conflits II, supra note 1, § 23, at 144-5 ("To explain the principle of the general
application of the new law, one also invokes the ineluctable unity of legislation.").
46. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 70, at 345-46; Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, § 180,
at 19 (paraphrasing & quoting Roubier with approval). See also Bach, Conflits II, supra note 1, §
23, at 144-5 ("In fact, the legislator who intends to promote a certain juridical order and, on this
occasion, to do an innovative work, would not be able to tolerate the obstacle that the survival of the
law would represent. Otherwise said, the general application of the new law.., would represent
the general tendency in our days, which is to hasten the application of new laws.. .).
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Every intertemporal conflict, then, involves a "collision" of seemingly
irreconcilable interests. Weighing in favor of the application of the old law is
the interest of "juridical security," which guarantees individual justice, promotes
the psychological health of individuals, stabilizes the society, and enhances
economic development. Weighing in favor of the application of the new law are
the interests of "social progress," "social justice," and "unity of law," the last of
which promotes equality, administrative efficiency, and transactional security and
is in keeping with the spirit of the times. From one class of juridical situations
to the next and, to some extent, even within each class of juridical situations,
these interests may well and undoubtedly often will vary in weight.
B. Function: Reconciliation of Interests
The function of the intertemporal law, like that of all law, is to resolve
conflicts among competing social and individual interests in a way that promotes
the common good.47 In the case of the intertemporal law, those interests
include, as we have seen, juridical security, social progress, social justice, and
unity of law.4"
Regarding precisely what balance should be struck in any given case or any
given class of cases, one would be hard-pressed to draw any firm conclusions:
it's a question on which reasonable persons may well disagree. One can,
nevertheless, draw some firm conclusions regarding how the balance should be
struck (or, to be still more precise, how it should not be struck). First, any
47. See Dabin, Thdorie, supra note 21, §§ 194-199, at 125-33 (noting that the task of the law
is to choose among, to prioritize, the various "orders of human interests that the common goods
covers"); Du Pasquier, supra note 16, §§ 10-11, at 19 ("The role of the law, then, is to assure the
peaceable coexistence of the human group or, as one often says, to harmonize the activities of the
members of society." This harmony "is realized by an equilibrium between opposing interests,
between conservative and innovative tendencies, between authority and liberty, etc."); I Geny,
Science & Technique, supra note 15, § 39, at 111 (the "supreme mission of the positive law" is to
effect an "equilibrium of interests"); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 29, at 50-51 (noting
various "equilibrium" theories of the function of law, including that which "takes into consideration
the two-fold individual and social end" of man and "puts the accent on the common good,
harmonizing and even integrating the interests of the individual and the collectivity"); Mazeaud et
al., supra note 1, § 5, at 20 ("Every society tends toward certain ends, individual or collective ....
These ends are numerous and often contradictory. Between them the law makes a choice....');
Roubier, Thtorie, supra note 17, § 33, at 283-90 (suggesting that the end of law is to establish an
"equilibrium" among competing imperatives of social life, with a view to attaining the "common
good").
48. See Dekeuwer-Difossez, supra note 1, § 197, at 234, & § 200, at 236-37 ("The transitory
system is one of the most important elements in the resolution of this contradiction [that between the
imperatives of security and justice], for it is this system that realizes the transitions that are
indispensable to the continued evolution of the law ... It is necessary, then, to make choices so
as to establish a certain equilibrium between liberty and equality, contradictory and equally imperious
needs. A compromise between the necessity of rapid reforms and that of the continuity of the law
as between the aspirations of civil equality and individual liberty, the transitory law appears as an
ensemble of equilibria.").
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approach to striking the balance that systematically undervalues (or ignores
altogether) either the collective interests or the individual interests in play is, for
that reason alone, technically defective. Second, any approach to striking the
balance that systematically excludes the consideration of the non-material
interests in play, for example, the "moral" interests of individual and social
justice, is, for that reason alone, technically defective. Unless one takes all of
the interests at stake into account-the collective as well as the individual and
the moral as well as the material-, one's conclusion regarding what's best for
all-the common good-will almost certainly end up skewed.
II. ExPosIioN OF LouSIA1NA's INTERTEMPORAL CONFLICTS LAW
A. Legislation
In Louisiana, as in other jurisdictions within the French civil law tradition,
the legislature has enacted legislation that is designed to resolve a broad range
of intertemporal conflicts of laws. Unlike those other jurisdictions, however,
Louisiana has not one, but two such pieces of legislation. One is Article 6 of the
Civil Code; the other, Title 1, Section 2 of the Revised Statutes.
The content of Article 6 can be boiled down to two seemingly straightfor-
ward rules. First, the legislature may accord to new pieces of legislation
whatsoever temporal effects it desires. That this is so the text of Article 6 itself
makes clear. According to that article, substantive laws apply prospectively "[fln
the absence of contrary legislative expression," and procedural and interpretative
laws apply both prospectively and retroactively "unless there is a legislative
expression to the contrary." Applying this first rule, then, is a matter of
discerning legislative intent.49 Second, if it's unclear just what temporal effects
49. One must be careful not to misunderstand the phrase "contrary legislative expression," as
it's used in Article 6. Relying on the usual denotation of the term "expression:' one might be
tempted to assume that deviations from the "usual rules" of Article 6 (substantive statutes apply
prospectively only, whereas procedural and interpretative statutes apply both prospectively and
retroactively) are permitted only where the legislature "expressly" calls for it, for example, where the
legislature includes in the new legislation a clause such as this: "This legislation shall be applied
retroactively." It would be a mistake, however, to yield to this temptation.
Deviations from the usual rules are in order not only where the legislature "in express terms,
declared such to be their intention," but also where the legislature "used words which give
unavoidable implication to such intention." That was the conclusion of the doctrine and the
jurisprudence that had grown up around the predecessor to Article 6-Article 8 of the Civil Code of
1870. Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 40, at 70 (quoting State ex rel. Howard Kenyon Dredging Co.
v. Miller Cravity Drainage Dist. No. 3, 193 La. 915, 926, 192 So. 529, 533 (1940)). And there's
no indication in Article 6 that the legislature, by substituting that article for old Article 8, intended
to reject that conclusion. Indeed, the comments to the articles indicate that, if anything, the
legislature acknowledged that that conclusion was sound. See La. Civ. Code art. 6 cmt. (b) ("a
substantive law applies prospectively only, unless it expressly or impliedly provides that it shall be
applied both prospectively and retroactively") & cmt. (d) ("the new law may, in principle, apply
retroactively even in the absence of express language to that effect'). Since the enactment of Article
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the legislature intended to accord to a new piece of legislation, then those
effects are determined as follows: if the legislation is "substantive," then
it applies prospectively only; if the legislation is "'procedural" or "interpre-
tative, " then it applies both prospectively and retroactively.5" Applying
6, the jurisprudence, not surprisingly, has stayed the course. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 815 (La. 1992) (noting that a lower court had relied on certain facts
"to imply a legislative intent of retroactive application"); Utley-James of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana
Dep't of Facility Planning & Control, 593 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (finding that
statute "does not expressly provide for retroactive application and its wording does not imply
retroactive intene'); Winstead v. Ed's Live Catfish & Seafood, 554 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1989) ("the principle ofnon-retroactivity of existing legislation admits three exceptions:. . . laws
that the legislature has expressly or impliedly declared to be retroactive"); Industrial Risk Insurers
v. NOPSI, 735 F. Supp. 200, 202 (E.D. La. 1990) (a statute may be applied retroactively... where
the laws are expressly or impliedly intended by the legislature to be applied retroactively").
Though the gap between the common connotation of the phrase "contrary legislative expression"
and the meaning of that phrase as it's used in Article 6 has, in practice, caused little (if any)
confusion thus far, one would hope that the legislature, when it next revises the article, will close the
gap, that is, will replace that phrase with one whose common denotation coincides more precisely
with its real meaning. "A legal terminology [for a civil code] must be, above all, precise and exact."
Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 La. L. Rev. 1088 (1988).
See also Alexandre C. Angelesco, La Technique Iegislative en Mati~re de Codification Civil §§ 212-
213, at 497-500 (1930) (the language of a civil code must be marked by "la clarti et ... la
pricision," in opposition to "rincertitude"); Frangois G3ny, La Technique Ugislative dans la
Codification Civile Moderne, in 2 Le Code Civil: Livre du Centenaire 987, 996 (1904), reprinted
& translated as The Legislative Technic of Modern Civil Codes, in Science of Legal Method 498,
507 (Joseph H. Drake et al. eds. & Ernest Bruncken trans., 1969) [hereinafter Giny, Technique]
("Everyone will agree without difficulty in recognizing that a 'good law' or a 'good code' must,
above all, present the qualities required of every literary work that is addressed to the intelligence
and the will rather than to the imagination or the emotions: unity, order, precision, and clarity.").
To cast legislation in terms that "no longer convey the intended meaning of the legislated law...
is a sloppy way to write a civil code." Robert Anthony Pascal, Of The Civil Code and Us, 59 La.
L. Rev. 3067 (1998) (26th John H. Tucker, Jr., Lecture in Civil Law, March 19, 1998). See also
Edmond Sal6 de la Mamierre, Elements de M6thodologie Juridique § 16, at 38 (1976) (legislation
"ought to be sufficient in itself' to convey its meaning; requiring the interpreter to consult other
authorities to determine its meaning produces "inconveniences" that present "a certain danger for the
security of juridical commerce"); Jeremy Bentham, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in
3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 267 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (from Chapter 33, entitled "Of the
Style of the Laws") ("The desirable object of the laws in regard to style is, that it may be such that
at every moment in which they ought to influence the conduct of a citizen, he may have presented
to his mind an exact idea of the will of the legislator .... This idea will not have been correctly
placed in the mind- .. . 2. When they [the words] present only part of the idea intended to be
conveyed; 3. When instead of this idea they present another altogether different [idea];....').
50. The immediate source of this rule seems to have been the Louisiana jurisprudence, in
particular, Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521,523 (La. 1979), and Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La. 1978). In those cases, the supreme court, drawing upon what it
called "civilian tradition:" concluded that then Article 8 of the Civil Code-the text of which forbade
retroactivity without exception-should nevertheless be interpreted so as to allow for a number of
exceptions, in particular, exceptions for "interpretative" and "procedural" laws.
This interpretation is questionable. To see why, one need only conduct a bit of legal
archaeology.
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the second rule requires a judgment regarding not legislative intent, but
statutory classification.
The content of Title 1, Section 2 can likewise be reduced to two proposi-
tions. First, the legislature may accord to new Revised Statutes whatsoever
temporal effects it desires. That is the point of the proviso in Section 2 that new
revised statutes can't be retroactively applied "unless it is expressly so stated."
Thus, under the first rule of Section 2, as under that of Article 6, legislative will
is determinative, provided it is evident."' Second, if it's less than entirely clear
Article 8 of the Civil Code of 1870 was derived from Article 8 of the Civil Code of 1825. Nothing
in the text of the new article indicates that the legislature of 1870 intended to change the law (the new
article is a verbatim copy of the old). The same is true of the new article's legislative history. That
this is so is hardly surprising, given the purposes of the revision of 1870. As Judge Wisdom once
observed,
[t]he limited purpose of the 1870 revision was to delete the articles relating to slavery and
to integrate the codal amendments since 1825. Adoption of the 1870 Code therefore did
not, either in itself or in terms, indicate any intention to change the unamended articles
of the Code of 1825.
Shelp v. National Surety Corp., 333 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1964). See also A.N. Yiannopoulos,
The Civil Codes of Louisiana, In Louisiana Civil Code XXV, XXXIV (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed.,
1999); James J. Morrison, The Needfor a Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 11 Tul. L Rev. 213,
228 (1937); John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 Tul. L Rev. 280, 295 (1932).
Among those "unamended articles" was Article 8.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of 1825 was, in turn, derived from Article 7 of the Digest of 1808.
Though nothing in the text of the new article indicates that the legislature of 1825 intended to change
the law (the new article is a verbatim copy of the old), the new article's legislative history does. In
the Digest of 1808 Article 7 was followed by an Article 8, which read as follows:
Nevertheless a law explanatory or declaratory of a former law may regulate the past,
without prejudice, however, to final judgments, to transactions and to awards or
arbitrations which have acquired the force of final judgments.
Reflected in this article (itself a verbatim copy of Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Projet du
Governement of the French Civil Code) was the traditional civil law principle that "interpretative
laws" are exempt from the general ban against retroactivity. This article, unlike Article 7, was
suppressed on the express recommendation of the redactors. Their rationale for suppressing the
article, which was before the legislature when it enacted the new code, was this: "No law ought to
regulate the past, not even explanatory or declaratory laws." Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana
of 1825, in I Louisiana Legal Archives 2 (1937). If one makes the reasonable assumption that the
legislature concurred in the redactors' judgment on this point (why else would the legislature have
agreed to suppress the article?), then the purpose behind the suppression of Article 7 is clear: the
legislature wanted to eliminate the theretofore existing exceptions to the ban on retroactivity. See
generally Symeon C. Symeonides, An Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Law System 467 (6th ed.
1991).
Looking at this evidence, one can come to one and only one possible conclusion: Article 8 of the
Civil Code of 1870 imposed an absolute ban on retroactivity. That is so because (i) the legislature
of 1825 intended to eliminate the traditional civil law exceptions to the ban on retroactivity that were
still recognized in the Digest of 1808 and (ii) the legislature of 1870 did not intend to change the law
on this point.
51. Whether Section 2 (in contrast to Article 6) means what it says, that is, whether it requires
an "express" dispensation from the usual rule (i.e., no retroactivity), is unclear. The texts of the two
pieces of legislation are certainly different- whereas Article 6 requires that the dispensation be
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that the legislature intended to accord retroactive effect to a new revised statute,
then that statute cannot be retroactively applied. Thus, the second rule of
Section 2, unlike its Article 6 counterpart, imposes a blanket prohibition against
retroactivity in cases in which the legislature has not expressed its intent, a
prohibition that admits of no exceptions.
Though the two rules in each of these pieces of legislation appear to have
quite different functions-one applies when the legislature expresses its intent,
the other when it does not-, they are, in fact, fundamentally related. Both of
the rules, not just the first, are connected with legislative "intent," though in
rather different ways. How the first rule is connected with legislative intent is
so obvious that it requires no comment. Though the connection between the
second rule-a default rule-and legislative intent is not so obvious, it is
nevertheless certain. The connection is signaled by several of the comments to
Article 6, which describe each of the elements of the default rule-that which
concerns "substantive laws" as well as that which concerns "procedural" and
"interpretative" laws-as a "well-settled rule of interpretation."'  This
understanding of the default rule is firmly rooted in civil law doctrine, particular
that of France:
[T]he principle of non-retroactivity.., is placed at the head of the
dispositions of the Code Civil in order to indicate to its interpreters
what should be the field of application of the laws ....
[I]t is principally to the judge, as interpreter, that [A]rticle 2 of the
Code Civil [the French default rule] is applied. That article is placed
under a rubric which furnishes some general indications for the solution
of judicial litigation .. : the judge must always interpret the law in
the sense of an exclusion of any effect on the past. 3
evidenced by a "clear legislative expression," Section 2 requires that the dispensation be "expressly
so provided." The courts, however, have not drawn any distinction between the two. See. eg.,
LIGA v. Guglielmo, 276 So. 2d 720, 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). It is possible, then, that an
"unavoidable implication" of legislative intent is good enough for Section 2, just as it's good enough
for Article 6.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 6 cmt. (b) (the default rule for substantive laws) & cm. (c) (the default
rule for procedural and interpretative laws). See also State ex rel. Howard Kenyon Dredging Co. v.
Miller Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 3, 193 La. 915, 926, 192 So. 529, 533 (1940) (describing Article
8 of the Civil Code of 1870 as a "sound rule of construction"); Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 40,
69 (noting that the question to which Article 8 of the Civil Code of 1870 is addressed--"whether a
certain law.., should be applied to pre-existing facts and relations"-is "a matter of statutory
interpretation").
53. Level, supra note I, § 73, at 133 & § 68, at 120. Other pertinent French law authorities
include Bach, Conflits 1, supra note 1, at 11 ("the rule of non-retroactivity of laws is an interpretative
rule"); Bach, Conflits 11, supra note I, § 16, at 144-3 ("the rule of non-retroactivity is a rule of
interpretation"); I Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 51, at 52 ("Tjhe prohibition pronounced by
article 2 is addressed only to judges: it does not bind the legislator; it aims at only the interpretation
of the laws, not their confection."); Weill & Terrd, supra note 2, § 166, at 171 ('T]he prohibition
of article 2 is addressed to the judges: it aims at the interpretation of the laws. When a judge must
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Now, if one recognizes that the aim of interpretation is to uncover the "intent"
of the legislature, then these descriptions of the default rule as a "rule of
interpretation" can mean one, and only one, thing: the rule is based on what, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must "presume" is the legislature's
intent. To put it another way, the default rule is supposed to reflect what a
reasonable legislator would, as a general rule, "intend" with respect to the
temporal scope of new legislation.
These two pieces of legislation, it is fair to say, raise as many questions as
they answer. It is not at all clear how the quite different default rules of Article
6 and Section 2 are to be reconciled or harmonized with each other. Nor is it
clear precisely what the concepts in terms of which Article 6 and Section 2 are
cast mean. Neither statute, for example, bothers to define the critically important
term "retroactive." And Article 6 provides no clue to the meaning of the terms
"substantive," "procedural," and "interpretative."
B. Interpretation5 '
1. Legislative Antinomy
The courts have addressed and, in the opinion of most observers, have
resolved the first of the questions that the legislation leaves unanswered,
fix the domain of application of a new law, article 2 forbids him to give to this law a retroactive
effect."); Count Vareilles-Sommieres, Une ThDorle Nouvelle sur la Ritroactiviti des Lois, 22 Revue
Critique de Lgislation et de Jurisprudence § 54, at 492 (1893) ("Article 2 of the Code Civil means
that, every time that it's not certain that the law ought to be retroactive, one ought to keep oneself
from rendering it so. It is a commandment that is addressed to the judges, to all those who are
charged with executing the laws as well as to all those who interpret them.'). ee also I Barbero,
supra note 31, § 41, at 97 ("It is in these cases [those for which the legislature fails to set up
transitory dispositions] that the interpreter avails himself of the principle of 'non-retroactivity."')
(Italy); I Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 172, at 189 (referring to the rales of Civil Code article 3
as "interpretative rules') (Argentina).
54. Those readers who have been trained in the civilian tradition may well be somewhat
surprised at the content of this section of the paper, which is devoted exclusively to an examination
of the pertinent jurisprudence. In particular, they may find it strange that a section entitled
"Interpretation" says not word one about the doctrinal (as opposed to the jurisprudential)
interpretation of the controlling legislation. In most, if not all, civil law systems, law students are
taught that doctrine stands alongside jurisprudence as an "indirect," "secondary," "subsidiary,' or
"persuasive" source of law, see La. Civ. Code art. I cmt. (b); I Barbero, supra note 31, §§ 27 & 28,
at 80; 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note i, §§ 64-66, at 80-83, & §§ 81-82, at 101-03; Ghestin &
Goubeaux, supra note 1, §§ 226-227, at 192-95; 1 Malaurie & Aynts, supra note 1, §§ 835-837, at
259-60; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 111, at 197-99, § 119, at 215-18, & § 127, at 236-37;
I Mazeaud etal., supra note I, § 63, at 117; Starck, supra note 1, § 115, at49, & §§ 119-26, at5l-
54; Alberto Trabucchi, Istituzioni di Diritto Civile n* 10, at 21-23 (32d ed. 1991); Wald, supra note
1. §§ 22-23, at 62-65; Weill & Terrd, supra note 2, § 119, at 121-22; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19,
§ 35, at 52-53, & § 36, at 57-58, and, further, that the world of "interpretation" comprises two hemi-
spheres-jurisprudential and doctrinal, see I Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, §§ 190-191, at 205-07;
Jean Carbonnier, Droit Civil: Introduction § 24, at 60-61, & at 277 (20th ed. 1991); 1 Chevallier
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&Bach, supra note 2, at 28-31; 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 32, at 33-35, &§ 36, at 38-41;
I Josserand, supra note 18, § 86, at 64-65, & §§ 89-90, at 69-71; Garcia, supra note 1, § 170, at
329-30; 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, §§ 93-94, at 149-51; 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1,
§ 145, at 64. To the civilian mind, then, a resunr6 of "interpretation" that covers the jurisprudence
but ignores the doctrine is like a football game that ends at halftime.
Here, however, it is appropriate to restrict the discussion of "interpretation" to the jurisprudential
interpretation alone. The reason is two-fold.
First, there's not much "doctrinal interpretation" to speak of. There's no treatise on the subject.
No monograph and, what's even more surprising, nota single periodical article has ever been devoted
to it. That's not.to say that there's no doctrinal writing on the subject at all. A few authors have
written periodical articles on the "retroactivity" of this or that new piece of substantive legislation,
see, e.g., Winston R. Day, Applicability of the New Mineral Code to Existing Mineral Rights, 22d
Annual Institute on Mineral Law: Louisiana State University Law School Institute of Continuing
Legal Education 205 (Thomas A. Harrell ed., 1975); Lee Hargrave, Constitutional Law, Develop-
ments in the Law, 1980-81, 42 La. L Rev. 596, 601-02 (1982); Cynthia Samuel, The Retroactivity
Provisions of Louisiana's Equal Management Law: Interpretation and Constitutionality, 39 La. L.
Rev. 347 (1979); Charles Joseph Duht, Jr., Comment, Retroactive Application of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act: A Civilian Analysis, 49 La. L. Rev. 939 (1989); others, in the course of
reviewing this or that new piece of legislation in treatises or articles, have commented on the
"retroactivity" problems that implementation of that legislation would raise, see, e-g., A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Property § 10, at 17-22, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991); William
Crawford, Developments in the Law. 1987-1988-Torts, 49 La. L. Rev. 543, 543-44 (1988); Thomas
Galligan, The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of it All, 49 La. L. Rev. 629, 630-38
(1989); John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49 La. L. Rev. 565, 587-
88,607-10 (1989); H. Alston Johnson, Developments in the Law 1983-1984--Legislation-Procedure
and Interpretation, 45 La. L Rev. 341,343-44 (1984); Katherine Shaw Spabt etal., TheNewForced
Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution," 50 La. L. Rev. 409, 474-75, 480, 483, 492-99
(1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revisions of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step Forward, 48 La.
L. Rev. 1131, 1153 (1988); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Developments In the Law 1984-1985-Persons,
46 La. L. Rev. 613, 621-25 (1986); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1982-Persons,
43 La. L. Rev. 535, 538-39 (1982); Symeon Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1984-
1985-Property, 46 La. L. Rev. 655, 691-93 (1986); Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes
to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69, 80 n.30; 108 n.71;
118 n.78 (1983); Leslie L Inman, Note, Insurance-Direct Action Against Insurer-Louisiana Acts
541, 542 of1950, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 290 (1951); and several ofthe textbooks used in introductory civil
law courses in law schools around the state include briefsections on "retroactivity," Alain Levasseur,
An Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Law System 418-54 (1996); J.-R. Trahan, A Supplement to
Symeon Symeonides' An Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Law System 60-84 (2d ed. 1997);
Symeonides, supra note 50, 465-88; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 40, at 67-70. But in most of
this writing, the subject ofretroactivity itself-what it is and when it's permissible-is treated only
in passing and then, more often than not, in a cursory fashion. Not surprisingly, then, most of this
writing fails even to identify, much less to propose solutions to, the questions that Louisiana's
intertemporal law legislation leaves unanswered. The only notable exceptions are (i) Professor
Yiannopoulos' monograph Louisiana Civil Law System, see supra note 19, in which the author
briefly summarizes (without endorsing) the so-called "acquired rights" theory, which, until recent
years, had held sway in all other civil law jurisdictions and systems, and (ii) a thesis written by
Michael E. Coney, then a candidate for a Master of Civil Laws degree at the LSU Law Center,
entitled Temporal Conflicts of Law: A Theory of Retroactivity, see supra note 1, in which the author
attempts to rework Louisiana's intertemporal conflicts law along the lines proposed by Paul Roubier,
the acknowledged "father" of modem civilian intertemporal conflicts law doctrine.
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namely, the apparent antinomy between the default rules of Article 6 and Section
2. According to the courts, the "conflict" between Article 6 and Section 2 is
"apparent, not real." 5 That is so, the courts have reasoned, because the scope
of Section 2, properly "interpreted," is limited to "substantive" legislation. 6 So
understood, Section 2 says nothing about the temporal effects of procedural or
interpretative legislation; rather, it merely restates the rule of Article 6 with
respect to the temporal effects of substantive legislation." For the courts, then,
the legislature's apparently bivocal response to our first question is, on closer
examination, a univocal response-that given in Article 6.
2. Absence of Definitions
a. Retroactivity
Prior to the 1950s, no Louisiana court had ever ventured to offer a definition
of retroactivity or a statement of the criteria for distinguishing retroactive from
nonretroactive applications. In most cases that involved intertemporal problems,
there was no need for it: the parties agreedthat the new statute, if applied to their
case, would operate retroactively. But even in those few cases in which there was
a need for it, that is, where the parties disputed whether the proposed application
of the statute in question was retroactive, the courts failed to meet the need.
Typical of these cases is State v. Alden Mills.5" Responding to the appellant's
Second, the few (that is, the two) doctrinal works that have explored the fundamentals of
intertemporal conflicts law have (regrettably) had little, if any, practical impact to date. Though the
jurisprudence has cited and, in some instances, even incorporated certain minor elements of Professor
Yiannopoulos' work on the temporal effects of laws, see, eg., Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 724
(La. 1994) (citing Yiannopoulos' explication of interpretative laws), ithas altogether ignored the most
important elements of that work, in particular, his explication of the meaning of and criterion for
retroactivity. The fate of Mr. Coney's work has been even more unfortunate. Until now, at least,
knowledge of its existence has been limited to a handful of professors at the LSU Law School.
Because my objective in this paper is to evaluate the intertemporal conflicts law that's now in force
in fact, that is, what a comparativist might call the "law in practice" in contradistinction to the "law
on the books,' an examination of these doctrinal works would be out of place here.
55. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809,816 (La. 1992); see also Manuel
v. Louisiana Sheriff's Risk Management Fund, 664 So. 2d 81, 85-86 (La. 1995).
56. Manuel, 664 So. 2d at 86; Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 721 n.16 (La. 1994); see also
Smith, 609 So. 2d at 816.
The stated rationale for this interpretation of Section 2 is fealty to civilian tradition. According
to the courts, a literal reading of Section 2 would be "inconsistent with the civilian principles
consistently adhered to in our jurisprudence." Smith, 609 So. 2d at 816 n.12.
57. See Keith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 694 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1997) ('[The
jurisprudence has generally construed the two provisions [Article 6 and Section 2] as being co-
extensive"); Smith, 609 So. 2d at 816 (same); see also Segura, 630 So. 2d at 721 n.16 ("[Tihe
general rule of prospective application applies only to substantive laws as distinguished from merely
procedural or remedial laws, which will be given retroactive effect in the absence of language
showing a contrary intention").
58. 202 La. 416, 12 So. 2d 204 (1943).
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contention that the lower court's judgment rested on a prohibited "retroactive
application" of a new statute, the court, instead of laying down a definition of
retroactivity, simply repeated the old nostrum, derived from American law
sources, that "a proposed application of a statute is not retroactive merely because
it would draw upon antecedent facts for its operation."59 Having done that, the
court proceeded to rule in favor of the appellant on other grounds,"° thereby
mooting the questionwhether the statute, as applied, indeed operatedretroactively.
In the late 1950s, however, a few of the state's appellate courts, including
the supreme court itself, finally made some effort to fill the gap.6' The most
important in the short line of cases that came of this effort was Henry v. Jean.62
Because of its significance, the case merits a fairly detailed discussion.
The facts were as follows. Back around the turn of the century, a certain
couple had several children out of wedlock. At the time, the methods whereby
such illegitimate children63 might be legitimated were limited: legitimation by
unilateral notarial act' and legitimation by subsequent marriage of the natural
parents plus a formal acknowledgement of the child by both parents in either a
pre-nuptial notarial act or in the act of marriage itself.65 Neither the man nor
the woman ever executed such a unilateral notarial act and, though they
eventually married and even informally acknowledged their illegitimate children
as their own, they made no such formal acknowledgement. In the course of time
the now married couple produced still another child, this one, of course,
legitimate. Still later, after the man's death, the legislature altered the law of
legitimation, establishing yet another method whereby it could be accomplished,
namely, by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents plus informal
acknowledgement of the child.66 When the woman later died, a dispute arose
between the older children, on the one hand, and youngest child, on the other,
regarding whether the former were entitled to share in the woman's succession.
59. 12 So. 2d at 206 (quoting Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S. Ct. 154, 157 (1922)).
60. Id. at 206-11.
61. See Henry v. Jean, 238 La. 314, 115 So. 2d 363, 367 (1959); Stokes v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 232 So. 2d 328, 332 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Henry v. Jean, 112 So. 2d 171, 174 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 238 La. 314, 115 So. 2d 363, 367 (1959); Brown v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 108
So. 2d 812, 815 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
62. 238 La. 314, 115 So. 2d 363, 367 (1959).
63. See La. Civ. Code art. 180 (1870) ("Illegitimate children are those who are born out of
marriage.").
64. Id. art. 200 ("A natural father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her
natural children by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, declaring that it is the intention
of the parent making the declaration to legitimate such child or children .. ").
65. Id. art. 198 ('Children born out of marriage... may be legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them for their
children, either before their marriage by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or by their
contract of marriage itself.").
66. Id. art. 198 (as amended by 1944 La. Acts No. 50) ("Children born out of marriage ...
are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have
formally or informally acknowledged them for their children, either before or after the marriage.").
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Though the disputants agreed that the older children could succeed only if they
could be classified as legitimate, the disputants disagreed regarding whether the
older children should be so classified. The youngest child, relying on the law
of legitimation as it stood when the older children were born, contended that
those children were illegitimate. The older children, relying on the law of
legitimation as it stood at the time of the woman's death, contended that they
were legitimate (by virtue of their parents having married after their births and
having informally acknowledgedthem). To rebut the older children's contention,
the youngest child argued that to apply the new law of legitimation to their
dispute would be to apply it retroactively, in particular, would attach to acts that
had occurred prior to the effective date of the new law-the marriage and
informal acknowledgement-a juridical effect that those acts did not have under
the law in force at the time-the legitimation of children born prior to the
marriage. The district court ruled for the older children.
The court of appeal affirmed that judgment. It did so, the judges explained,
because "we do not believe that the judgment... could be considered as giving
retroactive effect to the statute."'67 In support of its conclusion, the court
offered up the following definition of retroactivity, one drawn from a recent
decision of another Louisiana court of appeal:
68
A retrospective or retroactive law is defined as one which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability with
respect to transactions or considerations already passed.69
Applying the new law of legitimation to this case, the court went on to explain,
did not have that effect:
Now, no vested rights were had by any of the heirs to the succession of
[the woman] until the time of her death during the year 1949.... Prior
to the death of Coralie Lewis, none of the children had any vested
rights in her succession .... No vested rights were taken away from
the legitimate child..., as he had no vested rights until the death of his
mother.7°
The supreme court, in turn, affirmed the court of appeal's judgment. It did
so because, in its estimation, the new law, as applied to that case, "was not
retroactive or retrospective.' The court's rationale largely replayed that of the
court of appeal. First, the court noted that
67. 112 So. 2d at 174.
68. Brown v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 108 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
69. Henry, 112 So. 2d at 174 (quoting Brown, 108 So. 2d at 815).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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if the statute under consideration undertook to take away or impair
vested rights acquired under existing laws, created a new obligation or
imposed a new duty or disability with respect to transactions or
considerations already passed, it would have to be classified as
retrospective or retroactive in its operation.72
Second, the court insisted that the new statute, as applied to this case, did not
meet this criterion:
[T]he legitimations resulting from the enactment of the statute have not
accorded to the persons legitimated any rights in the succession of
persons who died before the passage of the Act, their right of inheri-
tance being governed by their legal status at the instant of death, at
which time the right of inheritance vests.
Moreover, the law did not take away or impair any vested rights in
other persons. Nor did it do any other thing which would make it
retroactive or retrospective. Defendant [the youngest child] had no
vested rights in the succession of his mother until she died in 1949 and
hence, legitimation of his brothers and sisters by Act 50 of 1944 could
take nothing from him.7'
With these decisions, the courts, it would seem, finally supplied
Louisiana's intertemporal conflicts law with what it had long lacked: a
definition of or a criterion for retroactivity. This definition or criterion,
which seems to be indistinguishable from that associated with what
civilians know as the "theory of acquired rights,"' can be boiled down
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id.
.74. This theory, it's fair to say, dominated civilian intertemporal conflicts law until the early
part of this century. The leading works on the theory include 10 Philippe Antoine Merlin, Ripertoire
Universel et Raisonn6 de Jurisprudence 1- 90 (5th ed. 1826) (entry for "effet ritroactif') and 8
Friedrich Carl de Savigny, Trait6 de Droit Romain §§ 383-400, at 363-528 (Charles Guenoux trans.
1851). See also 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, §§ 340-42, at 252-55; 1 Augusto, supra
note 1, § 166, at 155-56; Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, §§ 34-36, at 5; Bach, Contribution, supr
anote 1, § 4, at 408-10; 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at 97-98; I Bianca, supra note 1, §§ 84-85,
at 119-20 (1982); Bonnecase, supra note 18, §§ 91-119, at 107-38; Carbonnier, supra note 54, § 131,
at 226-27; 1 Chevallier & Bach, supra note 2, § 4, at 22-23; 1 Luis Claw Solar, Explicaciones de
Derecho Civil Chileno y Comparado §§ 114-15, at 64-65 (2d ed. 1978); Bonneau, supra note 1, §§
13-93, at 19-80; Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, §§ 139-41, at 156-59; Borda, Portie, supra note 1,
§§ 1-2, at 75-77; Coney, supra note 1, at 12-15; C6t6 & Jutras, supra note 1, §§ 11-62, at 940-57;
Pierre-Andr6 CtI, La Crise du Droil Transitoire Canadien, in Mdlanges Louis-Philippe Pigeon 177,
181-82 (1989); Comu, supra note 1, §§ 369-72, at 125-26; Do Cupis, supra note 18, § 8, at 16;
Dekeuwer-DWfossez, supra note 1, §§ 10, at 8-11; do Pina & de Pina, supra note 18, at 315; 1 de
Pina, supra note 18, at 111; 1 Gonzalo Figueroa Y., Curso de Derecho Civil § 67, at 179-80 (1975);
Galindo, supra note 1, § 74-75, at 166-69; Garcia, supra note 1, § 199-201, at 390-92; Ghestin &
Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at 295-96; Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, §§ 355-56, at 240-41; 1
Josserand, supra note 18, § 78, at58-59; Level, supra note 1, §§ 35-47, at 57-85; Malaurie & Ayn~s,
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to two propositions: if the statute, as applied, would have the effect of
depriving someone of a vested right, then the proposed application is retroactive;
if the statute, as applied, would not have that effect, then the proposed
application is prospective."
The Henry court, it's to be regretted, did not bother to define the term
"vested right." Even so, the definition is not in doubt. In a number of other
decisions, the courts have defined "vested right" and its antonym, "mere
expectancy," in the following terms.'6 "A right is vested when 'the right to
enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular
supra note 1, §§ 638-41, at 206-08; 1 Jorge Mario Magall6n Ibarra, Instituciones de Derecho Civil:
Introduction 135-38 (1987); 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 185-86; 1 Mazeaud et al.,
supra note 1, § 140, at 214-15; 1 Francesco Messineo, Manual de Derecho Civil & Comercial:
Introduction § 5, at 90-91 (Santiago Sends Melendo trans., 1979); 1 Pescio, supra note 1, § 105, at
336-41; 1 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 2, §§ 214-42, at 100-01; Rescigno, supra note 1, § 2, at 222;
i Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, §§ 235-38, at 111-13; 1 Rojina, Compendio, supra note 1, §§
2-4, at 42-45; 1 Rojina, Derecho, supra note 1, at 270-76; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, §§ 22-
27, at 89-124; Tavernier, supra note 1, at 233-53; Trabucchi, supra note 54, § 11, at 25-26 n.1; 1
Valencia, supra note 18, § 86, at 187-80; Vareilles-Sommires, supra note 53, §§ 19-53, at 451-68;
Wald, supra note 1, §§ 46-47, at 119-34; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 40, at 68; Codigo Civil,
supra note 20, art. 3, nn.47-51, at 149-51 (1989); Diccionario, supra note 18, at 1824, 1826-27.
That the Henry courts ended up embracing this theory is amusing, at least for those who delight
in historical irony. Let me explain. From the standpoint of a civilian, the Henry decisions are at
once both "decadent' and "retrograde": decadent, in the sense that the courts which rendered them
looked to common law, rather than civil law, sources to guide them in their interpretation of a rule
of civil law origin (then Civil Code article 8), and retrograde, in the sense that the courts made this
"mistake" after they had supposedly made their "turn" back to the civil law, after, that is, the so-
called "civil law renaissance." And yet, despite their regressive decadence, the courts ended up with
a theory identical to what was then and, for a century and a half prior thereto, had been the dominant
civil law theory of retroactivity.
75. The Henry court's definition of or criterion for retroactivity will sound familiar as well to
students of American constitutional law, in particular, the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th
amendments to the United States Constitution. The approach that the federal courts have traditionally
employed to determine whether a proposed retroactive application of a new statute violates "due
process" requirements goes by the same name, that is, "vested rights." It may be tempting, then, to
assume that the two theories-that used by the Henry court and that which is associated with the due
process clauses-are the same.
That assumption, however, is at best only half true. Insofar as the content of the two theories is
concerned (e.g., the abstract definition of "vested right' and the catalogue of rights'that qualify as
"vested'"), they are, in fact, largely indistinguishable. But insofar as theirfunction is concerned, they
are quite different. The function of the "civil law" vested rights theory is to enable one to determine
whether a proposed application is "retroactive" in the first place. The function of the "due process"
vested rights theory, by contrast, is to enable one to determine whether a proposed application of a
statute, which one has already determined (on some other basis) would be a "retroactive" application,
is permissible. Thus, whereas the former theory serves to distinguish retroactivity from non-
retroactivity, the latter serves to distinguish permissible retroactivity from impermissible retroactivity.
76. This definition, it should be noted, has been developed in the context of constitutional,
rather than statutory, retroactivity analysis. It seems fair to assume, however, that the term has the
same meaning in both contexts. See Coney, supra note I, at 12.
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person or persons as a present interest."'" This definition can be analyzed into
two parts. First, a vested right is aproperty right or, as civil law scholars prefer
to put it, a patrimonial right.7" According to the classical notion of patrimony,
a patrimonial right is one that is "susceptible of pecuniary evaluation"79 or, to
put it another way, to which a dollar value can readily be attached."0
Second, a vested right is a present right. That means that a right cannot
77. Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidel Control, 445 So. 2d 1221, 1224 n.9 (La. 1984)
(quoting Tennantv. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 1052,39 So. 2d 726,728 (1949)); DOTD v. McClendon,
552 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
78. Regarding the interchangability of the expressions "property right" and "patrimonial right"
in the Louisiana jurisprudence, see Malek v. Yekant-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (La. 1982) ("'All
rights that are susceptible of pecuniary evaluation are property in the sense that they are guaranteed
by the legal order and form a part of a person's patrimony.") (quoting A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property,
in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1980)).
79. Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 74, at 128.
80. Carbonnier, supra note 54, § 166, at 302 ("He who says patrimonial says pecuniary....
lit is appropriate to include among the patrimonial rights only the rights susceptible of a pecuniary
evaluation. Those that, by their nature, are repugnant to being appreciated in money remain outside
of it. These are the extra-patrimonial rights .... ); 1 Chevallier & Bach, supra note 2, at 40-41 ("It
results from the classic analysis of patrimony that it can include only those things and rights that are
appreciable in money and that, since they can be ceded or transmitted, can respond for debts. Now,
alongside these rights there are others that are not susceptible of pecuniary evaluation and that cannot
be ceded. The rights that remain outside the patrimony are called extra-patrimonial rights.") I Colin
& Capitant, supra note 18, § 122, at 106 ('The patrimonial rights ... constitute prerogatives that
end up, in the final analysis, procuring for their holders some satisfactions that are pecuniary or, at
the very least, appreciable in money."); Comu, supra note 1, § 40, at 27 ("One names 'patrimonial
rights' the right that carry, for their holders, an advantage that is appreciable in money. Patrimonial
rights have, principally, a pecuniary interest. They constitute economic values.... Whatever may
be their object. . ., patrimonial rights have, either directly or by evaluation, a monetary expression.
They represent a money-value. Every right of this type is worth so much: it is money."); Ghestin
& Goubeaux, supra note I, § 205, at 167 ("The criterion of distinction has then been found:
patrimonial rights are those that can be evaluated in money; the rights that rebel against this
conversion into money are outside of the patrimony."); I Josserand, supra note 18, § 648, at 374
("The patrimony is a notion of an essentially pecuniary kind; the rights that do not have pecuniary
signification remain outside the patrimony ... , extra-patrimonial rights that remain outside of
commerce and outside of juridical transactions."); I Malaurie & Aynts, supra note 1, at 69 ("All
riches that form the object of a private appropriation fall within the patrimony of a person: the
patrimony is the ensemble of rights and obligations that appertain to a person and have a pecuniary
value."); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 287, at 465 ("The patrimony is the ensemble of rights
and obligations of a person that have an economic and pecuniary value. Thus, the rights that have
a character that is not at least principally pecuniary do not form part of the patrimony..., the rights
that one unites under the qualification extra-patrimonial."); I Mazeaud et al., supra note I, § 289,
at 397 ("The patrimony comprises only rights of pecuniary value, to which, for this reason, one
reserves the qualification of patrimonial rights, by opposition to right not pecuniary .... so-called
extra-patrimonial rights."); Starck, supra note 1, § 333, at 137-38 ("One designates as 'the patrimony'
the ensemble of rights and obligations of a person (physical or artificial), rights and obligations that
have a pecuniary expression, an economic value, and that, in addition, find themselves in juridical
commerce."); Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 363, at 354 ("The patrimony is a notion of the
pecuniary order; the rights that have no pecuniary value remain outside the patrimony.. ., to which,
for that reason, one reserves the qualification extra-patrimonial.').
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be considered vested unless it is "absolute, complete and unconditional,
independent of a contingency..' If the interest in question is a "mere
expectancy of future benefit," then the interest "does not constitute a
vested right." 2
For better or for worse, whatever certainty Henry might have created
with respect to the meaning of "retroactivity" proved to be short-lived.
With the passage of time the courts allowed the waters surrounding that
notion to become muddied once more. It's not that the courts overtly
rejected Henry's definition of retroactivity; they did not. But they did
ignore it. Instead of Henry's definition of retroactivity, the courts, with
no objections from the doctrine, employed what can most charitably be
described as an "intuitive" approach to identifying retroactivity. s  This
intuitive approach reigned supreme for many years, so long, in fact, that
one might have been tempted to conclude that the Henry definition had
died the death of desuetude.U
81. Tennant, 214 La. at 1052, 39 So. 2d at 728; McClendon, 552 So. 2d at 1221.
82. See authorities collected supra note 81.
83. See, eg., Lirette v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 467 So. 2d 29, 33 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1985) (noting that "[a] statute is not retroactive merely because it is applied to the continuation of
a pre-existing contract' and then concluding, without further explanation, that the proposed
application was not retroactive); Drew v. Louisiana Dep't of Corrections, 374 So. 2d 129, 130 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979) (noting that "a statute does not operate retroactively merely because it relates to
antecedent events" and then resolving the intertemporal issue on another basis, thereby mooting the
question whether the proposed application was truly retroactive); Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Louisiana
Tax Comm'n, 338 So. 2d 963, 966 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
Guglielmo, 276 So. 2d 720, 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); see also Patrick's Cafe, Inc. v. Red River
Parish Police Jury, 315 So. 2d 27, 30 (La. 1975) (Summers, J., dissenting) (noting that "a statute is
not tendered retroactive in application merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its
operation" and then concluding, without further explanation, that the proposed application was not
retroactive); State v. Cleveland, 246 La. 668, 685, 166 So. 2d 267, 273 (1964) (McCaleb, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "a statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the facts or requisites
upon which its subsequent action depends are drawn from a time antecedent to its enactment' and
then concluding, with little additional analysis, that the proposed application was not retroactive).
By proceeding in this "intuitive" fashion, the Louisiana courts, at that juncture, were in good
company. It appears that their counterparts in France and Quebec were doing the same. See C6t
& Jutras, supra note 1, § 13, at 941 (noting that the "acquired rights" theory, which the Quebecois
courts applied for a number of years, entails "more intuition and impressionism that a
reasoned and methodical approach"); Level, supranote 1, § 44, at74 (suggesting that"the traditional
solutions" of the French jurisprudence have been "given intuitively and without doctrinal
justification").
84. To be sure, the Louisiana courts often mentioned "vested rights" in post-Henry
intertemporal conflicts cases. But in those cases the courts used the vested rights doctrine to resolve
a different issue and to perform a different function than did the Henry court. For the Henry court,
the vested rights doctrine forms part of the solution to what I've called the "civil law" retroactivity
issue, where it serves as a criterion for distinguishing retroactive from prospective applications of
legislation. In the post-Henry cases, the vested rights doctrine forms part of the solution to the
constitutional (due process) retroactivity issue, where it serves as a criterion for distinguishing
permissible from impermissible retroactive applications of legislation.
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But then came Segura v. Frank.s Back in 1970 the legislature created the
Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA),86 whose mission, in effect,
was to serve as the surety for insolvent member insurers with respect to their
unpaid claims. As originally, enacted, the statute included a provision-Section
1386(1)-that required unpaid claimants to "exhaust" their rights against "other
insurers," that is, insurers other than the insolvent insurer who, in addition to the
insolvent insurer, had issued policies that covered their claims, before pursuing
LIGA. s7 Interpreting the exhaustion requirement narrowly, the courts conclud-
ed, as early as 1980, that the requirement "was designed to apply to ordinary
insurance coverage and not to uninsured motorist [UM] coverage.""U Within
this legal milieu, Segura and Frank each took out an automobile insurance policy,
Segura from American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company and Frank
from Dixie Lloyds Insurance Company. Segura's policy included.a UM rider.
A short while later, on March 12, 1990, Frank's car struck Segura in a pedestrian
crosswalk, causing her to sustain personal injuries. That summer (1990) the
legislature amended Section 1386(1) so as to "require[ ] an injured claimant to
first exhaust his UM coverage before recovering against LIGA."89 Segura
evidently took no notice of the amendment. A few months later, on December
20, 1990 Dixie Lloyds, Frank's insurer, became insolvent and was liquidated.
And so, when plaintiff filed suit on March 4, 1991, Segura sued LIGA as Dixie
Lloyd's successor. LIGA met the suit with an exception of prematurity. Relying
on the amendedversion of Section 1386(1), LIGA contended that Segura had to
exhaust her rights against American under the UM rider of her policy before she
could make demand on LIGA. Segura opposed the exception, arguing that the
original version, not the amended version, of Section 1386(1) governed her rights
against LIGA. That was so, she argued, because to apply the amended version
of that statute to her case would be to apply it retroactively, a result that was
prohibited. Rebutting that argument, LIGA took the "position that the 1990
amendment would not operate retroactively in the present cases."90 LIGA's
reasoning should sound familiar: the proposed application was not retroactive
because Segura could not have had "a vested right in a cause of action against
LIGA until Dixie Lloyds was declared insolvent, which occurred after the
amendment's effective date."'" Unpersuaded by that argument, the supreme
court ruled for Segura. The trouble with LIGA's reasoning, the court explained,
was that it
85. 630 So. 2d 714 (La. 1994). Segura was consolidated with another, similar, cas--Rey v.
Guidry--for purposes of review. To avoid taxing my readers' patience, I've omitted any reference
to that other case.
86. La. RS. 22:1375-1394 (1995 and Supp. 1999).
87. Id. § 1386(1).
88. Hickerson v. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 377, 379 (La. 1980).
89. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 720.
90. Id. at 722.
91. Id. at 721.
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fail[ed] to take into account the amendment's effects on the existing
rights and obligations of the UM insurer[ ]. Those rights and obliga-
tions arose not on the date of insolvency, nor on the date[ ] of the
accident[ ], but on the dates the UM policies were issued.'*
Explaining itself further, the court noted how those "existing rights and
obligations" differed under the new and original versions of the statute:
[A]t the time[ ] the American... UM polic[y] w[as] issued, La. R.S.
22:1386 ... limited the UM insurers' liability under those policies to
claims in excess of a tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage even in the
event of the insolvency of the tortfeasor's insurer. If, however, the
1990 amendment... is applied, under those same policies the UM
insurers would be primarily liable for plaintiffs' claims against Dixie
Lloyds.93
For these reasons, the court concluded that the amendment "would operate
retroactively in these cases." 94
The Segura court's analysis, it's fair to say, bears all the hallmarks of a
vested-rights approach to the definition of retroactivity. To be sure the court did
not, as did the Henry court, offer up a formal definition of retroactivity in those
terms. But the court's analysis clearlypresupposes such a definition. Underlying
that analysis were the following assumptions: (i) whether a proposed application
of a new statute is retroactive or prospective depends on its effect on "existing
rights and obligations" and (ii) if it would alter those "rights and obligations,"
it is retroactive; if it would not, it is prospective.9" Those assumptions
correspond, as we have seen, to the basic postulates of the vested-rights
approach.
Though Segura certainly showed that the "vested rights" approach is not yet
dead, that decision should not be taken as a sign that the courts, at long last,
have embraced that approach whole-heartedly. To the contrary, at the same time
as and immediately after Segura was decided, the Louisiana courts, the supreme
court included, continued to use the "intuitive" approach of years past. The vast
majority these cases, like all of those that preceded Segura, can be characterized
as Delphic, in the sense that the courts simply asserted, without any explanation
whatsoever, that the proposed application was or was not retroactive. At least
one of those cases, however, was different. In it the supreme court, for the first
92. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 723.
94. Id.
95. Perhaps the clearest indication that this understanding underlay the Segura analysis appears
in the court's statement of LIGA's argument. As the court states it, that argument rests on an
identification between retroactive effect and the deprivation of "vested rights!' See supra text
accompanying notes 66 and 67.
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time ever, left behind a few clues from which one can reconstruct, to at
least some extent, the principles that sometimes drive the intuitive approach.
That case is Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff's Risk Management Fund.6 A
consortium of insurers issued a liability insurance policy to a sheriff's depart-
ment. During the policy period, a sheriff's deputy, while on duty, drove his car
into Manuel's car, causing Manuel to sustain personal injuries. Manuel then filed
suit against the sheriff's department and its insurers. Up until this point in time,
Louisiana law had imposed no duty upon insurers to settle third-party claims,
such as Manuel's, in good faith and, in particular, had not required that insurers
make or pay such settlements within any particular period of time. But while the
suit was pending, the legislature changed the law, imposing a general "good
faith" duty to settle third-party claims on insurers and, in particular, requiring
that an insurer, to discharge this duty, must (among other things) pay such a
settlement within 30 days of the date on which it is reduced to writing.
Sometime later, the insurers and Manuel reached a settlement agreement, which
was promptly reduced to writing. Due to footdragging by some (though not all)
of the insurers, Manuel did not receive his check by the 30-day deadline.
Manuel then sued the insurers, seeking to recover statutory penalties for their
breach of the new law. In their defense, the insurers made a predictable protest:
the new law was inapplicable to them because (i) to apply the new law to them
would be to apply it retroactively, inasmuch as the event that gave rise
to Manuel's claim and, with it, the insurers' duty to settle, arose before
the new law took effect and (ii) the new law was substantive. The
supreme court, however, rejected that argument, reasoning that its first
premise (unlike its second) was flawed. In its analysis of the temporal
effects problem, the court focused its attention on the conduct that the
particular statutory provision on which Manuel had based his penalty suit
had proscribed:
The cause of action that gave rise to this litigation was the failure to
pay within 30 days. Given the facts of this case, the statute is being
applied only prospectively, i.e. after its 1990 effective date. It is of no
consequence that the insurance policy and the accident predate that
statute, since the conduct which exposes the defendants to liability
occurred after the statute became law.
Although the statute was enacted after the insurance policy was
issued and after the date of the accident, the event which grants
the plaintiffs a cause of action is the failure to pay the settlement
within 30 days, and this happened after the enactment of the stat-
ute.
97
96. 664 So. 2d 81 (1995).
97. Id. at 87 (emphasis added) and 87-88.
[Vol. 59
J.-R. TRAHAN
Having found that the proposed application of the statute was prospective, the
court ruled that the statute could be applied to the insurers, notwithstanding that
it was "substantive."
The supreme court's analysis of the retroactivity problem presented in
Manuel rests on the intuition that, whatever else retroactivity means, it must have
something to do with the timing of the particular act or other event to which that
statute attaches juridical consequences-what civil law scholars call the
"presupposition" (presupposd, supuesto), "hypothesis" (hypothse, ipotesis), or
"juridical facts" (faitsjuridiques, Tatbestand).98 And this "something," to judge
from the Manuel court's analysis, can be described in two complimentary
propositions. First, where the presupposed or hypothetical act or event
occurs after the effective date of the new statute, the proposed application
cannot be considered retroactive. Second, where the presupposed or
hypothetical act or event occurs before the effective date of the new
statute, the proposed application may and, under some circumstances, should
be considered retroactive.
This understanding ofretroactivityrecalls the theory that, in civil law circles,
is known as the "theory of the completed act," an early alternative to the "vested
98. Modem civil law doctrine holds that every juridical rule worthy of the name, regardless of
its official form, has the same "logical structure," namely, a "permanent relation between a
presupposition (or hypothesis) and a juridical effect: if such and such a fact envisioned abstractly
is realized, then such and such a legal consequence results (or does not result, depending on the
content of the rule) from it." H6ron, supra, note 1, at 279; see also Hans Kelsen, General Theory
of Law and State 45-46 (Anders Wedberg trans. 1945) ("The rule of law.., is a hypothetical
judgment attaching certain consequences to certain conditions.... [Tihe rule of law ... connects
two facts with one another as condition and consequence. The condition is here the 'cause,' the
consequence the 'effect."). It follows, then, that every true juridical rule can be recast as a
conditional proposition, that is, a proposition in the form of "If A, then B." A is the presupposition
or hypothesis and B, the consequence or effect. See 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 5, at 58; Julio C.
Cueto-Rua, Judicial Methods of Interpretation of the Law 106 (1981); Dabin, Thdorie, supra note
21, § 60, at 73-74; Georges Del Vecchio, L'Homo Juridicus e l'Itnsuffsance du Droit comme Rigle
de la Vie (1935), reprinted in Justice-Droit-t at: Ltudes de Philosophic Juridique 225,229-31 (1938);
Du Pasquier, supra note 16, §§ 112-15, at 89-93 (5th ed. 1979); Garcia, supra note I, § 8, at 13-14;
§§ 87-98, at 169-85; § 198, at 388-89; Kelsen, supra this note, at 45 & 46; Henri Motulsky,
Principes d'une Realisation Methodique du Droit Priv6 §§ 16-17, at 18-20 (1948); Pierre Pescatore,
Introduction A la Science du Droit §§ 127-29, at 192-97 (1960); Frangois Rigaux, Introduction A ]a
Science du Droit 13-15 (1974); 1 Ernest Roguin, La Science Juridique Pure § 58, at 82-84, & § 72,
at 101-02 (1923).
Consider this rather simple example. In its official form, the rule of Civil Code article
2315 is worded as follows: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it" Recast in conditional form, the rule
would be worded something like this: "If a man, through his act, causes damage to
another, then the latter has the right to compel the former, through juridical process, Ito
compensate him for that damage." The presupposition or hypothesis is set out in the clause
"a man, through his act, causes damages to another... ."; the consequence or effect, in the
clause "the latter has the right to compel the former, through juridical process, to compensate
him."
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rights" theory." According to the proponents of this theory, "what matters is
to find out not if a right has been acquired, but if an act has been realized during
the reign of the old law, because laws operate directly on acts by assigning
juridical consequences to them."'" For that reason, the theory "sustains that
acts completed while the old law was in effect are governed by that law,
[whereas] those completed after the imposition of the new law are governed by
that law."' 0'
b. Typology of Legislation
As for the distinction between "substantive" legislation, on the one hand, and
"procedural" and "interpretative" legislation, on the other, that lies at the heart
of the Article 6 default rule, the courts have made at least some attempt to
illuminate it. According to the courts, substantive legislation either"establish[es]
new rules, rights, and duties or change[s] existing ones"'" or "inpose[s] new
duties, obligations or responsibilities upon parties"; 03 procedural legislation
"prescribe[s] a method for enforcing a previously existing substantive right and
relate[s] to the form of the proceeding or the operation of laws";'," and
99. 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at 98-99; 1 Bianca, supra note I, § 85, at 120-21; 1 Borda,
Tratado, supra note 1, § 166, at 182; Borda, Portie, supra note 1, § 2, at 77-78; Francesco Galgano,
Diritto Privato § 3.1, at 54 (7th ed. 1990); Galindo, supra note I, § 76, at 169; Level, supra note 1,
§ 48, at 80-81; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 186; 1 Messineo, supra note 74, § 5,
at 91; Rescigno, supra note 1, § 2, at 223; 1 Claw, supra note 74, § 116, at 65; 1 Rojina, Dcrecho,
supra note 1, 277; Roubier, Transitoire; supra note 1, § 29, at 134-45; Trabucchi, supra note 54, §
11, at 25-26; 1 Valencia, supra note 18, § 87, at 190-92 (1989); Vareilles-Sommibes, supra note 53,
§§ 3-18, at 445-51 (1893); Diccionario, supra note 18, at 1827.
100. Galindo, supra note 1, § 76, at 169.
101. Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 166, at 182. See also 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at
99 (describing the theory of the "completed act" in these terms: "Non-retroactivity (is used here]...
in the sense that, given a certain act, its juridical consequences remain those that were connected to
the act by the law in force at that time at which the act was completed.... mhe principle of
retroactivity is violated when one pretends to reevaluate an act that was completed during the reign
of the old law by deriving consequences from it on the basis of the new law."); I Bianca, supra note
1, § 85, at 120 ("According to this theory [the completed fact],. . . the principle of non-retroactivity
of laws provides that the new law cannot be applied to juridical relations that came to an end before
it came into force and not to juridical relations that were produced before then and are still
alive .... "); Trabucchi, supra note 54, § 11, at 26 n.1 ("According to this tendency, known as [the
theory of] the completed act orfacta praeterita, the new legislation ... does not touch the act in
itself, which is already completed.").
102. Aucoin v. State Dep't of Transp., 712 So. 2d 62, 67 (La. 1998); Keith v. United States
Fidelity Guar. Co., 694 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1997); Manuel, 664 So. 2d at 86; Chance v. American
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La. 1994); Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723 (La.
1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 817 (La. 1992).
103. Manuel, 664 So. 2d at 86.
104. Keith, 694 So. 2d at 183; Segura, 630 So. 2d at 723; see also Manuel, 664 So. 2d at 86
("Trocedural laws address the methods for enforcing an existing right or relate to how a law
operates.").
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interpretative legislation "merely establish[es] the meaning that the interpret[ed]
statute had from the time of its enactment"'0 5 or "clarifies pre-existing
law., , 1o6
Further elucidating the distinction between "substantive" and "interpretative"
legislation, the courts have identified a number of factors that may, depending
on the circumstances, influence the classificatory determination, some of which
are indicative or others of which are contra-indicative of "interpretative"
character. Among those in the former class are (i) "ambiguity in the original
version of the statute," what one can call the "interpreted statute"' 7 and (ii) a
"prompt legislative response""'8 to "a recent construction of a statute [the
interpreted statute] by the supreme court."'O9 Among those in the latter class
are (i) the new statute changes the "settled law";"" (ii) the parties' "reliance"
on "the line of jurisprudence interpreting the [interpreted] statute";.. and (iii)
the new statute was but one small part of a comprehensive legislative reform
package that was predominantly substantive."'
IV. CRIQUE
Louisiana's current intertemporal law is flawed. To some extent, the
legislation itself is to blame. The principalculprit, however, is the interpretation
that has been placed upon that legislation, in particular, the jurisprudential
intepretation.
In this Part of the paper, I will identify and explicate the technical
deficiencies of, first, the legislation, and second, the jurisprudence.
A. Legislation
The legislationonwhichLouisiana'sintertemporallaw is built reflects several
lapses of sound juridical technique, to be more precise, formulative technique." 3
105. Smith, 609 So. 2d at 817; see also Aucoin, 712 So. 2d at 67; Keith, 694 So. 2d at 183;
Manuel, 664 So. 2d at 86; Segura, 630 So. 2d at 723; Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 591 (La.
1974).
106. Smith, 609 So. 2d at 817.
107. Barron v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 397 So. 2d 29, 31 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
108. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 725; Smith, 609 So. 2d at 820.
109. Barron, 397 So. 2d at 31, cited with approval In Smith, 609 So. 2d at 818); see Gulf, 317
So. 2d at 590-91.
110. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 724; Smith, 609 So. 2d at 820.
111. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 725; Smith, 609 So. 2d at 820-21.
112. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 724; Smith, 609 So. 2d at 821.
113. Juridical technique, in the broadest sense of the term (the sense in which I use it here),
refers to "the entire process of the elaboration of the law," Jean Dabin, La Technique de
I'Plaboratlon du Droit Positif § 3, at 36-41 (1935) [hereinafter Dabin, Technique]. See also 2 Henri
de Page, de l'Interprttation des Lois 34-35 (1925); 3 Frangois G6ny, Science et Technique en Droit
Priv6 Positif § 183, at 23; § 178, at 1-3; § 188, at 33-36 (1921) (hereinafter 3 G6ny, Science], or,
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Three of these lapses can be qualified as "stylistic," namely, (i) the apparent
antinomy between the two pieces of that legislation, namely, Article 6 and Section
2, (ii) an equivocation in the use of the term "substantive" in the default rule of
Article 6, and (iii) the superfluity of(or, viewed from a different perspective, the
equivocation or disharmony introduced by) the exception to the anti-retroactivity
rule that Article 6 creates for "procedural laws." One other defect, which can
perhaps best be described as a deficiency in "efficacy,"is that the legislation fails
to make provision for all of the various kinds of temporal effects that reasonable
legislators, as a matter of good policy, would want to attribute to legal rules.
1. Style
a. Antinomy" 4
That the legislation from which Louisiana's intertemporal law springs
appears, on its face, to set out inconsistent rules regarding the permissible
in other words, "the ensemble of means and procedures, of whatsoever nature they may be-material
or intellectual-, whereby the law is 'realized,"' Dabin, Technique, supra this note, at 348. See a
Iso Du Pasquier, supra note 16, §§ 173-75, at 162-64 (including under the rubric "juridical
technique" both "political technique" and "juridical technique" in the narrow sense); Roubier,
Thdorie, supra note 17, § 10, at 86-7 (explaining the broad sense of "juridical technique"). So
understood, juridical technique entails two distinct, yet interrelated, processes. One, which can be
called socio-political technique, involves "the choice between competing ideas of the common good
that are called upon to provide the substantive foundation of the law." Dabin, Technique, supra this
note, § 3, at 36. See also 2 de Page, supra this note, at 39-40 (describing what he calls technique
rdelle or technique sociologique, which is "more intimately attached to the substance of the law" and
which "emanates from the fundamental synchronization of the individual and the collective and from
the necessity of stabilizing and organizing this synchronization conformably to situations .... "); Du
Pasquier, supra note 16, § 174, at 163 ("The determination of the results to be attained, that is, the
conditions of the social order that it's a question of realizing, falls to juridical policy."); Roubier,
Thdorie, supra note 17, § 10, at 87 ("[Wlhen it is a question of studying what ought to be the content
and the end of the rule of law," one is concerned with "juridical policy"). The other, which can be
called formulative technique, involves the choice between the alternative forms available for
expressing this idea, Dabin, Technique, supra this note, § 3, at 36. See also 2 de Page, supra this
note, at 39 (describing what he calls technique formnelle as "[tjhe first ... is the work of the
pragmatic intelligence, designed to facilitate rationality, to endow it in a fashion with algebraic signs
and synthetic formulas that are susceptible of rendering its use more rapid and its application more
expeditious... ."); Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 175, at 163 ("The ensemble ofprocedures whereby
the law transforms into clear rules and practices the directives of juridical policy has received the
name ofjurldical technique."); Roubier, Thdorie, supra note 17, § 10, at 87 ("[When it is a question
of studying the exterior aspect that the rule of law presents,' one is concerned with "juridical
technique."), or, to put it another way, the "putting into form ofjuridical rules the substance of which
is transmitted to the technician of the law by the technician of juridical policy." Dabin, Technique,
supra this note, at 57.
114. One of the most basic elements of sound formulative technique is "harmony." 3 Gdny,
Science, supra note 113, § 223, at 210; Edmond Sail6 de ]a Mamierre, E16ments de M6thodologie
Juridique § 17, at 39-41 (1976). That means, ata minimum, that legal rules must not contradict each
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temporal effects of new legislation is, in itself, certainly just cause for criticism.
Though foolish consistencies may the hobgoblins of small minds, one can hardly
characterizethe consistency of legal rules as foolish. For those who believe that
legislation can never be understood on its own terms, that is, without the aid of
jurisprudence or doctrine, this variance, of course, is of little concern."' But
for those who believe, as do I, that one should be able to get a fair idea of what
"the law" is merely by reading the legislation, this variance represents a serious
technical failure.
b. Equivocation"6
As it's used in the Article 6 default rule, the term "substantive" is equivocal.
It has one referent when used in the rule "procedural, as opposed to substantive,
laws may be retroactively applied"; it has quite another when used in the rule
"interpretative, as opposed to substantive, laws may be retroactively applied."
This equivocation, though elusive, is not at all difficult to illustrate. The
equivocation is clearly presented in at least two classes of cases.
The first kind of case involves "procedural but not interpretative" legislation.
Suppose that the legislature enacts a new statute that sets up a special delay
period-30 days-for filing the answer to the petition in products liability cases.
The preamble to the act in which the new statute is set out indicates that the
purpose of the statute is to "carve out a new exception to the general rule of
article 1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure," which sets up a 15-day delay
period. One can certainly justify classifying this new statute as "procedural":
it concerns the staging of litigation, which is procedure par excellence. But
under the circumstances, one could not possibly justify classifying it as
"interpretative": nothing suggests that the legislature, by enacting the statute,
intended to explain any previously-existing legislation. Now, if one classifies the
statute as procedural, then one also classifies it, by exclusion, as non-substantive,
inasmuch as substantive is the antithesis of procedural. At the same time,
however, if one classifies the statute as non-interpretative, then one also classifies
it, by exclusion, as substantive, inasmuch as substantive is the antithesis of
other. As Portalis, the principal author of the Projet du Governement of the French Code Civil, once
commented, "it would be a great evil if there were to be contradictions in the maxims that govern
men." Paul Foriers, Les Antinomies en Droit, reprinted In 2 La Penste Juridique de Paul Foriers
439, 448 (1982). See also 3 Giny, Science, supra note 113, § 223, at 210 ("The riuridical]
construction must be homogenous and coherent. This implies ... that its diverse parts are in
harmony with each other.....).
115. That is so because, as we have seen, the jurisprudence has resolved the apparent antinomy
between the two laws. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
116. Equivocation represents a defect in formative "style." See Jeremy Bentham, General View
of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 207 (John Bowring ed., 1962)
(from Chapter 33, entitled "Of the Style of the Laws") ("Defects of style may be referred to four
heads: ... equivocality....').
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interpretative. Thus, this statute is, at once, "substantive" for purposes of one
part of Article 6 yet "non-substantive" for purposes of another part.
The second kind of case involves "interpretative but not procedural"
legislation. Suppose that the legislature enacts a new statute that limits the
"general damages" recoverable in a "products liability action" to twice the value
of the "actual damages." Shortly after the statute takes effect, the question arises
whether this limitation applies to actions for loss of consortium brought by the
spouses or children of the victims of defective products (as opposed to actions
brought by the victims themselves). Though all five of the state's intermediate
appellate courts, relying on the legislative record, have answered the question in
the affirmative, the supreme court, by a vote of 4 to 3, answers it in the negative.
In a special legislative session called just days later for the purpose of "correcting
the court's vicious error," the legislature amends the original statute to provide
as follows: "The limitations of this provision apply to all actions that arise out
of the use of defective products, including actions for loss of consortium."
During the floor debate on the amendment, legislator after legislator rails against
the court for "knowingly circumventing the will of the people" as expressed in
the original bill. Under the circumstances, one would be on firm ground in
arguing that the amendment was "interpretative": evidence that the legislature
believed it was merely bringing to light its understanding of the original statute
abounds. But one would be hard pressed to argue that the amendment was
"procedural": everyone agrees that the extent of a tortfeasor's duty to repair the
injuries he's caused is a matter of substantive law. Now, if one classifies the
amendment as interpretative, then one also classifies it, by exclusion, as non-
substantive, inasmuch as substantive is the antithesis of interpretative. At the
same time, however, if one classifies the amendment as non-procedural, then one
also classifies it, by exclusion, as substantive, inasmuch as substantive is the
antithesis of procedural. Thus, this legislation is, at once, "substantive" for
purposes of one part of Article 6 yet "non-substantive" for purposes of another
part."
7
117. One might ask (as have some of those who reviewed drafts of this paper) whether the
"stylistic" flaw under examination here is of any consequence. After all, whether a particular law
is "procedural but substantive in the sense of not being interpretative" or "interpretative but
substantive in the sense of not being procedural:' the result is the same: the law is retroactively
applied. About that, surely no one could get confused. For that reason, one might argue, the
equivocation is, practically speaking, a non-problem.
I disagree and for two reasons. First, this argument rests on an erroneous assumption about the
proper scope of legal criticism, in particular, criticism of legislation, namely, that the only
deficiencies of formulative technique worth identifying, criticizing, and solving are those that have
"practical" consequences. To write legislation well the draftsman must, among other things, employ
"good style." And this "good style," I would insist, is not only an instrumental good, that is, a good
that is desired for the sake of something else (here, communicability), but also a good in itself, that
is, a good desired for its own sake. Now, surely no one would deny that equivocation is bad style.
And if that's true, then each and every equivocation should be found out, condemned, and eliminated,
even where the risk that the equivocation will breed confusion is one in a million.
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c. Superfluity,"a Equivocation,19 or Disharmony'
The exception to the anti-retroactivity rule that Article 6 carves out for
"procedural" laws is problematic, though the nature of the problem is somewhat
difficult to pinpoint. There would seem to be three alternative possibilities.
First, the exception is superfluous, in the sense that it purports to address a
problem that, in reality, is non-existent. Second, the'exception presupposes a
definition of "retroactive" that is at odds with the jurisprudentially-established
definition(s) of that term. This problem, in turn, leads to either of two others.
One, the more obvious, is that it creates still more uncertainty (as if that were
possible) regarding the meaning of the term "retroactive." The other, and the
more serious, is that this definition of the term "retroactive" is out of kilter with
the absolute prohibition on the retroactivity of substantive law rules that one
finds in the default rules of Article 6 and Section 2.
If one were to ask the defenders of the procedural laws exception for an
example of a case in which the "retroactive" application of procedural legislation
is appropriate and necessary, one would probably receive an answer like the
following. Imagine that a person buys a consumer product from a retailer. After
using the product for a short while, he discovers that the product has a latent
Second, this argument rests on an erroneous assumption about the magnitude of the (practical) risk
of confusion that this equivocation presents. Consider this example. Soon after the supreme court
renders a controversial decision regarding a certain statute that creates a "presumption," the
legislature amends the statute, altering the wording of the presumption. A few months later, a case
to which either the old or the new statute might possibly be applied comes before the supreme court.
The lawyer for one of the parties contends that the new statute ought to be applied, arguing that it
constitutes a "procedural" law and, for that reason, applies retroactively. Finding that the law is
"substantive,' the supreme court rejects that argument Not long after that decision, a client shows
up in an attorney's office with a problem. When the attorney hears the story, he realizes that the
disposition of the case will turn on the recently-changed presumption, in particular, that his client
could prevail if and only if the "new" presumption applies. Recalling that the new statute followed
close on the heels of a supreme court decision interpreting the old statute, the attorney wonders
whether the new statute might not be interpretative and so, sends his law clerk off to the library to
do some quick research. A few minutes later, the law clerk returns to inform him that"the supreme
court has said the new law is 'substantive."' Hearing that news, the attorney assumes (erroneously,
of course) that the interpretative-law argument "won't hunt" He then gives the client the bad news
and sends him on his way. Though this scenario is admittedly unlikely, who would dare to suggest
it's impossible? Indeed, given the level at which lawyers and judges normally "think" about
intertemporal conflicts matters, it's a miracle something like this hasn't happened yet But then
who's to say it hasn't?
118. Good juridical technique requires economy of expression. Useless and unnecessary words
"only serve to weigh down the sense of the grammatical construction." Alexandre C. Angelesco, La
Technique Idgislative en Matilre de Codification Civile § 328, at 776 (1930). Particularly
undesirable is redundancy of expression: wherever it occurs, it cannot help but breed confusion. Id.
See also Bentham, supra note 116, at 268 ("The faults opposed to brevity... are-I. Repetition in
terms.".
119. See supra note 116.
120. See supra note 113.
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defect. When he complains to the retailer, the retailer's representative tells him,
"Tough luck." And so the consumer files a "redhibition" suit against the
retailer.' 2' At the time, the Code of Civil Procedure places no restraints on the
timing of dispositive motions, for example, motions for summary judgment.
Before the retailer files his answer, however, an amendment to the Code of Civil
Procedure takes effect, one that requires each litigant to file dispositive motions
within 90 days of the date on which the defendant files his answer. The retailer
then files his answer. Just over four months later, the consumer thereafter files
a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the retailer knew of the
defect at the time of the sale. The retailer objects to the motion, citing the new
law. The consumer rebuts the objection by arguing that to apply the new law to
this litigation would be to apply it retroactively. And so, but for the procedural
laws exception to the general anti-retroactivity rule, the new law supposedly
could not be applied.
There's just one problem with this example: it's difficult, if not impossible,
to see in what sense the application of the new law might be considered
"retroactive." It certainly is not "retroactive" in either of the senses in which the
Louisiana jurisprudence has thus far used the term.
The application of the new law in our hypothetical case would not be
"retroactive" in the sense in which Louisiana's courts have formally defined that
term. The formaldefinition, it will be recalled, is this: a proposed application
of a new law is retroactive if and only if it deprives someone of a "vested right."
Surely no one could contend that applying the new summary judgment rule to
the consumer would deprive him of a vested right. The jurisprudence, as we will
see below, has consistently ruled that no one has a vested right to any particular
procedure.'2
Nor could the application of the new law in our hypothetical case be
considered "retroactive" in the sense in which the Louisiana courts (sometimes)
seem to understand that term when they approach intertemporal conflicts
problems "intuitively." In those cases, the meaning of that term is (sometimes)
tied to the timing of the events that form the presupposition or hypothesis of the
new law. If those events occurred before the new law took effect, then the
application is retroactive; if they occurred after the new law took effect, then the
application is prospective. The new law in question in the hypothetical case,
stated in conditional form, is "If a litigant does not file his dispositive motion(s)
within 90 days of the date on which the defendant files his answer, then the other
litigant may, in the event that the first litigant thereafter brings such a
motion, demand that the court refuse to hear it." The presupposition or
hypothesis of this rule evidently contains three elements: (i) the defendant files
an answer and (ii) during the next 90 days (iii) the litigant fails to file his
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
122. See infra text accompanying note 170.
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dispositive motion." In the hypothetical case, all three of these events
occurred after the new rule took effect. And so, to apply the new rule to that
case would not be to apply it retroactively, at least not in this second sense of
the term "retroactive."' 2 4
It should be clear, then, that the assumption on which the defense of the
procedural laws exception rests-that one can't achieve the "right" results in
typical intertemporal conflicts cases that involve procedural laws without
requiring that such laws be retroactively applied-is false. The truth is that one
can and will attain these results simply by being consistent, that is, by applying
to intertemporal conflicts in procedural laws the same principles that one applies
to intertemporal conflicts in substantive laws, including the anti-retroactivityrule.
There is simply no need for a special exception to these principles for procedural
laws.
To be sure, one might be able to salvage the procedural laws exception, in
the sense of providing some justification for hanging on to it, if one could devise
a definition of retroactivity that is substantially more expansive than either of
those that the jurisprudence has adopted. But precisely how that definition
should be formulated is anything but clear. Perhaps one could do it this way.
Start with the notion that "retroactivity" consists of "changing the rules"
once a "player" has initiated a new "juridical game" or, to use more traditional
civil law terminology, changing any part of the juridical milieu that constitutes
a "juridical situation! '  after a juridical actor has entered into that
123. Actually one can make a good argument that the 90-day delay is part of the consequence
or effect rather than the presupposition or hypothesis. See infra text accompanying notes 257-259.
124. For the application of this rule to be considered "retroactive" in this sense, a quite different
factual scenario would be required, namely, one in which the order of (i) the effective date of the
new rule and (ii) the defendant's delay in filing dispositive motions is reversed. Thus, the necessary
sequence of events would be this: (i) the plaintiff files suit, (ii) the defendant files his answer, (iii)
the defendant fails to file dispositive motions within 90 days thereafter, (iv) the new rule requiring
that such motions be filed by that deadline takes effect, and (v) without further delay the plaintiff,
relying on that new rule, contends that the defendant has forfeited his right to brings such motions.
125. The term "juridical situation" refers to the situation that a given "juridical subject" (that is,
a person) finds himself in vis-a-vis a given juridical rule. Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 131, at 106;
Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 168, at 126. Each such situation presents itself to us "as...
a complex of rights and duties." Paul Roubier, Droits Subjectifs et Situations Juridiques 52 & 53
(1963). The variety of these situations is "infinite." Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 39, at 181.
They include
in the law ofpersons,... the situation of spouses; those of divorced or separated spouses;
those of legitimate children, illegitimate children, and adoptive children; those correspond-
ing to diverse incapacities; those of tutors, curators, judicial counsels, etc.; in the law of
things, those of owner, usufructuary, the beneficiary of an active or passive servitude,
mortgage creditor, etc.; in the law of obligations, those of creditor and debtor, seller and
buyer, lessor and lessee, insurer and insured, tortfeasor and victim, etc.; in the law of
successions, those of legitimate heir, irregular successor, universal legatee, legatee under
universal title, legatee under particular tide, beneficial heir, coheirs, reservatory heir, etc.
Id. at 181-82. The concept "juridical situation," then, is a broad, catch-all category designed to cover
all of the juridical phenomena at which legislation can possibly take aim. It can mean, among other
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situation." 6 Then treat "litigation," from the moment at which the petition is
first filed until the time at which the last petition for review is rejected, as a
single juridical "situation," one that should be treated, for purposes of retroactivi-
ty analysis, as an undivided whole. And then draw the inevitable conclusion:
once the plaintiff files suit, the juridical milieu that constitutes that situation-the
entirely of the procedural law-is then frozen in place, so that, to replace any
part of it with a new procedural law would be to apply that law retroactively.
Though this salvage job is a pretty good one, it comes at a price and a high
one at that. If one adopts this definition, then, unless one is prepared to tolerate
an equivocation in the use of the term "retroactive," one must be prepared to
apply the definition to all intertemporal conflicts cases, not just those that involve
procedural laws. And there begins the trouble. To start with, one encounters the
problem of coming up with a criterion for determining where one "substantive"
situation or game starts and another ends. If one can somehow overcome this
problem or, instead, chooses to ignore it, then one immediately comes upon
another: how to square this definition of retroactivity with the notion that the
anti-retroactivity rule as applied to substantive legislation admits of no
exceptions. Consider this little brain-teaser. If"litigation" is a single, undivided
juridical situation, then why not (i) executory contracts, such as leases or loans,
(ii) ownership, or (iii) tutorship? Surely persons in these settings find themselves
in the face of a juridical milieu no less comprehensive, interconnected, and self-
contained than that which constitutes the juridical situation of litigation. But if
that is so, then once a juridical actor has entered into such a situation, be it an
executory contract, ownership, or tutorship, the juridical milieu that constitutes
that situation-which would be the entirety of contract law, ownership law, or
tutorship law, respectively-would be frozen in place, so that, to replace any part
of that milieu with a new law would be to apply that law retroactively. Now,
if the ban on the retroactive applicationof substantive legislation is absolute, then
any such "replacements" ought to be prohibited. But that is simply not so, that
is, the courts have consistently ruled that new laws regarding certain aspects of
contractual, ownership, or tutorship situations can, at least under some circum-
stances, be applied to already-established situations of these kinds.2 7 And no
one, at least not these days, would question that those results are correct. The
bottom line, then, is this: if one wants to adopt an expansive definition of
retroactivity in order to save the procedural laws exception, then one must be
things, (i) a certain juridical status, (ii) a certain juridical capacity, (iii) a certain right together with
its correlative duty, or (iv) a certain juridical relationship between two or more persons.
126. This account of retroactivity is not one that I conjured up out of thin air. It is a simplified
version of a theory floated by the French scholar Julien Bonnecase in the early 20th century, a theory
that, though brilliantly innovative, was in short order rejected by the rest of French doctrine. See
Bonnecase, supra note 18, §§ II through 247, at 13-280. For a critical appraisal of Bonnecase's
theory, see Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 29, at 141.
127. See infra note 248 (contracts), text accompanying notes 177-182 (ownership), & text
accompanying notes 208-211 (tutorship).
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prepared to carve out similar exceptions for a variety of substantive laws. To my
mind, the game is not worth the candle.'
2. Efficacy: Underinclusiveness
Louisiana's current intertemporal law legislation takes aim at two and only
two of the possible temporal effects that might be attached to any piece of
legislation: retroactivity and prospectivity. This restriction on the reach of the
legislation is reflected in the second sentence of Article 6, which provides that
certain types of legislation apply "both prospectively and retroactively."'2 9 No
other alternatives are contemplated.
But there is at least one other possibility. Alongside the application
of the law after its enactment (prospectivity) and the application of the
law before its enactment (retroactivity), one can also imagine "the
application of the law after its abrogation."' 30  Consider this example.
Suppose that the law now prohibits the manufacture of highly toxic
chemicals within one mile of the city limits of major metropolitan areas.
Though the legislature now wants to extend this "buffer zone" to two
miles, it also wants to protect those who presently own manufacturing facilities
that, though permissible under the old law, would be banned under the new law.
And so the legislature provides that the new law "shall not be applied to
manufacturing activities at any facility already in existence on the effective date
hereof that shall be located within two miles but without one mile of the city
limits of any major metropolitan areas." By virtue of this provision, after the
new law (buffer zone of two miles) takes effect, the old law (buffer zone of one
mile) will nevertheless continue to govern some juridical situations. Known in
countries within the French civil law tradition as the "survival of the law"''
128. The perceptive reader will have noticed that, throughout this discussion, I have avoided
attributing the decision to recognize the procedural-laws exception to the drafters of Article 6. There
is a reason for that. Though it is true that the drafters of that article codified the procedural-laws
exception (which, up until then, had not been codified), it would be unfair, not to mention inaccurate,
to say that they were the ones who "recognized" it. Let me explain.
The legislature's mandate to the drafters of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as I understand
it, was a limited one: simply bring the law "up to date" or, to be more precise, bring the law "on
the books" into line with the "law in practice." Louisiana Civil Code XXXV-XXXVI (A.N.
Yiannopoulos ed., 1999). When the drafters turned their attention to former Article 8, they
discovered just such a breach between the law on the books and the law in practice. Whereas Article
8 purported to prohibit retroactivity across the board and without exception, the jurisprudence
regularly made a number of exceptions to that rule, among them, that for procedural laws. And so
the drafters, in revising Article 8 (renumbered as Article 6), altered it so that it would reflect these
jurisprudentially-created exceptions.
It should be clear, then, that if anyone is responsible for the decision to "recognize" the procedural-
laws exception, it is the courts, not the drafters of Article 6.
129. La. Civ. Code art. 6.
130. Cdt6, supra note 74, at 182.
131. Bach, Contribution, supra note I, § 5, at 411, & §§ 52-56, at 458-64; Bach, Conflits I,
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or "postactivity"' ' and in Italy and Latin America as "ultractivity,' this
temporal effect carries the more colorfully metaphorical label "grandfathering"
in the United States.
The binary typology-retroactive v. prospective-ignores this "fundamental
dimension of the effect of law in time.""' 4 Postactivity
is in no fashion taken into account by the traditional method. That
method concerns itself solely with the application of the law before its
effectivity (retroactivity) and shows no interest at all in the application
of the law after its abrogation (survival). 13
It's no use objecting that the binary typology, to the extent that it prohibits
"retroactivity" of the new law, implicitly "takes care" of postactivity. Post-
activity of the old law cannot be reduced to a mere side effect of nonretroactivity
of the new law. Consider, once again, the "toxic chemical manufacturing"
hypothetical. Surely no one would suggest that to apply the new law (buffer
zone of two miles) in such a way as to stop future manufacturing activities at the
exempted facilities would be to apply that law "retroactively." To the contrary,
such an application would be "prospective," for it would prohibit those activities
only during the period of time after the effective date of the new law. Thus, the
reason that the new law will not be applied to the facilities in question is not the
standard prohibition against retroactivity, but rather the special dispensation that
the legislature made in favor of those facilities, whereby the old law, despite its
having been repealed, nevertheless remains applicable to them.' 6
supra note I, § 40, at 5, & §§ 229-259, at 23-26 (France); Bach, Conflits If, supra note 1, §§ 30-45,
at 144-7 through 144-10 (France); Bonneau, supra note 1, § 95, at 82 (France); I Colin & Capitant,
supra note 18, § 57, at 56 (France); C8t6, supra note 74, at 182 (Qudbec); Dekeuwer-DWfossez, supra
note 1, § 11, at 13; § 16, at 23; & § 17, at 25 (Belgium); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 334,
at 297; §§ 354-357, at 310-12; & §§ 371-375, at 332-37 (France); Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, §
357, at 242 (Lebanon); Level, supra note 1, § 28, at 44; § 41, at 68; & § 95, at 169 (Belgium); I
Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 188 (France); Garcia, supra note 1, § 203, at 394
(Mexico); Pescio, supra note 1, § 101, at 332 (Chile); I Planiol & Ripert, supra note 2, § 242, at 101
(France); I Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 230, at 110, & §§ 266-271, at 125-27 (France);
Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 3, at 11-12; § 28, at 124; § 29, at 13840; & §§ 77-78, at 381-
93 (France); Tavernier, supra note 1, at 14 & 72 (Algeria); Codigo Civil, supra note 20, § 118, at
178 (Venezuela).
132. Starck, supra note 1, § 491, at 203.
133. Francesco Galgano, Diritto Privato § 3.1, at54 (7th ed. 1990) (Italy); M.G. Pace, II Diritto
Transitorio § 146, at 506 (1944) (Italy); I Augusto, supra note 1, § 167, at 162 (Argentina).
134. C6td, supra note 74, at 182.
135. Id.
136. Nor can postactivity be reduced to or conflated with the phenomenon of "delayed" or
"deferred" effect, which occurs when the legislature specifies that the new law shall not take effect
until some date after what would otherwise and normally be the effective date. Dekeuwer-D6fossez,
supra note 1, §§ 81 & 83, at 104-05; Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, § 229, at 23. The distinction
comes down to this:
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That Louisiana's intertemporal legislation, owing to its exclusive focus on
retroactivity and prospectivity, fails to take postactivity into account is, to say the
least, odd. The legislature certainly has the power (within constitutional limits,
of course) to specify expressly or by clear implication that legislation shall have
any one or more of three temporal effects: retroactivity, prospectivity, and
postactivity. One would think that, if any one or more of them is worth
addressing, then they should all be addressed. And yet the legislature has chosen
to address only the first two.
This omission becomes all the more puzzling when one considers the general
purpose behind legislation that sets forth temporal-effects default rules, such as
those of Article 6 and Section 2. That purpose, once again, is to produce
temporal-effects results that are consistent with those that a reasonable legislator
in all likelihood would have desired, results based on this legislator's judgment
regarding the proper balance to be struck between the interests that would be
served by plenary application of the new, presumably better, law and those that
would be threatened by a post hoc displacement of the old law. Is it not
conceivable that, at least with respect to some juridical situations, the judgment
of a reasonable legislator might be that the individual interests dependent on the
old law so outweigh the collective interest represented by the new law that, not
only should the new law not be retroactively applied, but the old law should be
postactively applied? To ask the question is to answer it. One can think of
several examples of juridical situations in which "grandfathering" is so common
as to be considered the general rule (for example, existing income-generating
activities in the context of tax law and existing land uses in the context of land-
use planning law). Because that is so, any set of temporal-effects default rules
whose scope is limited to retroactivity and prospectivity, that is, that makes no
provision for postacivity, is necessarily incomplete."'
The delay of the effective date concerns all juridical situations, even those that are
created after the new law, whereas the survival of the old law can take aim at only those
that began under the old law and, sometimes, only some of those situations.
Further, the delay of the effective date always involves a determinate term [set
out] within the law itself, for example, "the first day of the fourth month that
will follow its promulgation" or, more simply, "January 1, 1971." The survival of the old
law, on the contrary, comes to an end only with the [end of the] situations that are
regulated by that law. Thus, the survival of certain dispositions that were in place before
the law of December 14, 1964, which concerned the tutelage of minors, will die out only
when the last.., child who was born before this law [the new one] took effect attains
majority.
Dekeuwer-D~fossez, supra note 1, § 83, at 104.05.
137. Let me make it clear that this criticism is not directed at Article 6 or Section 2 in itself.
Each of those laws was designed to handle just two of the possible temporal effects of laws, namely,
retroactivity and prospectivity. And that's just fine. The problem is that we don't have another law
(or laws) that is (or are) designed to handle the other possible temporal effect of laws, namely,
postactivity. Unless and until the legislature gives us such a law, the ensemble of intertemporal law
legislation will be incomplete or, in other words, will be unable to provide satisfying solutions to all
of the different intertemporal conflicts problems that might possibly arise.
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B. Interpretation
The interpretation that the jurisprudence has placed on the legislation from
which Louisiana's intertemporal law springs reflects numerous lapses of sound
juridical technique. Most of these lapses can be described as deficiencies of
formulative technique; others, as deficiencies of socio-political technique.
For purposes of analysis, it will be useful to divide the discussion of this
interpretation into three parts. The first will be devoted to the courts' resolution
of the apparent antinomy between Article 6 and Section 2; the second, to the
interpretation given the terms that the legislation uses to describe the varying
temporal effects of new laws, namely, "retroactive" and "prospective"; the third,
to the interpretation given the terms that the legislation uses to describe the
different types of laws, namely, "substantive," "procedural,"and "interpretative."
1. Resolution of the Apparent Antinomy
The courts' resolution of the apparentantinomybetweenArticle 6 and Section
2, though now well established, is nonethelesstechnicallydefective. The problem
is that no one who is trained in the art of resolving-legislative antimonies would
ever guess how the courts have proposed that the conflict be resolved, at least not
if one confined one's attention to the legislation itself. Let me explain.
The resolution of legislative antimonies is usually accomplishedby resort to
either or both of two related, yet conceptuallydistinct, principles. The first is the
ancient maxim of statutory construction specialia generalibus derogant (special
dispositions derogate from general dispositions).'" The second is the principle
of "implied abrogation.""' 9 Abrogation is implied (or tacit) "when the new law
contains provisions that are contraryto, or irreconcilablewith, those of the former
law."" The principle underlying implied abrogation is this: in the event of a
conflict between two successive expressions of legislative will, the more recent
ought to control. 4' The scope of implied abrogation varies with the scopes of
138. See Comu, supra note a, § 360, at 123; 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 76, at 57; 1 Mazeaud
ct aL, supra note 1, § 110, at 166; Chiam Perelman, Logique Juridique: Nouvelle Rhetorique 89 (2d
ed. 1979); Weill & Terri, supra note 2, § 177, at 184-85.
139. On the subject of implied abrogation in general, see I Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Droit
Civil Frangais §§ 88-89, at 148-51 (Paul Esnicin & Andrd Ponsard eds., 7th ed. 1964); 1 Gabriel
Baudry-Lacantinerie, Prdcis de Droit Civil §§ 43-44, at 28-29 (Paul Guyot ed., 14th ed. 1926);
Carbonnier, supra note 54, § 127, at 220-21; 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 63, at 61; Comu,
supra note 1, §§ 358-361, at 123; 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 76, at 57; 1 Malaurie & Aynts, supra
note I, § 563, at 195-96; 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note i, § 83, at 134; 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra
note 1, § 220-223, at 107; Starck, supra note 1, § 113, at 49; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 104,
at 182-83; Weill & Terri, supra note 2, § 157, at 159-60; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 43, at 76-77.
140. La. Civ. Code art. 8, 12.
141. 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 139, § 44, at 28; Carbonnier, supra note 54, § 127, at
220; 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 76, at 57; Weill & Terri, supra note 2, § 157, at 159;
Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 43, at 76.
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the successive pieces of legislation. If the new legislative provision is addressed
to only part, but not all, of the domain to which the old legislative provision was
addressed (scenario 1), then the scope of the abrogation is nearly always limited.
In such a case, the old legislative provision remains in force except in the special
sub-domain to which the new legislative provision is addressed.'4 2 But if the
old law addressed only part, but not all, of the domain to which the new
legislative provision is addressed (scenario 2), then the result is not quite so
clear. The more likely possibility is that the legislature intended for the old
special rule to remain in place as an "exception" to the new general rule. 43
But there's another possibility: that the legislature intended for the new general
rule to overrule the old special rule.'" To determine what effect the new law
has on the old in such a case, one has no choice but to attempt to reconstruct the
legislature's "intent. '"i4s
Applying these principles to the problem presented by the antinomy between
Article 6 and Section 2, one might possibly arrive at either of two conclusions.
One is that Section 2 carves out an exception to Article 6, an exception confined
to the revised statutes (as opposed to other legislation). The other is that the
legislature, through the enactment of Article 6, impliedly repealed Section 2.
If one takes the maxim specialia generalibus derogant as one's guide, then
one arrives at the former alternative conclusion. Because Article 6 applies to all
legislation whereas Section 2 applies to a subset of legislation, namely, the
revised statutes, the former can be viewed as a "general" disposition and the
latter, as a "special disposition." So understood, the latter carves out an
exception to the former.
But if one takes the principle of implied abrogation as one's guide, then the
result is far less clear. Though it might appear, at first glance, that this problem
involves a type 2 implied abrogation scenario (in that Article 6-the broader
provision-was enacted after Section 2-the narrower provision), the situation
is considerably more complicated than that. When Section 2 was first enacted,
the predecessor to Article 6-Article 8--was already in place. As former Article
8 had been interpretedby the jurisprudence, it established rules identical to those
now established by Article 6. It would seem, then, that the implied abrogation
scenario to which the enactment of Section 2 originally gave rise was not type
142. 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 139, § 44, at 28; Comu, supra note 1, § 360, at 123;
1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 76, at 57; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 104, at 182; 1 Mazeaud
et aL, supra note 1, § 83, at 134; Weili & Terri, supra note 2, § 157, at 160.
143. 1 Aubry & Rau, supra note 139, § 88, at 149; 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 139, §
44, at 29; Conu, supra note 1, § 361, at 123; 1 Josserand, supra note 18, § 76, at 57; 1 Marty &
Raynaud, supra note 1, § 104, at 182; 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 83, at 134; Weill & Terri,
supra note 2, § 157, at 160; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 43, at 77.
144. 1 Aubry & Rau, supra note 139, § 88, at 149; 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 139, §
44, at 29; 1 Mazeaud et al., supra note 1, § 83, at 134; Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 157, at 160;
Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 43, at 77.
145. 1 Aubry&Rau,supranote139,§ 88,at149; l Mazeaudetal.,supranote l, §83,at134;
Weill & Terri, supra note 2, § 157, at 160.
1999]
LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
2 but type I (in that Section 2-the narrower provision-was enacted after
former Article 8-the broader provision). Because that is so, one can argue that,
at least at that time, Section 2 impliedly abrogated former Article 8 in part. 4"
But that does not end the inquiry. When the broader provision-originally
instantiated in Article 8-was later reenactedin the form of new Article 6, a new
implied abrogation scenario-a type 2 scenario-was created. What effect, if
any, the emergence of this scenario had on the original relationship between
Section 2 and its Civil Code counterpart is, of course, a matter of legislative
intent. If one takes seriously the first comment to Article 6, 14 then it might
seem that the legislature had no intention to alter that relationship. It is just as
likely, however, that the legislature intended new Article 6 to replace all the
theretofore existing legislation regarding the temporal effects of legislation, not
only former Article 8, but also Section 2.
How these questions should ultimately be resolved is largely beside the
point. The point is that, no matter how one resolves them, one ends up with a
resolution for the antimony between Article 6 and Section 2 that is at odds with
that proposed by the courts.
146. That was not, of course, the conclusion the courts reached. Not long after the enactment
of Section 2, the courts ruled that it, like then Section 8 (the text of which admitted ofno exceptions
to the anti-retroactivity rule), admitted of numerous unstated exceptions. See, eg., Lott v. Haley, 370
So. 2d 521, 523 (La. 1979).
That construction of Section 2 flouts not only the principles discussed in the text, but also several
other standard principles of legislative construction. The first is the maxim ubi lex non distlinguit,
nec nos distinguere debemus (one shouldn't draw distinctions where the law itself does not): the
court's res6lution of the antimony introduces into Section 2 distinctions that the text of that statute
does not draw, namely, a distinction between substantive legislation, on the one hand, and procedural
and interpretative legislation, on the other. The second is the argument ab inutilitate (an
interpretation that renders a statutory provision superfluous or redundant of another ought to be
resisted): the court's resolution of the antinomy makes Section 2 redundant of Article 6 and,
therefore, renders the former utterly superfluous. Though these principles ofconstruction are, at best,
mere generalizations, the courts ought to follow them unless something in the text or legislative
history of the legislation or some imperative of the common good justifies putting them aside.
It's less than apparent what in the text or legislative history of Section 2 or what imperative of the
common good justifies a departure from these general rules here. The courts have certainly never
bothered to explain the departure, except to say that to read Section 2 literally, that is, so as to
prohibit retroactivity entirely, would be "inconsistent with ... civilian principles." See, e-g., St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 n. 14 (La. 1992). This rationale is not
convincing. As even a passing glance at the annotated edition of the Revised Statutes reveals,
Section 2 was based not only on Article 8 of the Civil Code of 1870, but also on the statutes of
several common-law jurisdictions, namely, Arizona, California, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. That
section, then, is a juridical half-breed, part civilian and part common. Though background "civilian
principles" are undoubtedly relevant in the interpretation of statutes of that kind, they are not
necessarily determinative. To interpret such a statute properly, one must consider background
principles associated with both of its "parents," the common law as well as the civil law.
147. La. Civ. Code art. 6, cmt. (a) ("This provision.., reproduces the substance of Article 8
... and accords with Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the source provision. It does not change
the law.").
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2. Interpretation of Terminology of Temporal Effects
a. General Critique
The jurisprudence must be condemned, first of all, for the vice of inconsis-
tency, a serious formulative-technical deficiency.' In the few cases in which
they've bothered to define the term at all, the courts have ended up developing
two definitions of "retroactive," definitions that are profoundly different. One
describes retroactivity in terms of effects upon "vested rights"; the other, in terms
of effects upon "completed acts."
As long as both of these definitions are recognized, courts will be free to
chose one or the other as it may suit their fancy. Under these circumstances, the
legislative restrictions on retroactivity fail to impose effective constraints on the
discretion of judges and, as a result, make predicting their behavior next to
impossible.
b. Critiques Pertaining to Particular Definitions
Each of the interpretations of the term "retroactive" that the jurisprudence
and the doctrine have developed has problems of its own. I will consider, first,
those associated with the "vested rights" theory and, then, those associated with
the "completed act" theory.
i. Vested Rights
a) Deficiencies of Formulative Technique
I) Style
V Vagueness149
The notion of vested rights is, in practice, so vague and ill-defined as to be
nearly useless. This is, of course, old news. For decades American legal
148. See supra note 116.
149. Sound juridical technique demands that the conceptual constructions in terms of which legal
rules are cast be clear and precise. Dabin, Technique, supra note 113, at IlI ("I[W]ith a view to
obtaining rules that are sufficiently easy to handle .... he [the jurist] will aim at delimiting, in a
precise and clear manner and without recoiling, if need be, from employing artifices, the concepts
that ... intervene in the composition of rules.... [m1he man of the law has no rest as long as he
has not succeeding in defining or, at the very least, in narrowing to the extreme the circle of the
indeterminate... ."); 3 Geny, Science, supra note 113, § 257, at 462 ("Above all else, it is
necessary to aim at a language that's extremely precise. For the law, whose essential objective is to
establish a firm regulative order that's capable of protecting all interests, must seize social realities
forcefully and must contain them within fairly rigid frameworks, in order to avoid, as much as
possble, uncertainties and hesitations."); G6ny, Technique, supra note 49, at 987, 996 ("Everyone
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scholars, who encountered the notion within the anti-retroactivity doctrine that
grew up under the Due Process Clause, have subjected it to relentless criti-
cism.15 On the assumption that there's no point beating a dead horse, one
might be tempted to pass over this criticism without further discussion. But that
would be a mistake. Judging from recent jurisprudence, one would have to
conclude that the news of the death of vested rights has not yet reached the
courts: in decision after decision, the courts continue to invoke the notion of
vested rights,' at least in connection with constitutional retroactivity analysis.
For that reason, the news needs to be broadcast once again.
will agree without difficulty in recognizing that a 'good law' or a 'good code' must, above all,
present the qualities required of every literary work that is addressed to the intelligence and the will
rather than to the imagination or the emotions: unity, order, precision, and clarity.... Legal
definitions should ... aim... at describing the legal ideas to which the statute refers in firm outlines
so as to show clearly to what the rule applies.") That means, among other things, that those.concepts
cannot be vague or uncertain. Jeremy Bentham, On Logic and Grammar as Applied to Legislation,
reprinted in Mary P. Mack, Jeremy Bentham: an Odyssey of Ideas 446 (1963) ("Appendix B") ("Of
every instance of uncertainty on the part of the rule of action, expressive of the will of the constituted
authorities in the state, one effect is-a correspondent degree of insecurity and sense of insecuri-
ty.... Uncertainty, in the case where it has for its seat the political rule of action, is at its
maximum in the case where that same rule ... has no determinate set of words belonging to it.").
For this reason, the lawmaker must "apply himself to fixing, ne varietur, the sense of the words that
he employs, by distinguishing each one from the others, in such a fashion as to assure to each of
them, as much as possible, a clearly specific bearing." 3 Giny, Science, supra note 113, § 257, at
463.
The trouble with insufficiently differentiated concepts is obvious: though the determination that
this or that phenomenon fits the concept appears to "drive" decisions, it in fact "follows" them,
serving as a mere conclusion for decisions that have been driven by other (usually unexpressed)
considerations. Far from illuminating the true basis for decisions, rationales that invoke vague and
uncertain concepts "mask" it. Hargrave, supra note 54, at 601-02. This masking effect is, to say
the least, undesirable. In the case of a relatively unsophisticated decision-maker, the mask may be
so effective as to conceal the true basis for the decision even from himself. Unaware of what he's
really doing, the decision-maker may end up unwittingly basing his decision on prejudices of which
he may be more or less conscious. A relatively sophisticated decision-maker, by contrast, may use
the mask in a deliberate effort to conceal the true basis for the decision, a basis of which he is fully
conscious. In either event, the real rationale behind the decision remains hidden from view,
effectively insulating the decision from meaningful criticism and making it difficult, if not
impossible, to predict how the decision-maker will behave in the future.
150. See, e.g., John Scurlock, Retroactive Legislation Affecting Interests in Land 6 (1953);
James L. Kainen, The Historical Frameworkfor Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and
Contract Rights, 79 Com. L. Rev. 87, 114 (1993); Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960); Bryant Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L Rev. 231, 246 (1927); Comment, The Variable
Quality of a Vested Right, 34 Yale LJ. 303, 307-09 (1925).
151. Within 1998 alone the courts have already done it no fewer than six times. See Aucoin v.
DOTD, 712 So. 2d 62 (La. 1998); Kimball v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 46 (La. 1998); Fields v.
Lofton, 712 So. 2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998); Succession of Mexic, 712 So. 2d 223 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1998); Boone v. State, 709 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998); Genusa v. Dominique, 708
So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
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The boundaries of the concept "vested rights" are radically indeterminate, so
much so that one cannot say with any assurance whether a given juridical interest
falls within or without that category. 2 That notion
is somewhat akin to the nebulous concept "proximate cause." It appears
that reference to the phrase "vested rights"... has produced doubt and
confusion as to the precise grounds on which the decisions rest....
[No clearly definable guidelines have been provided by which the
bench and bar may reliably or accurately determine the circumstances
under which a right, status or condition will be protected under the
concept of "vested rights."' 3
In other words, "[n]o one... has ever given an entirely satisfactory definition
of 'vested rights,"' with the result that "the distinction [betweenvested rights and
mere expectations] seems to fall for lack of an adequate criterion.""
152. 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 341, at 254; Bach, Contribution, supra note 1,
§ 4, at 409; Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, § 36, at 5; 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at 97-98; 1
Bianca, supra note 1, § 85, at 120; 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 140, at 158-59; Ct & Jutras,
supra note 1, § 13, at 941; Day, supra note 54, at 222; Dekeuwer-Defossez, supra note 1, § 10, at
9; Galindo, supra note 1, § 74, at 167; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 335, at 298-99; Hage-
Chahine, supra note 1, § 356, at 241; Level, supra note 1, § 44, at 73; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supr
a note 1, § 106, at 186; 1 Pescio, supra note 1, § 105, at 338-39; 1 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 2,
§ 241, at 100; 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 237, at 112; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note
I, § 36, at 167-68; Starck, supra note 1, § 483, at 199-200; Tavernier, supra note 1, at 243, 245,
251-53; Trabucchi, supra note 54, at 25 n.1; Wald, supra note 1, § 47, at 131-32; Weill & Terr,
supra note 2, § 169, at 176; Enciclopedia Juridica Omeba 1001, 1004 (Manuel 0. y Florit et al. eds.,
1977) (entry entitled "Retroactivity and Non-Retroactivity of Juridical Norms").
153. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 232 So. 2d 328, 338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
154. Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 40, at 68. See I Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1,
§ 341, at 255 ("Despite all the definitions it is, then, in many cases impossible to give a single and
certain criterion by means of which to distinguish acquired rights from simple expectations."); Bach,
Contribution, supra note I, § 4, at 409 n.12 ('Mhis distinction ... has the fault of not furnishing
any criterion."); I Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at 97-98 ("The gravest difficulty (with the acquired
rights theory] is that of delimiting the very concept of 'acquired right.' ... [Tihe theory has had
to make do (and sometimes lost itself in) distinctions that are sometimes difficult to perceive and
other times inconclusive... :"); I Bianca, supra note 1, § 85, at 120 ("This theory (acquired rights]
is reproached for the uncertain delimitation of the notion of acquired ight... ."); Ghestin &
Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 335, at 299 (bemoaning the "absence of any specific criterion [for] the
notion of acquired rights"); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 186 ("[N]o one has been
able to give a satisfactory definition of acquired right.'); I Pescio, supra note 1, § 105, at 338 & 339
("No one has ever been able to give a definition of 'acquired right.' ... mhe distinction, as
presented, has the defect of not supplying any effective criterion."); I Planiol & Ripert, supra note
2, § 24 1, at 100 ("No one has ever been able to give a satisfactory definition of 'acquired right.' ...
(Tjhis distinction, as presented, has the fault of not furnishing any criterion."); Enciclopedia, supra
note 152, at 1004 ('I]t is not possible to find a valid criterion whereby one can objectively
determine what is an acquired right"); see also I Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 140, at 159 ("If
one cannot make clear on the intellectual plane what kind of thing this equivocal concept of acquired
rights is, then it serves no purpose to speak of it and no such character can play a role in the science
of the law."); Ct6 & Jutras, supra note 1, § 13, at 941 ('The notion of acquired right, which is at
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ii) Inaccuracy'
aa) Phenomenological Adequacy
Yet another serious problem with the vested rights theory is what one might
call its "phenomenological fit," that is, the degree of correspondencebetween the
concepts in terms of which it operates, on the one hand, and the phenomena of
which it must take account, on the other.'56 That theory, clearly enough, views
intertemporal conflicts problems through the lens of threats to "rights," more
precisely, rights that have been fully realized (vested rights) and rights that have
not yet been fully realized (expectations).' The trouble with such a theory
the heart of the [traditional] system, itself constitutes a fuzzy notion... ."); I Ripert & Boulanger,
supra note 1, § 237, at 112 ("[I1n the jurisprudence the expression 'acquired right' has no precise
sense .... ); Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 168 ("Mhe authors [who champion the
acquired rights theory] have so much trouble furnishing... a clear definition of acquired rights ....
Thus understood, acquired right is no more than a pavilion that covers every kind of merchan-
dise... ."); Tavernier, supra note 1, at 245 & 252 ("Mhe notion of acquired right... is susceptible
of receiving divergent and sometimes even contradictory interpretations ..... It is... difficult to
build a juridical framework on so fuzzy a notion and to make of the distinction... between acquired
rights and simpl faculties or expectations the summa divislo of the transitory or intertemporal law.");
Wald, supra note 1, § 47, at 131-32 ("The difficulty arise[s]... because acquired right has been
given a new sense, one that is broad. It is in this acceptation that acquired right cannot be defined;
one can only enumerate the diverse cases it embraces. This is the central and up to now insuperable
difficulty of the theory of acquired rights: ... it is transformed into an incomprehensible
metaphysical concept, without any utility.... [It] has no utility, for it resolves nothing while
falsifying the givens of the problem.") & at 133 ('In truth ... the notion of acquired right does not
pass beyond a metaphysical solution, a verbal solution, a tautological explanation, as when we
explain that opium makes one sleepy because it has dormative value.").
155. Sound juridical technique demands that the terminology used in the rules of any given body
of law be "accurate." The terminology is accurate when the term chosen to represent a particular
idea (i) represents that idea rather than some other and (ii) represents all, rather than merely part, of
that idea. Bentham, supra note 116, at 207 ("This idea [that of the legislator] will not have been
correctly placed in the mind (of the citizen]--... 2. When they [the words] present only part of the
idea intended to be conveyed; 3. When instead of this idea they present another altogether
different; .... "). After all, the words and formulas of the text serve to express juridical "concepts
... or notions, which are the sole intermediaries by means of which juridical realities can be
expressed." 3 Gny, Science, supra note 113, 258, at 465-56. It is imperative, of course, that those
concepts or notions "grasp hold of these realities as nearly as possible." Id. at 466. And that can
happen only when the terminology chosen to express the concepts or notions is "the most apt to
translate the essential elements of the rule of law." Id.
156. See generally Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology § 66,
at 175-76 (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., 1962) ('faithful expression of the clearly given" begins, but
cannot end, "when we have settled how the word is to be applied so as to fit the intuitively
apprehended essence").
157. 1 Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 340, at 252-54; 1 Augusto, supra note 1, § 166,
at 156; Bach, Confluts I, supra note 1, § 34, at 5 & § 52, at 7; 1 Barbero, supra note 31, § 42, at 98;
Bonneau, supra note 1, §§ 54-55, at 51-53 & § 72, at 63-64; 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 139,
at 157; 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 58, at 56-57; 1 Chevallier & Bach, supra note 2, at 22-
23; 1 Claro, supra note 74, § 114-115, at 164-65 & § 117, at 65; Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note
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is this: not all intertemporal conflicts problems can be readily reduced to threats
to "rights," properly so called, at least not without more or less distorting the
phenomena. That is so because
legislation does not have as its exclusive, or even principal, object to
confer or to withdraw rights. Legislation [also] poses rules of conduct:
it requires, authorizes or prohibits certain behavior or attaches certain
consequences to them; it intervenes in order to determine the aptitude
to exercise or enjoy rights; it organizes procedures, manages institu-
tions .... 158
This description of legislation holds true not only in the "public law" arena (for
example, constitutional law and penal law), but also in the "private law" arena,
including the "civil law":
Even in the private law and in the part of this law-the civil law-that
remains closest to the fundamental and individual life of man-, there
are numerous rules, such as those that regulate civil status, the status of
married persons, the control of the paternal power, to give some
1, § 10, at 8; I Figueroa, supra note 74, § 67, at 178-80; Garcia, supra note 1, § 199, at 390-91;
Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at 295; Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, § 355, at 240; 1
Josserand, supra note 18, § 78, at 58-59; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 185-86; 1
Mazeaud et al., supra note I, § 140, at 214-15; 1 Messineo, supra note 74, § 4, at 90-91; 1 Pescio,
supra note 1, § 105, at 336-41; 1 Ripert & Boulanger, supra note 1, § 236, at 112; Roubier,
Transitoire, supra note 1, § 23, at 95-98; Starck, supra note 1, § 482, at 199; 1 Valencia, supra note
18, § 86, at 187-88; Wald, supra note 1, § 46, at 120-21; Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 169, at 175-
76; Enciclopedia, supra note 152, at 1002.
158. Bach, Contribution, supra note 1, § 4, at 410; Bach, Confilts I, supra note 1, § 36, at 5
(same). See also I Alessandri & Somarriva, supra note 1, § 343, at 256 (some legislation, instead
of affecting subjective rights, concerns "situations such as those of minors, interdicts, and prodigals');
Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 39, at 181 (same). See genera*ty Jean Dabin, Le Droit Subjectif
51-52 (1952) ("If subjective right has its place in the law, not everything in the law is reduced to
subjective right. In other words, the objective law ... is not the simple sum of subjective rights ...
with their logical counterpart: the obligation to respect them.... The truth is, on the contrary, that
'subjective right does not cover all the law."); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 171, at 129 ("It
is admitted today that rights do not constitute the whole of juridical matter... (i]t is recognized
by most that certain rules, such as those that concern the organization of the public powers or of the
penal law, give birth to juridical situations that cannot be reduced to a network of rights."); Marty
& Raynaud, supra note 1, § 137, at 256-57 ("If the individual exists and pursues his ends in the
midst of society, this network of individual activities nevertheless does not express the whole of
socialreality. There are, then, some rules thatonemustrecognize create juridical situations that are
not reducible to arrangements of subjective rights. In this category are, for example, the rules on the
organization of the public powers or those of the penal law...."); Weill & Terrd, supra note 2, §
69, at 84 ("The doctrine, in speaking of rights, has erred in not putting into evidence... that these
pretended rights are only some complex ensembles-juridical situations of individuals in relation with
each other, situations that involve as much limitations, conditions, and duties, as liberty, power, or
rights.").
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examples, that are not susceptible of being reduced to a simple network
of subjective ights ... 19
Thus, to attempt to describe all retroactivity in terms of threats to vested rights
is rather like trying to describe all crime in terms of threats to property. Though
it can be done,'6" it comes at a high price: by forcing many of the phenomena
into categories that don't really fit, one inevitably and necessarily ends up
denaturalizing those phenomena.
bb) Oversimplified Typology of Temporal
Effects
In their interpretation of Louisiana's intertemporal law legislation, the
Louisiana courts have assumed, without analysis, that all of the temporal effects
that a new law might possibly produce can be placed in either of two compli-
mentary categories: "retroactive" and "prospective." For the courts, then, these
two categories exhaust the universe of possible temporal effects of a new law.
This binary typology implies either of two things: (i) that, over against the
temporal-effect phenomenon called "prospectivity," there's one and only one
other kind of non-prospective temporal-effectphenomenon or (ii) that, if there's
more than one such phenomenon, the distinctions between them are immaterial
for the purposes of intertemporal law.
The first of these alternative implications-that there's only one other kind
of temporal effect that is non-prospective-is patently false. Indeed, it is
possible to identify no fewer than three different non-prospective temporal-effect
phenomena. The first, which has been termed "extreme retroactivity"'' or
"retroactivity of maximum degree, '162 occurs when the new law (as applied)
alters the creation, extinction, or effects of juridical situations that had already
come to an end before the new law's effective date or would call into question
the creation of a juridical situation that, although still in existence on the new
law's effective date, was created before that date. The second, which has been
termed "pure retroactivity"' 63 or "retroactivity of medium degree," ' occurs
159. 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 137, at 256-57. See also Dabin, supra note 158, at
52 ("[A] crowd of rules of law, and not only of the public or administrative law, but of the private
law, set out some prescriptions, prohibitions, or dispositions to which no active subject corre-
sponds...: it is thus with the rules of organization (public powers, tutelage, civil status), the rules
fixing the conditions for validity, of efficacy, of the proof of facts and of juridical acts, or still the
rules posed in the interest of the public in general.").
160. In the case of a theory of crime, one could, for example, conceptualize crimes against the
person as threats to the body qua property.
161. Rescigno, supra note 1, § 2, at 223-24.
162. 2 Miguel A. Torres & Manuel P. Gonzalez, Diccionario de Derecho Civil § 5, at 550
(1984); Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112.
163. Rescigno, supra note 1, § 2, at 224.
164. 2 Tones & Gonzalez, supra note 162, § 4, at 550; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112.
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when the new law (as applied) alters the past effects (those that accrued before
the new law's effective date) of a juridical situation that, although created before
that date, is still in existence on that date."" The third, which one might call
(following the Latin motif) "ambiactivity,"'" occurs when the new law (as
applied) alters the future effects (those that will accrue only after the new law's
effective date) of a juridical situation that, although created before that date, is
still in existence on that date.
An illustration may serve to drive home these distinctions. Suppose that
Pascal, a landowner, and Olide, a farmer, enter into two successive leases of a
one-arpent tract of farmland: on March 1, 2000 Pascal leases Olide the parcel
for a rent of $100/month and for a term of one year; on March 1, 2001 Pascal
leases Olide the parcel for $100/month and for a term of one year. When the
two leases are executed, the law imposes no restrictions on the magnitude of
rents of farmland. But at the end of the regular legislative session of 2001, the
legislature enacts a law that places a ceiling on rents of farmland of
$50/month/arpent, the effective date of which is September 1, 2001. By that
time, of course, the first lease has long since been "finished." The second lease,
however, is still "in progress": six months have passed and six more are still to
165. Some schemas, in particular, those developed by certain Venezuelan scholars, lump the first
two kinds of non-prospective temporal effects into a single category labelled "second grade" or
"grave" retroactivity. See Codigo Civil, supra note 20, art. 3, § 53, at 151.
166. 1 use the expression "ambiactivity"-formed by combing the Latin prefix ambi, meaning
"both," with the Latin word actio, meaning action-because this temporal effect, strictly speaking,
is neither purely retroactive nor purely prospective in the etymological senses of those words. On
the one band, this effect falls on juridical situations thatwere formed under the old law and, not only
that, on rights and duties ("effects" of juridical situations) that were conceived under the old law.
To that extent the effect seems to involve retroactivity (backward action). On the other hand, this
effect falls on rights and duties that do not become executory-in other words, the performance of
which is not due-and therefore are not truly realized until after the new law takes effect. To that
extent the effect seems to involve prospectivity (forward action). This effect, then, is at once partly
(but not purely) retroactive and partly (but not purely) prospective, to speak etymologically.
By choosing this expression, I part company with European and Latin American scholars, who
have variously referred to this temporal effect (i) in terms that connote retroactivity, such "impure
retroactivity," "retroactivity of minimum degree," "attenuated retroactivity," Rescigno, supra note 1,
§ 2, at 224; 2 Tones & Gonzalez, supra note 162, § 4, at 550; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112;
Codigo Civil, supra note 20, art. 3, § 53, at 151-52, or (ii) in terms that connote non-retroactivity,
such as "immediate effect," Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 3, at 10-11. The trouble with those
labels, in my view, is that they are potentially confusing, especially to the uninitiated. One who
knows little of contemporary civil law theories regarding intertemporal conflicts, upon encountering
these terms, might assume that they are used in a juridical, rather than an etymological, sense and
then, without further analysis, conclude that this temporal effect is or is not proscribed (depending
on whether the author whose work he's reading labels the effect as "impure retroactivity" or the like
or "immediate effect' or the like). The use of these labels, then, permits, if it does not invite, readers
to beg the very question that must be answered here, namely, whether this temporal effect should be
characterized as retroactive in the juridical sense of the word. See Wald, supra note 1, § 47, at 133
("It would always be good to remember, however, that that which some call the immediate effect is,
for others, not that but rather minimum retroactivity.").
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go. If the new law were now to be applied so as to "reduce" the rents that Olide
owed and paid or, in the case of the second half of the term of the second lease,
still owes but hasn't yet paid, the new law would produce a variety of different
non-prospective temporal effects.
First, if applied to the rents owed and paid under the first lease (which, as
a practical matter, would require Pascal to refund half of that rent) the new law
would have an "extremely" or "maximal" retroactive effect. That is so because
those rents represent the "effects" of a juridical situation that came to an end
before the new law's effective date, namely, the first lease.
Second, if applied to the rents owed and already paid under the second lease
(which, as a practical matter, would require Pascal to refund half of the rent paid
during the first six months of the lease term), the new law would have a "pure"
or "moderate" retroactive effect. Those rents represent the "past" effects of a
juridical situation that was created under the old law but was still in existence
when the new law took effect, namely, the second lease.
Third, if applied to the rents owed but not yet paid under the second lease
(which, as a practical matter, would allow Olide to pay and require Pascal to
accept future rental payments of one-half the agreed-upon sum), the new law
would have an "ambiactive" effect. Those rents represent the "future" effects of
a juridical situation that was created under the old law but was still in existence
when the new law took effect, namely, the second lease.
Contrary to the second alternative implication of the "prospective v.
retroactive"antithesis-thatthere's no material differencebetweenthese different
types of non-prospective temporal-effectphenomena-, these distinctions do (or
at least should) matter. To understand why that's true, one has only to recall the
analysis of the competing interests at stake in the typical intertemporal conflict
case.'67 First, every such conflict involves a collision of competing interests:
on the one hand, the progressive interests-those that favor the plenary
application of the new law-and, on the other hand, the conservative inter-
ests-those that favor the continued application of the old law. Any solution to
such a conflict therefore necessarily and inevitably entails a "balancing"
(reconciliation) of these competing interests. Second, the reason for maintaining
the old law is that it's unfair, not to mention inimical to economic development
in the long run, to "change the rules" on the players in the middle of the game.
Thus, equity and economic well-being demand that persons' reasonable
expectations be respected. Now, if these propositions are true, then it stands to
reason that (i) as the strength of the adversely-affected person's expectations
changes, so does the "weight" of the "conservative" interest side of the scale and
(ii) as the weight of that side declines, the scale begins to tilt the other way, that
is, in favor of the "progressive" interests. This conclusion is significant here, for
the strength of the expectations threatened by temporal effects phenomena other
than pure prospectivity are not the same. To the contrary, as one moves from
167. See supra notes 18-48 and accompanying text.
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maximal retroactivity to ambiactivity, one encounters expectations of ever
decreasing strength.
The "rent-control" hypothetical makes this point clear. Consider, first, what
would happen if the new law were applied in such a way as to reduce the rents
owed and already paid under the first lease (the lease that terminated long
ago)-the case of "maximal" retroactivity. This application of the new law
would frustrate the lessor's expectation that he can keep (and, therefore, use as
he will) all of the rent that he already and long ago collected. That expectation
will undoubtedly be "firm," and with good reason. The risk that he might
possibly be compelled to give up all or part of that money is, at this juncture,
remote. To be sure, it's not impossible. For example, it might turn out that the
lessee lacked contractual capacity for some reason (minority, insanity, etc.) or
that his consent to the lease was vitiated for some reason (error, fraud, duress),
in which case the lessee might be able to "nullify" the lease and, in the (very
unlikely) event that the rent exceededthe value of the use of the land, get some
sort of refund. Or it might turn out that the lessee, who, at the time he made the
rental payments, was on the verge of bankruptcy, has since been declared
bankrupt, in which case his creditors might be able to recover part of those
payments. But these scenarios are so unlikely that the lessor is entitled not to
worry about them.
Next, consider what would happen if the new law were applied in such a
way as to reduce the rents owed and already paid under the second lease (the
lease that's still running)-the case of"moderate"retroactivity. This application
of the new law would frustrate the lessor's expectation that he can keep (and,
therefore, use as he will) all of the rent that he already, but not so long ago,
collected. That expectation will likewise be "firm," though not quite as firm as
the first. In addition to the "compulsory return" risks that he faced in connection
with the first lease, he now faces at least one other: an action to dissolve the
lease for impossibility of performance. Imagine that, just as the second half of
the lease term begins, some freakish event (for example, a hurricane, a war, a
collision between the earth and an asteroid) occurs, effectively preventing the
lessee from paying the rent. The lessee will then be entitled to bring an action
to dissolve the lease on grounds of impossibility of performance, in which event
he will be able to demand restoration of the rent already paid, less the value that
he received for the use of the land during the first six months. This risk, though
certainly real, is remote for at least two reasons: (1) the unlikelihood that the
freakish event will occur and (2) the unlikelihood that the court will find that the
rent exceeded the use value of the land. And so, though the lessor has more to
worry about here than he did in connection with the first lease, he still need not
worry much.
Finally, consider what would happen if the new law were to be applied to
reduce the rents owed but not yet paid under the second lease-the ambiactivity
scenario. This application of the new law would no doubt frustrate the lessor's
expectation that he will eventually receive all of the rent that is still outstanding.
But this expectation is considerably less "firm" than the first two. Why?
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Because the lessor now faces several additional risks. The first is the "height-
ened" risk of an effective action to dissolve the lease for impossibility of
performance. The risk that the lessee will bring such an action is no greater here
than it was in the second scenario: the likelihood that a freakish event will occur
is the same. But now the risk that the action, if brought, will be successful, that
is, will be able to force the lessor to forfeit the rent, is much greater. That is so
because, with respect to the rent that has not yet been paid, the lessor cannot
demand a setoff in the amount of the use value of the land: the lessee owes no
use value for that which he hasn't yet used. The second, and more significant,
is the risk that the lessee, for whatever reason, simply won't pay. In that event,
of course, the lessor could try to realize his expectation by (i) suing the lessee
to enforce the lease, that is, to compel him to pay the rent or (ii) leasing the land
to someone else. But both alternatives are fraught with uncertainties: the first,
because (i) the cost of suing the lessee (attorney fees, court costs, etc.) may be
too high, (ii) the lessee may be insolvent, or (iii) the lessee may be judgment-
proof (e.g., if he attained a bankruptcy judgment discharging him from his
liabilities) and, the second, because the lessor can't be sure he'll even be able to
find a new lessee, much less one who'd be willing to pay so high a rent. Thus,
the still outstanding rent from lease #2, unlike the rent collected under lease #1
or lease #2, is anything but "in the bag."
2) Harmony16
i) Internal Disharmony
Defining retroactivity in terms of "vested rights" has the inevitable
consequence of reducing the second rule of Article 6-that procedural and
interpretative legislation may be retroactively applied-to a conceptual muddle.
That this is so becomes clear when one considers the relationship between vested
rights, on the one hand, and procedural or interpretative legislation, on the other.
If one can take seriously certain propositions that the courts routinely put
forward regarding the nature of that relationship, 69 then it would seein that
legislation of that kind cannot, as a logical matter, threaten vested rights.
Consider, first, the implications of this standard jurisprudential statement
regarding procedural legislation and vested rights: "no one has a vested right in
168. See supra note 114.
169. As a general rule one ought to take seriously what others say, if for no other reason than
that it's courteous, not to mention moral, to give others the benefit of the doubt. But when the
speaker, immediately after making a statement, flatly contradicts it, then one is entitled to make an
exception.
With respectto the standard jurisprudential statements regarding procedural and interpretative laws
that I'm about to examine, such an exception may be in order. As I will point out below, see infra
text at pp. 61-62 & notes 171 & 173, the courts often make statements about procedural and
interpretative laws that cannot be squared with their statements about the meaning of retroactivity.
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any given mode of procedure." 0 Now, if that is true, then for a change in
procedural legislation to deprive anyone of a vested right would, by definition,
be impossible.' Next, consider the implications of the standard jurisprudential
account of the interplay between interpretative legislation and vested rights. The
"theory" behind interpretative legislation, as Judge Rubin once explained it, is as
follows:
Interpretative laws do not establish new rules; they merely determine the
meaning of existing laws and may thus be applied to facts occurring
prior to their promulgation. In these circumstances, there is an apparent
rather than real retroactivity, because it is the original rather than the
interpretative law that establishes rights and duties. 7 '
If that is true, then a new interpretative law, just like a new procedural law,
"cannot properly be said to divest vested rights."'73
Once one understands that, the problem with defining retroactivity in terms
of "vested rights" comes into bold relief. If a retroactive application is one that
deprives someone of a vested right and if new procedural or interpretative
170. Producers Oil & Gas Co. v. Nix, 488 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); see also
Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidal Control Levee Dist., 445 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (La. 1984) ("there
is no vested right to a particular remedy (which means the procedure used in effectuating substantive
rights)"); Adams v. Adams, 673 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996) ("Because the statute
addresses the mode or means of the trial, it is a procedural matter, which does not affect any vested
rights... ."); DOTD v. McClendon, 552 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) ("there is no
vested right to aparticular remedy"), overruled on othergrounds by DOTD v. Stem, 570 So. 2d 513,
515 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
171. This inference contradicts an ineluctable implication ofanotherproposition aboutprocedural
legislation that the courts are wont to repeat The other proposition is this: the constitution forbids
that procedural legislation be applied retroactively "so as to divest... [a] vested right" Cole v.
Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058,1063-64 (La. 1992); seealso Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidal Control
Dist., 445 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (La. 1984); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521, 523 (La. 1979); Hargrave,
supra note 54, at 601. The implication is that, but for this prohibition, procedural legislation could
possibly be applied in such a way as to deprive persons of vested rights.
If and when the courts decide to stop talking gibberish when it comes to issues of intertemporal
law, they'll have to choose one proposition or the other. They can't have it both ways.
172. Laubie v. Sonesta Int'l Hotel Corp., 752 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J.) (citing
Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La. 1978) & Yiannopoulos, supra
note 19, § 43, at 68). See also Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff's Risk Management Fund, 664 So. 2d
81, 86 n.9 (La. 1995); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 818 (La. 1993).
173. Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 724 (La. 1994); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338-39 (La. 1978); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576,591(La. 1975).
If you half way pay attention to other things the courts sometimes say about interpretative laws,
then this inference-that interpretative legislation can't divest vested rights-will leave you baffled.
Consider this example: the constitution forbids that interpretative legislation be applied retroactively
"so as to divest a person of a vested right." Smith, 609 So. 2d at 816 & n.11 & 819. The
implication of this proposition is that, in the absence of the prohibition, interpretative rules could
possibly be applied in such a way as to deprive persons of vested rights. Now, which is it?
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legislation cannot possibly deprive anyone of a vested right, then a retroactive
application of such legislation is, as a logical matter, impossible. And if that is
true, then Article 6, to the extent that it authorizes retroactive applications of
such legislation, is a waste of legislative breath.
ii External Disharmony
Defining retroactivity in terms of "vested rights" has the inevitable
consequence of bringing much of Article 6 into conflict with higher-ranking
norms, namely, several provisions of the federal and state constitutions. That this
is so becomes clear when one considers the interplay between that limitation, as
the courts routinely formulate it, and several of the rules of Article 6.
The constitutional requirement of "due process," the courts have concluded,
prohibits the legislature from according "retroactive effect" to legislation in any
and every case in which doing so would threaten vested rights. As the state
supreme court recently explained,
since the application of legislative enactments has constitutional
implications under the due process ... clauses of both the United States
and Louisiana Constitution, even where the Legislature has expressed
its intent to give a new a substantive law retroactive effect, the law may
not be applied retroactively if it would... disturb vested rights. 74
Now, if one sets this limitation alongside the rules of Article 6, while
defining retroactivity in terms of vested rights, one ends up with a host of results
that are nothing short of astonishing. Those results, which I'll illustrate shortly,
can be 'summed up as follows: both the first rule of Article 6-that the
legislature may specify that legislation, including substantive legislation, shall be
accorded retroactive effect-and the second rule of Article 6-that procedural
and interpretative legislation apply retroactively as a matter of
course-necessarily and inevitably violate due process.
Consider, first, the problem with the first rule of Article 6. Imagine that the
legislature has just enacteda statute that everyone would agree should be classified
as substantive. If Article 6 means what it says, then the legislature should be able
to accord that statute retroactive effect. But is that everpermissible, constitution-
ally speaking? In other words, can one conceive of even a single instance in
which the legislature might possibly, at one and the same time, accord retroactive
174. Keith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 694 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1997). See also
Smith, 609 So. 2d at 816 n.l 1 ("no law can be retroactively applied so as to divest a party of a
vested right as this would violate the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions"); Cole,
599 So. 2d at 1063 ("statutes enacted after the acquisition of... a vested property right... cannot
be retroactively applied so as to divest the plaintiff of his vested right ... because such a retroactive
application would contravene the due process guarantees"); Hargrave, supra note 54, at 601
("remedial or procedural statute cannot apply retroactively if they divest a vested right'); La. Civ.
Code art. 6, cmt. (b).
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effectto such a statute without trampling on someone's due process rights? If one
defines retroactivity in terms of vested rights, then the answer must be "no."
Why? Because for the statute to be "retroactively applied," as we've defined the
term retroactive, that statute must necessarily deprive someone of a vested right.
And if the statute does that, it's necessarily unconstitutional as applied.
Next, consider the problem with the exception to the second rule of Article
6. Imagine that the legislature hasjust enacteda statute that everyone would agree
should be classified as procedural or interpretative. If Article 6 means what it
says, then that statute must be accorded retroactive effect as a matter of course.
But is that ever permissible, constitutionally speaking? In other words, can one
conceive of even a single instance in which such a statute might have that effect
without, at the same time, violating someone's due process rights? If one defines
retroactivity in terms of vested rights, then the answer must be "no." Why?
Because for the statute to be "retroactively applied," as we've defined the term
retroactive, that statute must necessarily deprive someone of a vested right. And
if the statute does that, it's necessarily unconstitutional as applied.
3) Correspondence"'
One of the most serious defects of the vested-rights theory is its "explanatory
impotence," or, to use the lexicon of juridical technique, the lack of "correspon-
dence" between the solutions it dictates and the solutions arrived at by the courts.
175. No body of law can be considered technically sound unless there is a "complete correspon-
dence" between the solutions to which that body of law, if given a straightforward interpretation,
would seem to lead and the concrete solutions at which those charged with applying that law arrive.
3 Giny, Science, supra note 113, § 223, at 209-10 ("Concepts that form juridical constructions must
be exactly adapted to the positive realities of the living law. It is necessary that the construction
cover all the rules that relate to each other, in such a fashion that there is a complete correspondence
between the solutions given in fact and the conceptual garb in which they are dressed up. Otherwise,
the process bankrupts its mission: the process becomes false and pernicious."). If, in order to make
those concrete solutions "fit' the conceptual constructions in terms of which the rules are cast, those
constructions must be stretched and contorted if not deformed, then, provided that those solutions
adequately translate the juridical policy behind the body of law, those constructions should be
replaced with others with which those solutions have a better fit. As G6ny once observed,
when a new situation arises and it appears useful, for purposes of governing that situation,
to put our [established] abstract analytical procedure into question, it would be better to
have fresh recourse to a new construction, rather than to cause the intellectual molds to
burst due to an abusive use of them that would poorly match their effective contours.
Id. at 211. See generally Robert Anthony Pascal, Of The Civil Code and Us, 59 La. L. Rev. 301,
307 (1998) (26th John H. Tucker, Jr., Lecture in Civil Law, March 19, 1998) (to cast legislation in
terms that 'o longer convey the intended meaning of the legislated law... is a sloppy way to write
a civil code.'). It would be "better" to do so because anytime the law on the books is out of sync
with the law in practice-whenever, in other words, the law on the books is not "sufficient in itself'
to describe the law in practice-, the security of juridical commerce is threatened. de ]a Mamierre,
supra note 114, § 16, at 38 (legislation "ought to be sufficient in itself" to convey its meaning;
requiring the interpreter to consult other authorities to determine its meaning produces "inconvenienc-
es" that present "a certain danger for the security of juridical commerce").
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As we will soon see, one can isolate a number of cases of "non-retroactivity"
that seem to involve the deprivation of vestedrights as well as a number of cases
of "retroactivity" that don't seem to involve the deprivation of vested rights. 76
i) Non-Retroactivity Despite the Loss of
Vested Rights
The vested rights criterion, rigorously applied, is at an utter loss to explain
a number of intertemporal conflicts cases in which the courts have found no
retroactivity.'" Nowhere is the truth of this proposition better demonstrated
than in the realm of real rights.
Consider this illustration. X, a real estate developer, purchases a tract of rural
swampland, which he hopes to develop into an industrial mall. At the time of the
sale, no law stands in the way of this kind of development. Shortly after the sale,
however, the government enacts a "wetlands protection law," one that forbids any
commercial or residential development that might have a "significant adverse
impact" on the ecology of wetlands areas. X's tract of land qualifies as such an
area. For X, of course, the application of the new law would mean a substantial
loss of his usus rights7 s over his property, rights that, at least before the
enactment of the new law, were fully "vested" elements of his patrimony.
79
Prior to the enactment of the new law X could have dealt with these usus rights
as he wished, for example, could have sold them along with the rest of his rights
or could have ceded them to someone else in the form of a usufruct or a lease. If
rights such as this aren't vested, then no rights are. Thus, it would seem that if
retroactivity is defined in terms of vested rights, then the new prohibition cannot
be applied to already-established wetlands owners, such as X.
It is doubtful, however, whether the courts would reach that conclusion. In
a number of cases in which the courts have had to consider the temporal effects
of new laws that restrict the prerogatives of ownership, the courts have ruled that
such laws, as appliedto existing owners, do not operate retroactively. Illustrative
176. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 170-71 ("We have seen... that laws can be
retroactive without impinging on acquired rights; we now see some laws that impinge on acquired
rights without being retroactive."); Tavemier, supra note 1, at 245 ("[There are some cases of
retroactivity without an attack on acquired rights."); Wald, supra note 1, § 47, at 133 ("In reality
laws can be retroactive without violating acquired rights ... and can violate acquired rights without
being retroactive.").
177. 1 Galindo, supra note 1, § 74, at 168; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at 296;
1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 106, at 186; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 169;
Wald, supra note 1, § 47, at 1332.
178. In the civil law as in classical Roman law, ownership is understood to comprise three
distinct real rights (that is, rights in things), namely, usus (the right to apply the thing to this or that
purpose),frtus (the right to take the natural or civil fruits that the thing produces), and abusus (the
right to dispose of the thing, both physically and juridically). See La. Civ. Code art. 477 (defining
"ownership").
179. For the definition of "patrimony," see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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of this genre of cases are those that involve "rezoning." Take, for example, the
case of Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson."° Ransome acquired
a certain tract of land with the intention of putting up a restaurant on it. Soon
after the sale, Ransome began construction of the restaurant. At the time of the
sale and at the moment when construction began, the tract was subject to no
particular zoning restrictions. But before Ransome could complete construction,
the police jury, at the urging of several of Ransome's neighbors, enacted a new
zoning ordinance that classified as "residential" all land within the subdivision
in which Ransome's lot was situated. Ransome then sued the police jury,
seeking to have the new ordinance declaredunconstitutional as applied to his lot.
Among the various theories that Ransome advanced in support of his claim was
that "the zoning ordinance would be retroactive if applied to [his] property."
2l
The supreme court, however, disagreed. In the court's estimation, "the
prohibition against the establishment of a place of business in the [residential]
district is prospective and not retroactive," for "the ordinance prohibits the
establishment of places of business in the residential district only after the
effective date of the ordinance itself."' " Whatever else one might say about
this decision, one cannot say that it is consistent with the "vested rights" theory.
ii) Retroactivity Without the Loss of Vested
Rights
The vested rights criterion, rigorously applied, is unable to explain a number
of intertemporal conflicts cases in which the courts have found retroactivity.
Those cases can be grouped into the following categories: those that involve (i)
conditional rights, (ii) progressive juridical situations, (iii) the formal validity of
testaments, (iv) null juridical acts, and (v) extra-patrimonial rights.
aa) Conditional Rights
The "vested rights" would seem to offer conditional rights no protection
against threats posed by new legislation.' By definition, a conditional right
cannot be an "acquired right," properly so called.' That is so because "the
conditional right is... in suspense and depends on an event whose realization
is uncertain.'" s Indeed, unless and until that event occurs, the "ultimate
enforceability" of the "right" is plagued by "uncertainty."'"
180. 216 La. 994, 45 So. 2d 601 (La. 1950).
181. Id. at 998,45 So. 2d at 602.
182. Id. at 1000, 45 So. 2d at 602.
183. Level, supra note 1, § 44, at 74; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 169; Wald,
supra note 1, § 47, at 132-33.
184. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 169.
185. Id.
186. 1 Safil Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations § 5.8, at 93, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
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The courts, however, have consistently ruled that conditional rights deserve
as much protection from the effects of new laws as do unconditional rights.
Consider, for example, the early case of Town v. Syndics of Morgan, Dorsey &
Co.'"7 A partnership executed a note in favor of a certain creditor. To secure
the indebtedness represented by the note, Dorsey, one of the partners, endorsed
it. Under the law that was then in force, this creditor, by virtue of the
endorsement, was entitled to a preference over other creditors of the partnership
with respect to the assets of Dorsey's estate. Sometime later, but before the note
had come due, the government changed the law, eliminating the preference. The
partnership then defaulted on the note, as well as on its other obligations,
prompting the partnership's creditors to assert their rights against the assets of
the partners' individual estates. Relying upon the old law, the creditor that held
the note claimed a preference over the other partnership creditors. Those other
creditors, relying on the new law, denied that the first creditor was entitled to
such a preference. Though the court acknowledged that the preferred creditor's
preference was a merely conditional right, inasmuch as it was "depend[ent] on
a future and uncertain event" (the maker's failure to pay), the court ruled that the
new law was without power to alter that right.' As the court explained,
[W]hether the law, at the time the obligation was contracted, or that in
force when the condition took place, should govern the rights of the
parties, is not a difficult question .... [T]he right which results from
the engagement is deemed to be acquired from the time of the con-
tract. 89
And so the court applied the old law."9 Though this result makes sense in
terms of political technique, the "vested rights" theory is at a loss to explain it.
bb) Interests Related to Progressive
Juridical Situations
Certain juridical situations can be described as "progressive," in the sense that
they are "in the process" of creating or extinguishing rights or duties or juridical
relations. Consider, for example, a case of acquisitive prescription of land. While
the prescriptive period is still running, one can say that the prescriber is "in the
(1992). See also Alain A. Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Obligations in General: A Prcis 62 (3d ed.
1996); 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 164, at 296; Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, § 319, at 144.
187. 2 La. 112 (1830).
188. Id. at 113.
189. Id.
190. See also United States ex rel. Myra Clark Gaines v. City of New Orleans, 17 F. 483 (E.D.
La. 1883) ("Our jurisprudence is settled that, in conditional obligations, the law which exists at the
time the obligation was contracted, and not that which exists when the condition takes place, governs
the rights of the parties."), rev'd on other grounds by City of New Orleans v. United States ex rel.
Gaines's Adm'r, 131 U.S. 220, 9 S. Ct. 755 (1889).
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process" of creating a real right, namely, ownership of an immovable, and that, for
the time being, he has only a right-in-becoming. Next, consider the situation of
an estranged husband and wife who have lived separate and apart for four months.
As the clock continues ticking, one can say that the spouses are "in the process"
of terminating their juridical relation-marriage-as well as their mutual rights
and duties and, further, that those rights are only rights-in-ceasing.
Insofar as interests related to such situations are concerned, the vested rights
criterion affords no protection against threats posed by new laws. 9' Consider,
again, the example of acquisitive prescription of land. Suppose that, when the
would-be prescriber first takes possession of the land (without title), (i) he is
married to the owner of the land and (ii) a certain statute provides that marriage
suspends prescription. Later on, after twenty-nine years have passed, the
government repeals that statute, thereby eliminating marriage as a cause for the
suspension of prescription. Can the new law be applied to this juridical situation
in such a way as to permit the husband to count the past twenty-nine years toward
the satisfaction of the thirty-year delay requirement? If"retroactivity"is defined
in terms of "vested rights," then the answer should be "yes." Just as the husband's
right-in-becoming is not a vested right, so the interest that the wife derived from
the suspension rule was not a vested right. And so, one would have to conclude
that to apply the new law to this situation would not be to apply it retroactively.
That the jurispmdencewould countenance such a result seems most unlikely.
Though the courts have rarely, if ever, wrestled with this kind of problem in the
context of acquisitive prescription, they have wrestled with it in the context of the
prescription of non-use. And the results in those cases make it clear that the
suspension of prescription cannot be erased after the fact without retroactivity.
Take, for example, the case of Mire v. Hawkins. 92 Several persons, all of them
minors, received a number of mineral servitudes. For over a decade thereafter,
none of these persons exercisedhis servitude rights. At the time, the law provided
that prescription did not run against minors. About four years later, however, the
government changed the law to provide that "prescription with regard to mineral
interests was not suspended or interrupted by reason of minority." When the
decade was up, several persons with interests opposed to those of the minor
servitude holders contended that the servitude had been extinguished through the
prescription of non-use. The minors opposed this contention, arguing that
prescription had been suspended throughout their minority. Countering that
argument, the minors' opponents, in reliance on the new law, maintained that the
minors were not entitled to claim the benefit of suspension under the old law. The
minors disagreed, arguing that to apply the new law to them would be to apply it
retroactively and that, as a substantive law, the new law could not be so applied.
Though the court ruled for the minors' opponents, it was not because the court
191. Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, § 356, at 241; Level, supra note 1, § 44, at 74-75; Roubier,
Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 170.
192. 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (Tate, J.)
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rejected their argument that the new law, as applied to their case, operated
"retroactively." To the contrary, the court ruled as it did because it concluded that
the government had intended for the new law to be retroactively applied.193 This
characterizationof the effect of the new law, though certainly understandable and
perhaps even defensible on some other basis, cannot be defendedby means of the
"vested rights" theory.
cc) Formal Validity of Testaments
It is well settled that "succession rights do not vest until the death of the
decedent."194 Before that time, the decedent's heirs and legatees (if any) enjoy,
at most, a mere expectationof rights. Their rights, in other words, are still rights-
in-becoming.
Because that is so, the vested rights criterion cannot protect legatees from
adverse changes in the law regarding the prerequisites for testamentary validity
that intervene in the interim between the execution of the testament and the death
of the decedent.'95 Take this example. Suppose that the would-be testator, T,
some years before his death, executes a testament in which he leaves a universal
legacy to his child, A, but nothing to his child, B. The reason that T makes the
legacy to A and not to B is that T suspects that B had spread some nasty rumors
around town regarding T's paramour. T, however, is mistaken: the real source
of the rumors was A. At the time, the law provides that a donation mortis causa
can be nullified for fraud or duress, it cannot be nullified for error. A few years
later, but before T's death, the government amends the law of testaments to
provide that legacieswhich result from error are null. Can the new law be applied
to this juridical situation in such a way as to void the legacy and, therefore, strip
the A of the bequest? If"retroactivity"is defined in terms of "vestedrights," then
the answer would be "yes." To apply the new law in this fashion would not be to
deprive the legatees of any vested rights, but to defeat his mere expectations.'I
The courts, however, would never embrace such a result. Consider the recent
case of Succession of Dowling.'97 Dowling, an elderly attorney in poor health,
193. Id. at 799-801.
194. Succession of Doli v. Doll, 593 So. 2d 1239, 1255 (La. 1992); Henry v. Jean, 238 La. 314,
325-26, 115 So. 2d 363, 367 (La. 1959).
195. 1 Galindo, supra note 1, § 74, at 168; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 170.
196. One cannot escape this box by shifing the focus of analysis from the legatees to the
testator, that is, by inquiring whether the testator had a vested right to make out his testament in the
form that he chose. A vested right, it will be recalled, is first and foremost a patrimonial right.
Now, whatever interest a testator may have in the formal validity of his testament can hardly be
considered patrimonial. To see why, one has only to ask whether this interest produces any of the
effects associated with patrimonial rights: Is this interest one that the testator could have sold or
donated to another? One that the testator's creditors could have seized in the event he failed to pay
his debts to them? One that the testator's heirs could have inherited? Each of these questions
demands a negative response.
197. 633 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
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executed a testament in which he left sizeable bequests to both his secretary and
his associate. At the time, the law provided that a legacy could be nullified for
"undue influence," provided that the legatee or third person who had pressured the
testator into making the bequest had done so at the moment at which the
disposition was made, and that the standard of proof with respect to undue
influence was clear and convincing evidence. Sometime later Dowling died.
After the succession proceedings got under way, one of Dowling's heirs
challengedthe testament on the ground that it was the product of undue influence,
in particular, that of the secretary and associate. By that time, however, the
government had changed the law to provide that a legacy could be nullified for
undue influence regardless of the time at which the pressure had been brought to
bear upon the testator and to lower the applicable standard of proof to a mere
preponderance of the evidence where a confidential relationship existed between
the legatee and the testator. The challengermaintained that, at the very least, the
new standard-of-proof rule, which the challenger characterized as "procedural,"
should be applied. The legatees opposed that proposal, arguing that the new
standard-of-proof rule was inseparable from the other new rule, that is, that which
altered the timing rule for undue influence and, further, that to apply these new
rules to such a case, that is, one in which the testament was confected before the
new law, would be to apply them retroactively. That would be impermissible, the
legatees further argued, because the new timing rule was substantive. The court
sided with the legatees. Agreeing with the legatees that the new rules, as applied
to the case, would operate "retroactively,"' 98 the court ruled that "the law as it
existed at the time the testator's will was confected... applies in this case."'"
This result, though probably "right" as a matter of political technique, cannot be
reconciled with the "vested rights" theory."r
dd) Interests Related to Null Juridical
Acts
If retroactivity is defined in terms of vested rights, then no obstacle should
stand in the way of the post hoc validation of null juridical acts.2 ' That is true
whether the nullity in question is absolute or relative. Consider, for example,
one who loses a wager during an illegal poker game. After his loss, but before
198. Id. at 855 n.6.
199. Id. at 855.
200. 1 recognize that, since the change in laws involved in this case occurred after Dowling's
death, the result in this case might be explained on the theory that Dowling (or perhaps his legatees)
acquired a "vested right" in connection with his testament at the moment of his dea)i. But that is
not how the court explained the result. The court described the applicable law not as "the law in
effect at the time of Dowling's death," but rather as "the law in effect at the time of Dowling's
testament." For the court, then, the critical moment for determining what, if any, interests Dowling
had that deserved to be protected from the ravages of new laws was not the moment of his death,
but the moment at which he made out his testament.
201. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 170.
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he has paid, the government changes the law, legalizing all poker games. Can
this new law be applied to the loser's situation in such a way as to validate what,
at the time, was an absolutely null act? If retroactivity is defined in terms of
vested rights, it's hard to see why not. A null juridical act, by definition,
produces no effects, that is, creates no rights, duties, or relations. Thus, there
would be nothing for the new law to divest. Again, consider a child of sixteen
years who places a telephone order for the "Best of Motley Crile" collection in
response to an ad in Rolling Stone. After the sale has been completed, the
government changes the law, reducing the age of majority to 14. Can this new
law be applied to the loser's situation in such a way as to validate what, at the
time, was an absolutely null act? If retroactivity is defined in terms of vested
rights, it's hard to see why not. Insofar as the seller is concerned, the application
of the new law, far from depriving him of any rights, would simply confirm the
rights that the contract was supposed to give him. Insofar as the minor is
concerned, the contract, as a null juridical act, supposedly produced no effects.
The minor, therefore, has nothing to lose." 2
These results, however, find no support in the jurisprudence. It is well
settled that a new law cannot validate a juridical act that, under the law in force
at the time of its execution, was absolutely null. Consider, for example, Lieber
v. Caddo Levee District Board of Commissioners.0 3 Back in the 1950s, the
Department of Highways purchased a servitude over a tract of land for the
purpose of extending a highway. Under the law in force at that time, however,
the Department was prohibited from purchasing any interest in land less than full
ownership. Sometime later the government changed the law, authorizing the
Department to "acquire any use of the property or the full ownership of it."
When a dispute later arose over the validity of the servitude agreement, the
Department, citing the new law, contended that it was valid. The court,
202. One might object, however, that this analysis ignores what one might call the "nullification"
rights of those whom nullity adversely affects. Consider, again, the wager hypothetical. Should the
winner demand that the loser pay off, the loser can bring an action to have his "promise to pay"
(which is the essence of every wager) declared absolutely null. Or, consider, once again, the sale-to-
a-minor hypothetical. If he wants to, the minor can sue the seller for the return of the purchase price
on the ground that the sale was relatively null. These litigious rights, which the application of new
laws legitimizing gambling or reducing the age of minority (as the case might be) would eliminate,
constitute "vested rights," it can be argued. This was, in fact, the position taken by the adherents of
the doctrine of "acquired rights" in Europe. See Roubier, supra note 1, § 36, at 170.
This objection is not persuasive. For one thing, this supposed "vested right" is one of "singular
content": an acquired right which has no object other than to bring about the recognition of the fact
that nothing has been acquired! Id. Furthermore, when one considers the purpose behind the
retroactivity rule as it's understood by the proponents of the vested rights theory-to protect
reasonable expectations born of the old law-, one is hard-pressed to find any justification for
protecting this "right." It goes without saying that one who enters into an absolutely or relatively
null act does so, not in reliance on the law that renders that act null, but rather in the hope that that
law (if the actor is even aware of it at all) will not be invoked. Thus, even if nullification rights can
be considered "vested," it's difficult to understand why they ought to be protected.
203. 660 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
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however, disagreed. According to the court, to apply this new law to the
servitude agreement, which the court, relying on the old law, described as
"absolutely null," would be to apply the law retroactively. Because the new law
was substantive, the court ruled, the new law could not be so applied.
2°4
Equally well settled is the rule that a relative nullity cannot be validated via
an after-the-fact change in the law. Among the many cases that stand for this
proposition is Freeman v. Freeman."5 A husband and wife, after first having
obtained a judicial separation and then having reconciled, allegedly formed a
joint venture or partnership with respect to certain of their assets. At the time,
however, the law imposed upon spouses an incapacity to contract with each
other. Sometime later the government changed the law, eliminating this
incapacity. A short time after that the wife filed for divorce. When the wife
demanded her half of the partnership property, the husband, citing the old law,
argued that the partnership agreement was invalid, in particular, was relatively
null. In rebuttal, the wife, citing the new law, contended that her partnership
agreement with her husband was valid. The court sided with the husband. To
apply the new law so as to legitimize the relatively null agreement, the court
reasoned, would have been to apply that law retroactively. And that, the court
concluded, was impermissible.2"
The results in Lieber and Freeman and similar cases, 7 though perhaps
politically justifiable, cannot be explained in terms of the "vested rights" theory.
In all of these cases the courts refused to use new legislation to validate null
juridical acts, notwithstanding that so validating those acts would not have
threatened any vested rights.
ee) Interests Related to Status
Laws regarding status give rise to a multitude of juridical interests. Take for
example the status of minor. Absent certain unusual circumstances that are of
no interest to us here, every minor is subjected to the authority of his parent or,
if he has none living, the authority of his tutor and, for a wide variety of
purposes, can act juridically only with the approval and participation of his
parent or tutor. But when the minor reaches the age of majority, he is released
from parental or tutorial authority (as the case might be) and, from that point
forward, can act juridically on his own.
The interests to which this or that status gives rise, which can be substantial,
are open to the vagaries of new laws under the vested rights criterion."S That
204. Id. at 193.
205. 430 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
206. Id. at 678-79.
207. Cf Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19,23-24 (La. 1995) (refusing to apply new legislation
regarding "detrimental reliance" so as to render enforceable a promise that, under prior law, was
unenforceable).
208. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 36, at 170.
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is so because those interests qualify as faculties or expectations rather than as
vested rights.0 9 Consider, for example, the interests that tutorship creates in
favor of the tutor (for example, the right to make decisions regarding the minor's
domicile, discipline, education, religious formation, and property). After a
tutorship has already been established in favor of one person (say, a grandpar-
ent), can a new law that establishes a different regime of preference for tutors
(say, an aunt or uncle) be used to force the replacement of the original tutor by
a new one? If retroactivity is defined in terms of vested rights, then the answer
has to be "yes." The interest that a particular person has in serving or continuing
to serve as tutor can hardly be considered a vested right. If this interest qualifies
as a "right" at all, it is an extra-patrimonial right or, in more common terms, not
a "property" right.2 0 Nor does the interest that the minor has in a particular
person's serving or continuing to serve as his tutor rise to the level of a vested
right. Though this interest is undoubtedly significant, it does not qualify as a
"right," properly so called, and, in any event, is indisputably extra-patrimoni-
al."' The "vested rights" theory, then, presents no obstacle to applying new
tutorship laws to already-establishedtutorships.
The courts, however, have at least on some occasions shielded existing
tutorships from the effects of new tutorship laws. Take the recent case of In re
Sanches." After having been married for several years, during which they
produced a single child, the Sancheses obtained a divorce. The court granted
custody of the child to both parents jointly, designating Mrs. Sanches as the
domiciliary parent. Sometime later, Mrs. Sanches died. In her testament, Mrs.
Sanches expressed her wish that, in the event of her death, her brother, Roger
Fleshman, be appointed as tutor over her child's property. The law in force at
209. Id.
210. Starck, supra note 1, § 168, at 76 ("One will range ... among these extra-patrimonial
rights of a familial character the power of a tutor in regard to his pupil."). See also Carbonnier,
supra note 54, § 166, at 302 (extra-patrimonial rights include "not only the public and political rights
of the individual, but also certain private rights (for example, the rights that constitute parental
authority, the actions that protect the status of persons .... '); I Chevallier & Bach, supra note 2,
at 41 (extra-patrimonial rights include "family rights that flow from marriage or from filiation, such
as rights attached to parental authority.... ); 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 122, at 105
(extra-patrimonial rights include "family rights," that is, "those that result from the quality of spouse,
parent,... or child"); Cornu, supra note I, § 61, at 32 ("The relations of a personal order among
members of the family form the framework of certain extra-patrimonial rights," among them "the
authority of parents over the persons of their children," which entails the "rights of custody,
surveillance, and education."); I Josserand, supra note 18, § 648, at 374 (extra-patrimonial rights are
"such as family rights (paternal power and marital power)"); I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, §
144, at 266 (extra-patrimonial rights "are given to a person to protect his physical and moral
individuality, his family life, his social life: thus .... the rights of the head of the family.....);
I Mazeaud et al., supra note I, § 289, at 397 (extra-patrimonial rights include the rights of "status"
and "filiation'); Weill & Terr, supra note 2, § 363, at 354 (extra-patrimonial rights include "the
rights of parents over the person and things of their child").
211. See authorities collected supra note 210.
212. 619 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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that time, however, reserved to the "parent dying last" the exclusive right to
appoint the child's tutor, not only with respect to the child's person, but also
with respect to the child's property.2 " Relying on that law, Mr. Sanches
appointed himself tutor over the child for all purposes, including the administra-
tion of the child's property. When Mr. Sanches applied to the court for
confirmation, Fleshman opposed him. A few years later the government
amended the law to authorize each parent to designate a tutor to administer any
property that the child might receive by virtue of an inheritance from that
parent.2 "4 Though it is not clear whether Mrs. Sanches' brother tried to invoke
this new law in support of his opposition, the court of appeal made it clear that
any such attempt would have been futile. According to the court of appeal, to
apply this new law to such a case would be to apply it retroactively. Since it
was a substantive law, the court of appeal further explained, the new law could
not be so applied."' That result, though probably correct as a matter of
political technique,"' simply cannot be squared with the "vested rights" theory.
4) Efficac9'"
To define "retroactivity" in terms of "vested rights" is, at least at first
glance, an odd, if not bizarre, choice. Judging from its etymology-it comes
from the Latin retro, meaning backward, and actio, meaning action-, one would
have to say that "retroactivity" refers to some temporal phenomenon, in
213. La. Civ. Code art. 258.
214. La. Civ. Code art. 258 (as amended by 1992 La. Acts. No. 680).
215. Sanches, 619 So. 2d at 801 n.l.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 278-281.
217. Formulative technique can be described as a practical art, for it entails the adaptation of
means to ends. Dabin, Technique, supra note 113, § 3, at 36-41; Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 175,
at 163; Roubier, Th~orie, supra note 17, § 10, at 87. The means are juridical rules; the end, the
balance of interests struck by policy-makers through the exercise of socio-political technique. Du
Pasquier, supra note 16, § 175, at 163 ("[Tjhe jurist must elaborate rules that are adequate to the end
that juridical policy has assigned to him. . . ."); Roubier, Th6orie, supra note 17, § 10, at 87-88
("Juridical technique has a vaster object, for it comprehends, in reality, the study of the ensemble of
means whereby the end that has been glimpsed by juridical policy is translated into the state of a
rule.... [Mhe complete field of technique.., is the art of the juridical means that should permit
one to attain the end sought by juridical policy."). Because that is so, the juridical technician must,
of necessity, be concerned with how well the means-the juridical rules--wvork" in practice, that
is, the extent to which they produce results that are consistent with the chosen socio-political end.
Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 175, at 163 ("I'rMhe jurist must... render those rules [the juridical
rules he proposes) realizable and efficacious by adapting them to the milieu that they must
govern... :'); 3 G6ny, Science, supra note 113, § 223, at 210 ("Even if it possesses the preceding
qualities, which are attached to its intrinsic structure, the juridical construction can play its proper
role and give useful results only if it corresponds, in some measure, to the practical needs and
interests that remain the substantial foundation of the law. This extrinsic quality, which ties the
means to the end, shows itself to be indispensable for the efficacious play of every technical
process:). It follows, then, that for a body of law, such as the intertemporal law, to satisfy the
demands of sound formulative technique, that body of law must be efficacious.
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particular, to the application of legislation in the past. Now, what, if any,
connection the deprivation of vested rights has with "time" is anything but
clear.218
Indeed, to the extent that the deprivation of vested rights is undesir-
able at all, it would seem to be so regardless of when the deprivation oc-
curs.2 19  Consider, for example, a law that prohibits workers from
forming a union to bargain for them collectively. Even if that law is to
operate only in the future, so that it leaves in place whatever collective-
bargaining agreements the workers' union have already hammered out with
management, one could still fault it. for depriving the workers of a
"vested right."
It would seem, then, that by defining retroactivity in terms of vested rights,
one "confounds here, in large measure, the question of justice [or wisdom or
efficiency] and that of retroactivity."" 0  When a new law takes away vested
rights, the problem is not so much (or invariably) "retroactivity" as it is
"iniquity, which is another thing altogether, for retroactivity is not always
iniquitous and iniquity most often is not retroactive."2'
b) Deficiencies of Socio-Political Technique22
1) Introduction
The vested rights theory often dictates results that are politically
unacceptable, that inhibit, rather than foster, the realization of the common
good.m  That this theory has that effect is no accident. As I will
demonstrate below, the theory is inextricably bound up with two socio-
political philosophies that, at their very foundations, are ontologically and
ethically dubious. Those philosophies are "individualism" and "econom-
ism."
218. See 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 141, at 159, & § 148, at 166; C~td, supra note 74,
at 181; Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, § 356, at 241; Level, supra note 1, § 36, at 60-61; Vareilles-
Sommires, supra note 53, § 48, at 465.
219. See C8t0, supra note 74, at 181.
220. Vareilles-Sommilres, supra note 53, § 48, at 465.
221. Id. See also 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 148, at 166 (the acquired-rights criterion
"confounded retroactive laws with laws that affect acquired rights and made of this confused idea
the base of the legal system"); Dekeuwer-1Mfossez, supra note 1, § 10, at 9 ("[T]he notion of
acquired rights is not specifically transitory: the attack on acquired rights is the work of iniquitous,
unjust, or ill ieral laws as well as of retroactive laws."); Level, supra note 1, § 36, at 59 ("[The
theory of acquired rights confounds iniquitous, unjust or illieral laws with retroactive laws.") & §
46, at 74 (quoting Vareilles-Sommire's critique with approval); Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1,
§ 29, at 136 ("fI]f there are some particularly sacred rights that the legislator would do well not to
touch .... that is an altogether different question from the question of the non-retroactivity of the
laws: there are some laws that are iniquitous outside of any retroactivity.").
222. For the definition of the expression "socio-political technique," see supra note 113.
223. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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2) Discussion
i) Individualism
The criterion of "vestedrights" is intimately tied to the politico-philosophical
movement variously known as individualism or liberalism," 4 whose basic tenet
is that individual liberty, narrowly and negatively understood as freedom from
state constraint, ought to be maximized, even at the expense of what many would
consider to be legitimate collective interests.2u When retroactivity is defined
in this fashion, "the question is envisioned solely from the point of view of the
individual, whose subjective rights are opposed to the powers of the govern-
ment." '' This way of envisioning the question
leads one to search out those domains that adhere so closely to the heart
of man that the deception [of hopes] which results from the attacks that
the new makes upon them implies a [societal] sclerosis ... [and to
identify] those "sacredrights"... which, when put into question by the
new law, lead to "undermining the foundation of every human
society".... Mhe field of application of the new law ... [is
restricted] in the measure in which it threatens that which liberal
individualism considers to be essential values.227
224. Bach, Contribution, supra note 1, § 4, at 410; Bach, ConflUs I, supra note 1, § 36, at 5;
Bonneau, supra note 1, § 5, at 3-4; § 14, at 20; § 83, at 70-71; C6t6 & Jutras, supra note 1, § 14,
at 941; Dekeuwer-D6fossez, supra note 1, § 10, at 8; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at
296; Hage-Chahine, supra note 1, § 356, at 240; Level, supra note 1, § 35, at 58; 36, at 59-62; 37,
at 62-63; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 23, at 98; § 27, at 120; § 29, at 144; Weill & Terr6,
supra note 2, § 169, at 175.
I use the term "liberalism" here in its European, as opposed to its American, sense. See Saul
Litvinoff & W. Thomas Tete, Louisiana Legal Transactions: The Civil Law of Juridical Acts 106
n.1 (1969). Americans might prefer to call it "libertarianism."
225. Du Pasquier, supra note 16, §§ 231-235, at 223-261; Leclercq, Fondement, supra note 23,
at 209-11; Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law 7-8 (Doris Anson trans., 1943);
1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 12, at 24-25 & § 27, at 48-49; Roubier, Thdorie, supra note
17, § 25, at 229-30, & § 26, at 231-32; Andr6 Vincent, La Synthse Cosmogdmitique de Teilhard de
Chardin et le Droit, 10 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 33, 35-36 (1965); Wald, supra note 1, §
44, at 112 & 114-15. See also Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Christian
Freedom and Liberation § 13 (Mar. 22, 1986), reprinted in Liberation Theology: A Documentary
History 461,465 (Alfred T. Hennelly ed., 1990); Pope Paul VI, OctogesimaAdveniens §§ 26 & 35
(May 14,1971), reprinted in Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage 265,274-75,277
(David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992); Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progresslo § 26
(Mar. 26, 1967), reprinted in Catholic Social Thought, supra this note, at 240, 246; Pope Pius XI,
Quadragesimo Anno § 88 (May 15, 1931), reprinted in Catholic Social Thought, supra this note, at
42, 62.
226. Dekeuwer-Ddfossez, supra note I, § 10, at 8.
227. Level, supra note 1, § 36, at 60.
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Thus, the non-retroactivity rule itself is understood as an "essential" means of
"protecting the liberty of man against legislation."'"
One can question whether it is appropriate to ground intertemporal law on
a concept that was and still is imbued with this philosophy. For one thing, this
philosophy is now and has for some time been passi. 9 In the course of the
twentieth century, liberalism has given way to a variety of other politico-
philosophical movements, known collectively (in Europe, at least) as the "social
doctrines."' O The common denominator of these movements is to place
greater emphasis on the collective interest vis-a-vis individual interests and to
require that, at least in some instances, the collective interest be put first.l
To be sure, the end of the century has witnessed something of a renaissance of
liberalism, 2 sometimes referred to as neo-liberalism, but most of the persons
who identify with this movement recognize the legitimacy of "social" constraints
on individual rights to a degree that their predecessors would have found
intolerable."s
Aside from the desirability of remaining philosophically au courant, there
are other good reasons to reject the philosophy in which the vested rights
doctrine is rooted. The first is that classic liberalism stands in the way of what
most people would agree constitutes social progress. Indeed, it was this insight
that led to the simultaneous decline of liberalism and rise of the "social
doctrines": the growing conviction among political philosophers and social
scientists that genuine political and social progress is impossible without the
sacrifice of existing rights. 4 Illustrations of this principle are not difficult to
228. Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112; Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 165.B, at 169.
That the concept of vested rights is linked to liberalism should hardly come as a surprise. That
concept took shape in the 19th century, a time at which classic liberalism, which had inspired and
then, in turn, been reinforced by a series of liberal revolutions (the American and French among
them), was still in its ascendancy. Bonneau, supra note 1, § 14, at 20; § 83, at 70-71; Level, supra
note 1, § 35, at 58. See also Wefll & Terri, supra note 2, § 163, at 168.
229. Bonneau, supra note 1, § 5, at 4; Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 290, at 270; Litvinoff &
T~te, supra note 224, at 106 n.1; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112-15.
230. Bonneau, supra note 1, § 5, at4& § 83, at71; Weill &Terr6, supranote2, § 165,at 169.
See also 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 5, at 5-6; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 112-15. Weill
& Terr6, supra note 2, §§ 62-64, at 65-67. The expression covers movements as diverse as "New
Deal liberalism" and the "Catholic worker" movement in the United States, "social democracy" on
the Continent, and "Fabian socialism" in Britain.
231. See Bonneau, supra note 1, § 5, at3, & § 83, at 71; Wald, supranote 1, § 44, at 114-15.
See also I Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, §§ 28-29, at 49-52; Roubier, Th6orie, supra note 17, §
27, at 240-52 & § 30, at 266-71 & § 33, at 283-90. Some movements (e.g., state communism) call
for a more or less complete "subordination" of individual to collective interests, I Marty & Raynaud,
supra note 1, § 28, at 49-50; Roubier, Theorie, supra note 17, § 27, at 240-52, whereas others seek
an "equilibrium" between or a "harmonization" of individual and collective interests, 1 Marty &
Raynaud, supra note 1, § 29, at 50-52; Roubier, Thdorie, supra note 17, § 30, at 266-71 & § 33, at
283-90.
232. See, e.g., Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1993).
233. Id. at 132-36.
234. Bonneau, supra note 1, § 83, at 71; 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 138, at 155; § 169,
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come by. Few today would deny that the elimination of slavery, the prohibition
of child labor, the institution of minimum standards for food and drug quality,
and the elimination of restrictions on the power of women to acquire and to
transfer property, just to take a few examples, were progressive social develop-
ments. Those developments, however, came with a price: persons privileged
under prior law (for example, slave holders, employers, manufacturers, and
males) lost some of their theretofore-existing rights.
The second is that classic liberalism is philosophically flawed. That this is
so becomes clear once one understands the view of human being that lies at the
bottom of that movement. For liberalism man is, in his essence, nothing but an
individual, one who is radically isolated from others and whose interests are
radically distinct from those of others.2" The proper end of man is essentially
egoistical: it consists of the realization or actualization of the individual will or,
in other words, the fulfillment or satisfaction of individual desire. 6 Human
society is nothing but a more or less voluntary aggregation of autonomous
individuals;2' human institutions, such as government, are nothing but
artifacts-creations--of these autonomous individuals."' As such, these
institutions are limited to performing the specific functions that individuals have
entrusted to them, which, in the view of most liberals, consist of (i) protecting
individual interests, (ii) reconciling or arbitrating among those interests when
they are incompatible, and (iii) providing services that individuals cannot readily
provides for themselves.u 9 Except to the extent necessary to fulfill these
objectives, those institutions have no business interfering with individual will or
desire.240 They certainly have no business doing so in order to pursue some
"common good" (apart from that which might be attained by the performance of
these limited functions). Indeed, the common good, to the extent that this notion
at 187-88; § 177, at 192; 1 Colin & Capitant, supra note 18, § 59, at 58; C~t6 & Jutras, supra note
1, § 14, at 941; Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at 296; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note
I, § 106, at 186; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 29, at 145; Starck, supra note 1, § 480, at 198;
Tavernier, supra note 1, at 308; Wald, supra note 1, § 44, at 111; Weill & Ter6, supra note 2, §
165, at 170, & § 171, at 177.
235. Jacques Dagory, La Libertl Libirale: Faculid de Juger ou Volonti de Puissance?, 33
Archives de Philosophic du Droit 383, 385 (1988); Pascal, supra note 175, at 308; Pope Paul VI,
supra note 225, §§ 26 & 35, reprinted in Catholic Social Thought, supra note 225, at 274-75 & 277;
Vincent, supra note 225, at 35-36.
236. Dagory, supra note 235, at 385; Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 290, at 270; Lukas K.
Sosoe, Individual ou Communauti: La Nouvelle Critique de Libiralisme Politlque, 33 Archives de
Philosophic du Droit 77, 82 & 87 (1988); Pope Paul VI, supra note 225, § 35, reprinted in Catholic
Social Thought, supra note 225, at 277; Vincent, supra note 225, at 35-36.
237. Dagory, supra note 235, at 385; Pascal, supra note 175, at 307-08; Sosoe, supra note 236,
at 87-88; Vincent, supra note 225, at 36.
238. Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 232, at 223-24; 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 12, at
23-24; Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, § 24, at 31-32.
239. 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 1, § 12, at 24; Weill & Terrt, supra note 2, § 24, at 31-32;
see also Dabin, Thorie, supra note 21, § 190, at 221.
240. Dabin, Thtorie, supra note 21, § 190, at 221.
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is intelligible at all, can be nothing but the coincidence(altogether accidental and
always shifting) of the interests of individuals.24'
This understanding of human being is, to say the least, reductionistic. As
we have already noted, human being has, at once, both an individual and a social
dimension, neither of which can be reduced to the other.242 Any view of
human being that ignores the "social" element in the ontology of man is
necessarily incomplete and, to that extent, distorted. Liberalism is such a view
of human being.
Linked, as it is, to a politico-philosophical system that is both opposed to
progress and ontologically suspect, the vested rights criterion, one might say,
"does what comes naturally." Not surprisingly, it "has not been able ... to
abstract itself from the liberalism and the individualism and especially the
subjectivism that inspire it."" 3 As a result, it "does not always propose to the
problem of the application of the law in time solutions that proceed from a
purely intellectual and objective analysis, that is, a disinterested analysis. 244
To the contrary, those solutions are at once conservative and individualistic:24S
241. Pascal, supra note 175, at 308; Sosoe, supra note 236, at 82 & 87.
242. Support for this view of human being, which is indeed widespread, cuts across the politico-
philosophical specirum. Here's a random, though fairly representative, sampling: (1) classical Greek
philosophy: 1 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome 223 (1993)
(analysis of Plato's notion of "society"); Aristotle, Politics bk. 1, §§ 1-2, 1252a-1252b (Benjamin
Jowett trans.), reprinted & translated in 9 Great Books of the Western World 445, 446-47 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1978); (2) Thomism & neo-Thomism: St. Thomas, supra note 23, pL I of
2d pt., Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009-10, & Q. 95, art. 4, at 1016; Dabin, Thlorie, supra note 21, § 15, at
19-20; Maritain, supra note 225, at 5-6; Pascal, supra note 175, at 308-09; Second Vatican Council,
Gaudium et Spes §§ 24-25 (Dcc. 7, 1965), reprinted in Catholic Social Thought, supra note 225,
166, 180-81; Catichisme de I'lglise Catholique §§ 1879-1880, at 394 (1993); (3) neo-Marxism:
Theodor W. Adomo, Society (F.R. Jameson trans.), reprinted in Stephen E. Bronner & Douglas M.
Kellner, Critical Theory and Society: A Reader 267 (1989); (4) existential phenomenology: Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time § 26, at 154-63 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson eds., 1962); (5)
communitarianism: Harold J. Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion
251-76 (1993); Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community 14-18 (1993); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice 173-83 (1982); Sosoe, supra note 236, at 77.
243. Bach, Conflits I, supra note 1, § 36, at 5.
244. Bach, Contribution, supra note 1, § 4, at 410. See also C6t6 & Jutras, supra note 1, § 14,
at 941 ("Mhe system of acquired rights is characterized... by aprejudice in favor of the old law.")
(emphasis added).
245. Comu, supra note 1, § 369, at 125; Cftd & Jutras, supra note i, § 14, at 941.
I use the term "conservatism" here in its original sense, that is, an effort to maintain the political,
social, or economic status quo. The effect of this conservatism can, of course, be anything but
"conservative" in the other, more modem (American) sense, that is, as "favoring free enterprise."
Everything depends on the policy content of the "status quo" that the conservative wants to maintain.
Consider, for example, the frustrating experience that the Louisiana Association of Business &
Industry has had with Louisiana's contemporary vested-rights-dominated intertemporal law. During
the mid-1990s, LABI succeeded in getting enacted all manner of legislation that benefits business at
the expense of consumers, workers, tort victims, welfare mors, and tree-huggers, just to name a few.
LABI has had considerably less success, however, in getting this legislation applied to juridical
situations that arose in whole or in part under the prior legislation. Why? Because the courts,
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the criterion consistently frustrates efforts at political, social, or economic reform,
regardless of the urgency of the social problem that has called forth the reform
effort, and just as consistently tips the balance of interests in favor of the
individual and against the collective.24 Indeed, the vested rights theory seems
to ignore altogether the collective interests that are undeniably at play in every
intertemporal conflict of laws, in particular, those that favor the plenary
application of the new law.
That the vested rights theory ignores these interests is evident in several of
the hypothetical cases that we examined earlier. 47 Take, for example, the
"6rent control" hypothetical. Pascal, a landowner, and Olide, a farmer, enter into
a lease of a one-arpent tract of farmland: on March 1, 2001 Pascal leases Olide
the parcel for $100/month and for a term of one year. When the lease is
executed, the law imposes no restrictions on the magnitude of rents of farmland.
But at the end of the regular legislative session of 2001, the legislature enacts a
law that places a ceiling on rents of farmland of $50/month/arpent, the effective
date of which is September 1, 2001. At that time, of course, the second lease
is still "in progress": six months have passed and six more are still to go.
Olide, relying on the new law, thereafter reduces the amount of his monthly
rental payment to $50. Pascal, relying on the old law, demands that Olide
continue to pay $100/month. An action ensues. Pointing out that the lease was
executed while the old laws was still in force, Pascal contends that to apply the
new law to this case would be to apply it retroactively. For his part Olide,
noting that Pascal's right to demand the rent for October through December
matured only after the new law took effect, argues that to apply the new law
would be to apply it prospectively.
applying Louisiana's "conservative" intertemporal law, have refused to allow it, in other words, have
insisted that the old law rather than the new law govern those situations. In so doing, the courts
"conserved" (albeit it for only a while) the (relatively) "liberal" (in the sense of "social democratic")
status quo that the "progressive" (in the sense of "favoring free enterprise") LABI "reformers" (in
a "restorationist" sense) wanted to change.
246. See Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 1, § 333, at 296 ("Mhe theory of acquired rights
gives too great a place to juridical conservatism and puts the brakes on progress or, in any case, the
evolution that the legislator has desired."); see generally Dekeuwer-D6fossez, supra note 1, § 3, at
4, & § 8 (suggesting that the vested rights criterion favors subjective rights over the common good);
Weill & Terr6, supra note 2, §§ 168-169, at 174-75 (noting that the vested rights criterion puts the
accent on individual interests created under the old law).
Just so that there will be no misunderstanding, I should make clear the sense in which I use the
terms "collective interest' and "common interest." It has been observed, correctly in my view, that
the term "interest' and its various derivatives are often (perhaps even ordinarily) associated with the
"positivist tradition," within which they serve to designate "a subjective advantage or preference,
without concern for its justification in terms of the ontologically[-]indicated good." Pascal, supra
note 175, at 309. But that is not the only possible usage of the term. Here, it's used as it was by
Dabin, that is, as a modem synonym for "good." See Dabin, Thdorie, supra note 21, § 187, at 218
("Inhere is a public 'interest' or a public 'good,' which is the interest and the good of the public
... [t]he 'whole' of the public .. ").
247. See supra text at pp. 57-60.
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In a case such as this the politically preferable result, most persons (but
admittedly not all) would probably agree, is to apply the new law.248 Applying
the new law will admittedly frustrate Pascal's expectation that he would
eventually receive all of the rent that is still outstanding. But this expectation is,
relatively speaking, not all that firm. That is so because Pascal's right to it is
subject to scores of contingencies, any one of which might limit that right or
destroy it altogether, for example, the risk of an action by Olide to dissolve the
lease for incapacity, vice of consent, or impossibility of performance; the risk
that Olide won't pay voluntarily; the risk that Olide may become insolvent or
obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, and so on. At the same time, however,
applying the law will further the collective interest in social progress. If the
government takes the momentous step of enacting a rent control law, it can only
be because the public perceives that property owners have taken unfair advantage
of lessees or, to put it another way, that lessees are the victims of social injustice.
Further, legislation of this kind reflects a popular judgment that the
community as a whole will be better off if the cost of rental property is
reduced (even if that means, as it most assuredly would, that the available
stock of such property would decline). On balance, the collective interests
in progress and in assuring social justice together with the individual
interests of lessees may well outweigh the community's economic interest in the
maximization of the stock of rental property and the individual interests of
lessors.
The trouble is that the vested rights theory simply can't be squared with this
result. If one takes that theory seriously and applies it faithfully, that is, without
distorting the pertinent categories (vested right and expectation), then one has no
choice but to conclude that the old law, not the new law, must be applied. The
argument goes like this. First, as soon as Pascal and Olide signed the lease,
Pascal acquired the right to receive (and Olide the correlative duty to pay) each
and every one of the twelve monthly rental payments, including those for
October, November, and December. True, his right with respect to all of those
payments was subject to a suspensive term, namely, the arrival of the first of
each month within the lease period. But that a right is subject to a term merely
means that the obligor's performance is suspended, put off until a later date; it
does not mean that the obligee's right does not yet exist. Second, if the new law
248. 1 base this prediction about political preference on my reading of American "rent control"
cases. If one can assume that what really drives controversial court decisions are the political, social,
and economic values of the judges (as any American Realist worth his salt would argue), then
Americans (or at least Americanjudges) evidently believe that, on balance, it's a good idea to apply
rent control laws to existing leases. In case after case, American courts have turned back
constitutional challenges to the immediate application of such laws. See, e-g., People v. H&H
Properties, 201 Cal. Rptr. 687, 689-90 (App. 1984); Huard v. Forest St. Housing, Inc., 316 N.E.2d
505, 507-08 & n. 6 (Mass. 1974); Albigese v. Jersey City, 316 A.2d 483, 488-89 (NJ. Sup. Ct.
1974); 91 E. BWAY Corp. v. Pippo Toy Co., 58 N.Y.S.2d 484, 488 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1945). The
Louisiana courts are no exception. See, eg., Probst v. Nobles, 223 La. 685, 688, 66 So. 2d 609,
610-11 (1953); West v. Schuber, 81 So. 2d 436, 439-40 (La. App. Orl. 1955).
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is applied in such a way as to reduce Olide's rental payments for the months of
October, November, and December, then Pascal's will be divested of his right
to the full rental payment for each of those months. Therefore, to apply the new
law in that way would be to apply it retroactively. This outcome, though the
inexorable result of the vested rights theory, is, as we have seen, politically
unpalatable.
ii) Economism
Yet another charge of political-technical deficiency can be brought against
the vested rights theory: the vested rights theory is "economistic." By
economism (sometimes called simple materialism), I mean the tendency to define
the "end" of man in terms that are primarily, if not exclusively, economic or, in
other words, the notion that the acquisition of "more stuff" is the most important,
if not the only, unqualified human good." 9 Like liberalism, this tendency or
notion is ontologically flawed, though for a different reason. Economism is, first
of all, reductionistic, in that it tends to deny the existence of the only truly
distinctive dimension of human being-the spiritual- - - 0 or, what is just as
bad, treats that dimension of human being as if it were some "superfluous
phenomenon" that springs from and is determined by the material dimension of
human being."' Not only that, but economism "reverses" the natural
human order by "plac[ing] the spiritual and the personal (man's activity,
moral values and such matters) in a position of subordination to material
reality." 2
Just why the vested rights theory is economistic has less to do with its links
to liberalism than with the rather narrow definition of "rights" on which it is
based. A right qualifies as a vested right, we learned earlier,253 if and only if
249. See 2 Jacques Leclercq, Les Droits et Devoirs Individuels § 12, at 77 (3d ed. 1955)
[hereinafter Droits] (describing "materialism" as "a reaction against spiritual values" that "opposes
the cult of the machine and of production to spiritual development" and "the society in which
everyone goes to heaven to that in which everyone eats until he's satisfied"); § 9, at 50 ("Under the
influence of materialism and of the absorption of social life... by economics, one is accustomed
more and more to size up everything in terms of monetary equivalents....'); & § 41, at 223
("What can be the end of such [economistic] societies? Every human end, every human interest,
other than to gain money is without relation to the social end. If men work in the service of society
..., the society can engage them and pay them only so that they will add back money. Men are put
at the service of capital .... .'). See generally Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens § 7 & § 13
(Sept 14, 1981), reprinted in Catholic Social Thought, supra note 225, at 360-61 & 368-70
(discussing "economism" and its links to common and dialectical materialism).
250. 2 Leclercq, Droits, supra note 249, § 53, at 276 ("It is true that a materialist doctrine
necessarily impoverishes man, since it denies in him the essential and the central thing in favor of
that which there is in him that is less noble:).
251. See id.
252. Id. See also 2 Leclercq, Droits, supra note 249, § 53, at 276 (noting that materialism
elevates the "less noble" side of human nature above that which is "essential" and "central').
253. See supra notes 76-82 & accompanying text
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it has definitively and irrevocably become the "property" of this or that person
or, to put it in more technical terms, if and only if the right has become part of
someone's "patrimony." Now, a patrimonial right, as we also learned earli-
er," is defined as a right "that is susceptible of pecuniary value" or "to which
a dollar value can readily be attached." So defined, the category of
"vested rights" is necessarily limited to those that register on the "economic"
scale. And it is those rights, and only those rights, that the vested rights theory
protects.
The "vested rights" theory's exclusive focus on economic well-being is not
without practical political consequences. To the contrary, this focus can and
often does lead to politically undesirable results, as cases involving "status"
readily illustrate. After the death of his parents, a child, C, is placed under the
tutorship of his grandfather, G. At the time the law establishes a regime of
preference for tutors that favors grandparents over aunts and uncles. Some years
later, the government alters the regime of preference, putting aunts and uncles
ahead of grandparents. Relying on the new law, the court ousts the grandfather
as tutor, replacing him with the minor's aunt. Surely no one who favors the
well-being of children could defend foisting this kind of wrenching change of
life on such a minor. It would be bad enough if all that the minor had to fear
was the devastating loss-now for the second time--of his most fundamentally
important relationship (that with his "parent") and of his home. But there would
undoubtedly be other disadvantages as well, for example, abrupt changes in
discipline, education, religion, or use of property, brought on by the inevitable
differences between his grandfather's and his aunt's preferences on these matters.
This possibility, if realized, not only would turn his world upside down, but also
would adversely affect the interests of a number of other persons, in particular,
his grandfather. The trouble is, however, that none of these interests-not those
of the grandfather, not even those of the child-constitute "patrimonial" rights.
If they are rights at all, which one may doubt, they are at most what civilian
theorists call "extra-patrimonial"rights. As such, they lie outside the protective
umbrella of the vested rights theory.
3) Summary
For these reasons, the vested rights theory is incapable of satisfying
the basic desideratum of sound socio-political technique: identifying and
then striking the right balance (the one that promotes the common good)
among the interests at stake in such controversies. Thanks to its links to
liberalism, it ignores or underestimates the value of collective interests.
And thanks to its eeonomistic bias, it ignores or underestimates the value
of interests, such as extra-patrimonial rights, that cannot be reduced to
dollar terms.
254. See supra note 80 & accompanying texL
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ii. Completed Acts
a) Deficiencies of Formulative Technique
1) Vagueness
One of the principal, if often overlooked,'" deficiencies in the "completed
acts" theory is the indeterminacy inherent in the notion of the "structure" of
juridical rules on which it rests. As we pointed out earlier," this theory pegs
retroactivity to the time or times at which the acts or other events that compose
the "presupposition" or "hypothesis" (as opposed to the "consequence" or
"effect") of the new law occur. The problem, in short, is this: it is often, if not
invariably, uncertain just what acts or events should be considered part of the
presupposition. The uncertainty arises on two different fronts: (i) the dividing
line between the presupposition and the consequence and (ii) the dividing line
between the presupposition and what might be called the "background" or
"setting" of the presupposition, that is, those acts or events that, though not part
of the presupposition, nevertheless must have taken place in order for the
presupposed acts or events to have taken place.
i) Presupposition v. Consequence
Sometimes it's hard to tell for sure whether a particular act or other event
is an element of the presupposition or an element of the consequence. The
problem is particularly acute in cases of statutes that prescribe some sort of
delay.
Suppose that the legislature, in response to complaints regarding the behavior
of overly-eager adjusters employed by liability insurance companies, enacts the
following statute: "In connection with any actual or potential claim that a third
party may have against a liability insurer, no representative of that insurer,
including but not limited to an adjuster, shall contact that third party until 30
days have elapsed since the date of the accident or other event out of which the
claim arose." Upon first reading this statute, one might be tempted to conclude
that its presupposition includes not only the "accident or other event" from which
the claim arose, but also the expiration of the delay of "30 days." After all, the
statute provides that the first contact cannot be made until after both of these
events, including the expiration of the delay, have occurred. A closer analysis,
however, suggests another possibility. Another term for the presupposition, was
255. Of the French and Latin American scholars who have commented on the "completed acts"
theory, hardly any have noted this rather obvious problem. One (and perhaps the sole) exception is
Jacques Hdron, but even he seems not to have appreciated the true magnitude of the problem. See
Hdron, supra note 1, §§ 70-73, at 322-23.
256. See supra notes 98-101 & accompanying text.
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we learned earlier,' 7 is "hypothetical," a term which suggests that the presup-
position ought to include only those events that are contingent or uncertain to
occur. The "accident or other event" fits this description, for those events might
or might not have occurred. The delay, however, runs "inexorably" from the
moment at which the "accident or other event" occurred: "it's running has
nothing hypothetical about it: it is absolutely certain that the delay is going to
run up to the end." 'ss All that the adjuster has to do is to "wait." 59 For this
reason, it might make more sense to place the delay not in the presupposition,
but in the consequence, where it will function as a sort of "suspensive term" on
the adjuster's power to contact the third party. This possibility, like the first,
seems reasonable. But because the dividing line between presupposition and
consequent is so unclear, it's difficult to know which is preferable.
ii) Presupposition v. Background
Sometimes it's hard to tell for sure whether a particular act or other event
is an element of the presupposition or just part of what one might call the
"background" of that presupposition. This problem, which can be called a
problem of "infinite regression," is not unlike the notorious problem of the same
name associated with the doctrine of "proximate cause" in Anglo-American tort
law. The "consequence" of a particular law can be seen as simply the last link
in a causal chain of events that extends backward in time to the Big Bang itself.
The challenge is to figure out just how far back up this chain the "presupposi-
tion" extends or, to put it another way, which of the events in this chain marks
the first element of the presupposition. Two of the cases we examined earlier,
Henry v. Jean and Manuel v. Sheriffs' Risk Management Fund,26 illustrate the
problem well.
At issue in Henry v. Jean26 was whether certain children who had been
born out of wedlock and who, therefore, had originally been illegitimate, were
entitled to share in the inheritance of their mother's estate alongside their
mother's legitimate child. To establish that they had this right, these children
had to prove that, though they had been born illegitimate, they had somehow
acquired legitimate status later on. Their claim to legitimation was based on a
"new" law, one that created a new mode for the legitimation of an originally
illegitimate child, namely, the subsequent marriage of the child's biological
parents plus the parents' formal or informal acknowledgementof that child. The
law was "new" in the sense that it had not been enacted until after the parents
of the originally illegitimate children had married each other and had acknowl-
edged them.
257. See supra text accompanying note 98.
258. Hdmon, supra note 1, § 72, at 322.
259. Id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 61-75 & 96-97.
261. 238 La. 314, 115 So. 2d 363 (La. 1959).
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Determining the content of the presupposition of the law (or, better, network
of laws) on which the originally illegitimate children staked their claim to inherit
is downright dicey. For the consequence of that law to have been triggered, that
is, for their right to share in their mother's estate to have arisen, several events
must necessarilyhave occurredbeforehand. The ones to which the particular law
of legitimation on which the originally illegitimate children relied mentions at
least three-the mother must have died, she must have acknowledged the
children, and she must have married their biological father-and arguably a
fourth as well-the mother must have given birth to the children out of wedlock.
A moment's reflection, however, will reveal that the law necessarily "presuppos-
es" still others, in other words, events without which those referred to in the law
would never have occurred, for example, the mother must have had sexual
relations with the biological father. But for those relations, there would never
have been a birth. But why stop there? The chain of necessarily "presupposed"
events certainly does not. Indeed, if one wanted to be rigorously logical about
this exercise, one would have to add still more events, starting with the births of
the biological parents themselves, proceeding through the births of their ancestors
(both human and nonhuman), and ending with the birth of creation itself. Surely
no one would maintain that the presupposition extends back that far, but
reasonable persons might well disagree regarding how far back it does extend.
A similar problem appears in Manuel v. Sheriffs' Risk Management
Fund.262 At issue in that case was whether a consortium of liability insurers
that had failed to pay a third-party claimant in a timely fashion was liable for
statutory penalties. The claimant's demand for penalties was based on a "new"
law that imposed on insurers a duty to settle third-party claims in good faith and,
beyond that, provided that an insurer breached that duty when it failed to pay a
settlement within sixty days of the date on which it had been reduced to writing.
The law was "new" in the sense that it had taken effect only after the insurer had
issued the policy, the incident out of which the claim had arisen had occurred,
and the claimant had put in his claim with the insurer.
Determining the content of the presupposition of the law on which the third-
party claimant founded his demand for penalties is problematic. For the
consequence of that law to have been triggered, that is, for the consortium of
insurers to have incurred liability for penalties, several events must necessarily
have occurred beforehand. The ones to which the particular law on which the
third-party claimant relied mentions at least two-the reduction of a settlement
to writing and failure to pay the settlement-and arguably a third as well-a
delay of sixty days. A moment's reflection, however, will reveal that the law
necessarily "presupposes" still others, in other words, events without which those
referred to in the law would never have occurred; namely, the claimant must
have presented a claim to the insurer, the insured must have done something to
the claimant that fell within the scope of the policy, and the insurer must have
262. 664 So. 2d 81 (La. 1995).
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issued the insured the policy. But, of course, that's not all, for these events, too,
necessarilypresuppose others, which, in turn, necessarilypresuppose others, and
so on back to the beginning of time. Though one can say, with some confidence,
that the presupposition does not include all of these events, one cannot say with
great confidence that it includes these or those but not other events.
To solve this problem, one might be tempted to propose a "textualist"
solution, that is, the presupposition consists only of those events to which the text
of the new law in question (that is, the new code article or the new section of the
revised statutes) expressly refers. Although this solution seems reasonable at first
glance, it proves to be problematic upon close analysis.
The flaw in this approach, in short, is that it rests on a naive, if not flat out
erroneous, assumption about the redaction of "laws," namely, that each article or
section contains a complete statement of the presupposition (and consequence)
of a distinct legal rule. The trouble with the assumption is three-fold. First, the
divisions among laws, that is, the division of codes into books, titles, chapters,
and articles or the division of a revised statute into titles, sections, and
paragraphs is, to a large extent, arbitrary. In most, if not all, cases it would have
been possible for the legislator to have divided the laws up differently, in
particular, to have used fewer or more divisions and subdivisions or to have used
a single, relatively lengthy article or section in place of several shorter articles
or sections or vice-versa. Second, legislative drafters, sometimes by accident, but
often deliberately, fail to word articles of codes or sections of revised statutes in
such a way that each one is "self-contained." To be sure, some articles or
sections provide a comprehensive statement of all of the "presupposed" facts on
which their operation depends. But most, for example, the articles in highly
systematized codes, expressly refer to only a few (if any) of those presupposed
facts and depend, for the completion of the presupposition, upon other articles
or sections within the pertinent legislative milieu." 3 Third, some articles or
sections do not establish legal rules at all, in the sense of norms whose structure
is "if this or that event occurs, then this or that juridical effect shall follow," but
rather establish definitions of or criteria for juridical concepts set out in other
articles or sections.2" These three observations about the drafting of legisla-
263. See Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 112, at 90 (noting that there am somc articles "where
one does not find, at first glance, the two elements (of a legal rule] that we just put to light");
Motulsky, supra note 98, § 17, at 19 C'[Mlost often, the article entails only one of the two parts, the
presupposition or the juridical effect, or sometimes just some scattered elements that are designed,
when duly completed, to form one or the other."); Pescatore, supra note 98, § 128, at 196 ("It can
be that the complete legal rule must be derived from the reunion of two or of several articles....');
see also Dabin, Thorie, supra note 21, § 60, at 74 ("[R]ules of law are not always separated and
independent, but very often on the contrary are chained to each other and form themselves into a
series .... ).
264. Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 112, at 9O (noting that some articles or sections "seem rather
to specify the bearing of other rules or the sense of terms employed elsewhere'); Motulsky, supra
note 98, § 17, at 19 (noting that many articles or sections "merely amplify one of the factors that
composes the presupposition" of the rule set out in some other article); Pescatore, supra note 98, §
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tion make it clear that "the logical structure of the rule of law is altogether
independent from its redaction."26 It follows, then, that one cannot necessarily
limit the search for the "presupposition" of this or that legal rule to the text of
a single article of a code or section of a title within the revised statutes.
It would appear, then, that the uncertainty inherent in determining the scope
of the presupposition cannot be cured by recourse to the expedient of textualism.
In this instance, the proposedcure could well be worse than the disease. Without
the cure, however, the disease rages undiminished.
2) Inaccuracy
The "completed act" theory can be faulted on yet another score, namely, that
the conceptual apparatus in terms of which it is constructed fails to jibe with
many of the phenomena that it is required to explain. This lack of correspon-
dence becomes apparent in two types of cases: those that involve (i) juridical
situations that, at the moment at which the new law takes effect, are still in the
process of being created or destroyed (in technical terms, facta pendentia) and
(ii) juridical situations that, at the moment at which the new law'takes effect,
have alreadybeen created, but are still in the process of producing their juridical
effects.
z) Inaptitude for Resolving Intertemporal
Conflicts that Involve Juridical Situations
in Course of Formation or Extinction
(Facta Pendentia)
Thanks to its focus on "completed" acts, the "completed act" theory is less
than ideally suited for those intertemporal conflicts cases in which the events that
constitute the presupposition are "dispersed" in time, that is, where some of those
events occur before and others occur after the new law takes effect. In such
cases, though the events that occurred before the effective date may fairly be
regarded as complete, the same cannot be said of the events that occurred
thereafter or, perhaps even more importantly, of the ensemble of events as a
whole. The trouble, in such a case, is to know whether these events should be
considered in isolation or in their ensemble. Regarding how this often critically
128, at 196 (noting that definitional articles, far from setting forth complete rules themselves, merely
form "trunks" of the presupposition).
265. Motulsky, supra note 98, § 17, at 19; see also Cueto-Rua, supra note 98, at 106
("Ordinarily, however, written general rules of law, as given by the legislator to the judges for
application to cases, are not complete, or fully written, at the very outset, i.e., usually both parts of
the norm are not enacted at the same time."); Du Pasquier, supra note 16, § 112, at 90 ("[Ain article
of law is not necessarily identical to a rule of law."); Pescatore, supra note 98, § 128, at 195 ("It is
necessary to emphasize... that an article of law does not always represent a rule of law....").
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important question should be resolved, the completed acts theory provides no
clear guidance.266
Consider this example. Before his death, D makes out an olographic
testament 67 in which he leaves all of his estate to T, his best friend. After D
executes the testament, but before he dies, the legislature alters the law on
testamentary form, requiring that all testaments be witnessed and notarized. D
then dies. After T petitions the court for the probate of the testament, A, D's
healthy 30-year old son, intervenes in the proceedings, seeking to annul the
testament on the ground that it violates the new law. T, noting that the testament
was valid under the law that was in force at the moment of its execution, argues
that to apply the new law so as to invalidate the testament would be to apply it
retroactively. Is T correct?
To answer that question by resort to the "completed act" theory, one must
first identify the elements of the presupposition. Recast in conditional form, the
law upon which T relies looks like this: If the decedent executes a valid
testament in which he makes a bequest to N and if the testator then dies, then the
property designated in the bequest belongs to and must be delivered to N. The
presupposition, then, has two elements: (i) execution of a testament and (ii)
death of the testator. Here, these elements were dispersed in time: whereas the
former occurred while the old law was in force, the latter occurred while the new
law was in force. If one can consider each of these acts in isolation from the
other, then one might say that since the former-the execution of the testa-
ment-was completed while the old law was in effect, to apply the new law to
that act would be to apply it retroactively. In that event the testament would be
valid and T would win. But if the "act" that must be "completed" for purposes
of gauging the temporal effect of the new law is the whole of the presupposition
in its ensemble, then since that act was not complete when the new law took
effect (D had not then died), to apply the new law to that act would not be to
apply it retroactively. In that event, the testament would be invalid and T would
lose. Which of these constructions of the facts one should choose the completed
acts theory does not and, indeed, cannot say.
One might object, however, that this problem could be easily solved in either
of two ways. First, focussing on the first element of the presupposition (that
which occurred before the change of laws), treat cases in which the elements of
the presupposition are dispersed in time as "completed act" cases, that is, as cases
in which the pertinent act was completed before the effective date of the new
law. To apply the new law to such a case, then, would be to apply it retroactive-
ly. Second, focussing on the last element of the presupposition (that which
occurred after the change of laws), treat cases in which the elements of the
266. 1 Borda, Tratado, supra note 1, § 166, at 182; Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 29, at
136-37.
267. An olographic testament is one that is written, dated, and signed in the testator's own hand.
It requires neither witnessing nor notarization. La. Civ. Code art. 1588.
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presupposition are dispersed in time as "uncompleted act" cases, as cases in
which the pertinent act was not completed before the effective date of the new
law. To apply the new law to such a case, then, would be to apply it prospec-
tively.
If only it were that easy. Though either of these proposed solutions would
admittedlybe sufficientto solve the dispersion problem, neitherof them, as we'll
see below,26 is politically acceptable in all cases.
ii) Inaptitude for Resolving Intertemporal
Conflicts that Involve Juridical Situations
in Course of Effect
Still another difficulty with the "completed act" theory is that it is ill-suited
for resolving intertemporal conflicts associated with juridical situations that are
in course of effect, that is, that are still producing effects at the moment at which
the new law intervenes. In such situations "the study of acts no longer teaches
us anything, because it is the very destiny of the juridical situation... that is in
question.'
269
Take this example. H and W, husband and wife, adopt an infant child, C,
whose biological parents are B and G. At the time, the law provides that an
adopted child has no right to alimony from his biological parents. A few years
later, H and W die in an automobile accident, after which C ends up in an
orphanage. The government then changes the law to provide that an adopted
child, upon the death of his adoptive parents, may demand alimony from his
biological parents. The state, relying on the new law, then files suit on C's
behalf against B and G, demanding that they contribute to his support. B and
G, relying on the old law, refuse to pay. In their view, to apply the new law so
as to permit C to obtain alimony would be to apply that law retroactively. Is
that contention correct?
Before addressing that question, it might be helpful to consider how this
juridical situation differs from most of those that we have heretofore analyzed
with the help of the "completed act" theory. Here the question is not whether
some past act is now to be considered valid or invalid (for example, the
execution of a testament) or some other past event to be invested with or
divested of juridical consequences, so that this or that juridical situation that
arose in the past will now be upset (for example, the juridical situation of
testamentary successor). The question, rather, is what effects a certain juridical
situation that was validly constituted under the old law and whose validity is not
now in doubt-the situation of the adopted child and his biological and adoptive
parents-will produce from this point forward in time: will the effects be those
268. See infra text at pp. 92-97.
269. Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 29, at 136.
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specified under the old law (the biological parent owes no alimony) or those
specified under the new law (the biological parent owes alimony)?
What relevance, if any, the occurrence of "completed acts" has to the
resolution of intertemporal conflicts cases of this kind is not at all clear. In such
cases the hub around which the intertemporal conflict revolves is not so much
this or that past act that may or may not have given rise to a certain
juridical situation as it is the juridical situation itself or, to be still more precise,
the rights and duties that this continuing juridical situation produces while it
endures.
To see just how inappropriate it would be to apply the completed acts theory
to such cases, one has only to give it a try and then evaluate the result.
Consider, once again, the adoption hypothetical. Let's start, as always, by
identifying the elements of the presupposition of the new law, that is, the one
that accords orphaned adopted children a right of alimony against their biological
parents. Those elements include: (i) the adoption itself and (ii) the death of the
adoptive parents. Here both of those events occurred before the new law took
effect. It would appear, then, that the pertinent "act" (whether that means these
two events considered in isolation or in their ensemble) was completed
while the old law was still in force. To apply the new law to this child and his
biological parents, then, would be to apply it retroactively. And, since this law
is undoubtedly 'substantive, Article 6 would rule such an application out of
bounds.
Though one can certainly question this result on grounds of political
technique, my concern, at present, is with something else, namely, the subtle, yet
undeniable lapse of formulative technique that this result reflects. The problem
is that it seems arbitrary to peg the applicability of a new law of this kind to the
moment in time at which the events that form its presupposition occurred.
What's needed in a case such as this is a temporal-effects rule that's tied
to rights and duties, not acts, that tells us under what circumstances the
rights and duties that spring from an ongoing juridical situation can and
can't be altered, not under what circumstances, if at all, the acts that
formed that situation can be attacked. In short, the "fit" between the
completed act theory and intertemporal conflicts of this kind is less than
perfect.
One might suppose, however, that this problem, like that of the dispersion
of facts, could be easily solved in much the same manner. First, treat cases of
ongoing juridical situations as "completed act" cases, that is, as cases in which
the pertinent act (understood as the act that created the situation) was completed
before the effective date of the new law. To apply the new law to such a case,
then, would be to apply it retroactively. Second, treat cases of ongoing juridical
situations as "uncompleted act" cases, that is, as cases in which the pertinent act
(understood as the realization or maturation of the effects) was not completed
before the effective date of the new law. To apply the new law to such a case,
then, would be to apply it prospectively.
[Vol. 59
J.-R. TRAHAN
These solutions, though beguiling thanks to their simplicity, simply won't
do. Each of them, as we'll see below,27 produces results that are politically
unacceptable in at least some cases.
b) Deficiencies of Political Technique
Unlike the vested rights theory, the completed act theory is not rooted in any
particular socio-politicalphilosophy (such as individualism or collectivism). The
latter theory, then, is not predestined, as is the former theory, to produce results
that are politically unacceptable.
And nevertheless the completed acts theory (at least the simplistic and
unsophisticated version of it that the Louisiana courts have used on occasion)
does, in some instances, produce such results. In those cases in which the theory
presents few formulative-technical difficulties, namely, those that concern the
creation or extinction of juridical situations (as opposed to the effects of ongoing
juridical situations) and in which all of the elements of the presupposition occur
either before or after the effective date of the new law, the theory rarely runs
into political trouble. The same cannot be said, however, of the theory's
performance in cases in which the elements of the presupposition are dispersed
in time or that involve juridical situations in course of effect.
1) Cases Complicated by Dispersion of the Facts
To solve the formulative-technicalproblems that arise from attempts to apply
the completed acts theory to cases in which the elements of the presupposition
of the new rule are dispersed in time, one might be tempted, as we have seen,
to select one of two simple alternatives: (i) focussing on the first element of the
presupposition (the one that occurs before the effective date of the new law),
treat such a case as one in which the pertinent act was already completed under
the old law; (ii) focussing on the last element of the presupposition (the one that
occurs after the effective date of the new law), treat such a case as one in which
the pertinent act was not yet completed under the old law. Unfortunately, neither
of these solutions will produce politically acceptable results in all cases.
Consider this "products liability" hypothetical. X, a manufacturer, makes a
widget according to a certain design and then sells it to a retailer who, in turn,
sells it to Y, a consumer. Up until this point in time, the law has imposed
liability upon the manufacturers of defective products on the basis of negligence
alone (for example, negligent design or negligent manufacture). But now the
government alters the law of products liability, instituting, for the first time, a
system of strict products liability. A few days after the new law takes effect, Y,
while using the widget, injures himself. Y then brings suit against X, seeking
to recover damages for personal injuries. Among Y's theories is that X is
270. See infra text at pp. 92-97.
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strictly liable for those damages on account of defective design and defective
manufacture. X then moves for summary judgment on Y's strict liability claims.
His theory is that since the old law of negligence was in force when he designed
and manufactured the product (the first element of the presupposition of the new
law271), to apply the new law of strict liability to this case would be to apply
it retroactively. Y opposes the motion, arguing that since the injury (the last
element of the presupposition of the new law) did not occur until after the
effective date of the new law, to apply that new law to this case would be to
apply it prospectively.
Though reasonable persons might well disagree, the better result here, as a
matter of political technique, is to apply the new law. To be sure, applying the
new law here would adversely affect interests that were created under and in
reliance on the old law. Chief among those interests are the investment-backed
expectations of X. When he designed and manufactured the widget, he
undoubtedly did so with knowledge of and in reliance on the old law, under
which he was entitled to a relatively favorable standard of liability. Had he
known that he would one day face a relatively unfavorable standard of liability,
he might well have behaved differently, for example, purchased more liability
insurance, altered the design, or not manufactured anything at all. Even so, the
apparent injustice that would be visited upon X were the new law to be applied
here is not nearly so severe as it might at first appear. The truth is that X, had
he been vigilant, could have protected himself after the new law took effect. For
example, he might have taken out additional liability insurance, issued appropri-
ate warnings to the consumers of his products, or even recalled his products.
Another interest that application of the new law might well affect adversely is
the community's interest in generating new wealth. One should not ignore the
negative repercussions that applying the new law here would have upon future
investment in the product-manufacturing sector of the economy. If investors
know that the standards of liability are subject to change at any time, they might
be less willing to make the investment. But this problem, too, should not be
exaggerated. It is possible, for example, that investors might be able to obtain
insurance against the risk of such unanticipated changes in the law. 22  By
contrast, failure to apply the new law here would have a significant adverse
effect on a number of the interests that found expression in the new law.
Perhaps the most important is the community's interest in progress. The new
legislation reflects the judgment of the community that the quality of life for all
(for everyone is a consumer) will be enhanced if manufacturers of consumer
goods are held to higher standards of care and, beyond that, if victims of
271. The new law, stated in conditional form, might be worded like this: "If A (i) either (aXI)
manufactures a product according to a (2) defective design or (b) (1) mismanufactures a product in
such a way as to render it (2) defective and (ii) that product causes (iii) damage to B, then B may
obtain compensation from A."
272. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L Rev. 509,533-50
(1986).
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defective consumer goods are better assured of receiving compensation for their
injuries. On balance, then, the scale of interests probably tips in favor of
applying the new law.
Only one of the alternative "dispersed fact" solutions set forth above273
will bring about this politically desirable result. It is the latter, namely, that
which treats dispersed-facts cases as if the pertinent act was not yet complete at
the time when the new law took effect. The former alternative, namely, that
which treats dispersed-fact cases as if the pertinent act was complete on the new
law's effective date, would require the opposite result-the application of the old
law.
Now, consider, once again, the "testate succession" hypothetical that I posed
earlier.274 Before his death, D makes out an olographic testament in which he
leaves all of his estate to T, his best friend. After D executes the testament, but
before he dies, the legislature alters the law on testamentary form, requiring that
all testaments be witnessed and notarized. After T petitions the court for the
probate of the testament, A, D's healthy 30-year old son, intervenes in the
proceedings, seeking to annul the testament on the basis of the new law. T,
noting that the testament was executed while the old law was still in force (the
first element of the presupposition of the new law27.), argues that to apply the
new law to this case would be to apply it retroactively. A counters that
argument by contending that since D did not die (the last element of the
presupposition of the new law) until after the new law took effect, to apply the
new law to this case would be to apply it prospectively.
Though one can certainly disagree with this position as a matter of policy,
most civil law jurisdictions, Louisiana and France included, have long preferred
to apply the old law in situations that involve changes in the law of testamentary
validity. 6 This judgment, one must suppose, rests on some intuitive judgment
regarding how that balance of interests should properly be struck in such cases.
It is undeniable that the testator who goes to the trouble of preparing a testament
in conformity with the law then in force thereby acquires a significant "reliance"
interest under the old law, one that application of the new law would destroy.
And it is likely that the motives which lie behind changes in the law of
testamentary validity typically have less to do with high-minded concerns about
progress and social justice than with protecting the individual interests of legatees
and heirs. Under these circumstances, one might well conclude that the balance
of interests tips in favor of applying the old law.
273. See supra text at pp. 89-90.
274. See supra text at p. 89.
275. The new law, stated in conditional form, might be worded as follows: "If A (i) drafts,
dates, and signs a testament in his own hand; has the testament (ii) witnessed and (iii) notarized; and
(iv) dies without altering the testament, then A's named legatees shall be entitled to his property on
the terms and conditions outlined in that testament."
276. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200; see also Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1,
§ 63, at 294-95.
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To arrive at this politically desirable result, one must select the former of the
alternative "dispersed facf' solutions, namely, that which treats dispersed-fact
cases as if the pertinent act were complete on the new law's effective date. The
latter alternative, namely, that which treats dispersed-facts cases as if the
pertinent act were not yet complete at the time when the new law took effect,
dictates a politically undesirable result-the application of the new law.
Now that we've worked through these hypotheticals, it's time to take stock
of how the two alternative solutions to the "dispersed fact" dilemma performed.
In connection with the first hypothetical, the former alternative produced a
politically undesirable result, while the latter alternative produced a politically
desirable result. In connection with the second hypothetical, the former
alternative produced a politically desirable result, while the latter alternative
produced a politically undesirable result. It is clear, then, that the completed act
theory, in its original and unsophisticated form, can't guarantee results in
"dispersed fact" cases that are acceptable as a matter of political technique.
2) Cases Complicated by Juridical Situations in
-Course of Effect
To solve the formulative-technicalproblems that arise from attempts to apply
the completed act theory to cases that involve juridical situations in course of
effect, one might be tempted, as we have seen, to select one of two simple
alternatives: (i) focusing on the event that gives rise to the juridical situation
(which will occur before the effective date of the new law), treat such a case as
one in which the pertinent act was already completed under the old law; (ii)
focusing on the date on which the effects of the juridical situation come to
fruition (which will occur after the effective date of the new law), treat such a
case as one in which the pertinent act was not yet completed under the old law.
Unfortunately, neither of these solutions will produce politically acceptable
results in all cases.
Let's start our examination of this problem by calling to mind yet again the
"rent control" hypothetical that we considered earlier.2" Pascal, a landowner,
and Olide, a farmer, enter into a lease of a one-arpent tract of farmland: on
March 1, 2001 Pascal leases Olide the parcel for $100/month and for a term of
one year. When the lease is executed, the law imposes no restrictions on the
magnitude of rents of farmland. But at the end of the regular legislative session
of 2001, the legislature enacts a law that places a ceiling on rents of farmland of
$50/month/arpent, the -effective date of which is September 1, 2001. At that
time, of course, the second lease is still "in.progress": six months have passed
and six more are still to go. Olide, relying on the new law, thereafter reduces
the amount of his monthly rental payment to $50. Pascal, relying on the old law,
demands that Olide continue to pay $100/month. An action ensues. Pointing out
277. See supra text at pp. 57-60.
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that the lease was executed while the old laws was still in force, Pascal contends
that to apply the new law to this case would be to apply it retroactively. For his
part Olide, noting that Pascal's right to demand the rent for October through
December matured only after the new law took effect, argues that to apply the
new law would be to apply it prospectively.
As we concluded earlier,"' the preferable result in a case such as this,
politically speaking, is to apply the new law. That is so because the collective
and individual interests behind the new law, including the interests of social
progress and social justice, outweigh the collective and individual interests
created under the old law, such as the interest in maximizing available rental
stock.
This politically acceptable result, it's clear to see, can be produced only if
the latter of the two solutions to the "situation in course of effect"problem posed
earlier is selected. Under that solution, it's the production or maturation of the
effects that constitutes the critical act for purposes of the completed act theory.
Here, that act did not occur until after the new law took effect. By contrast, the
other solution, which assigns the "critical act" role to the event that originally
gave rise to the situation, demands the politically undesirable result-the
application of the old law.
Now, consider the following curatorship hypothetical regarding tutorship that
I posed earlier,279 which, for present purposes, should perhaps be reconceived
as an effects-of-minority problem. Suppose that the tutor whom the court
appoints for the minor according to the old law is his grandfather. A few years
later, after the minor has settled into life with this his new "father figure," the
government changes the law to require that the minor's nearest collateral relative
be appointed his tutor. C's aunt, A, then petitions the court to terminate G's
tutorship and to appoint her tutor in place of G. G opposes the petition, arguing
that since C's tutorship was created under the old law, that law ought to
determine who serves as C's tutor. A, on the other hand, argues that because C's
minority is an ongoing juridical situation, one that continues to subject C to the
authority of a tutor and will continue to do so until he reaches majority, the new
law ought to control from this point forward.
The preferable political result, few would disagree, is to maintain the status
quo, that is, to continue to apply the old law. One must suppose that the
government had some good reason for altering the law, perhaps a growing public
perception that a child's aunts and uncles, on the whole, are better equipped
financially, physically, and mentally to handle the challenges of child-rearing
than are the child's grandparents. But be that as it may, the collective interest
in realizing this rather de minimis advantage in tutorship competency as quickly
as possible pales in comparison to the individual interests that children such as
278. See supra note 248 & accompanying text
279. See supra text at p. 83.
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
C would already have staked on the old law. As we noted earlier,"' to foist
this kind of wrenching change of life on such a minor could be emotionally
devastating: in addition to losing his close relationship with his first tutor, he
would undoubtedly lose other relationships, for example, those with his friends
at church and school and then would be required to make the difficult adjustment
to a new style of discipline and direction. Here, balancing up the competing
interests is a "no brainer": the interests protected by the old law predomi-
nate.28'
To achieve this result, of course, one must select the former of the two
solutions to the "situation in course of effect" problem posed earlier.282 Under
that solution, the event that originally gave rise to the situation is determinative.
Here, that event occurred while old law was still in force. The latter solution,
on the other hand, by hinging the determination on the timing of the production
or fruition of the situation's effects, would require the politically undesirable
result-the application of the new law.
Let's now compare the results of the two hypotheticals to see how well the
two alternative solutions to the "situation in course of effect" problem fared. In
connection with the first hypothetical, the former alternative produced a
politically undesirable result, while the latter alternative produced a politically
desirable result. In connection with the second hypothetical, the former
alternative produced a politically desirable result, while the latter alternative
produced a politically undesirable result. For these reasons, the completed act
theory, in its original and unsophisticated form, can't guarantee politically
defensible results in cases of this kind.
3. Interpretation of Terminology of Typology of Laws
As we have seen, the legislation (at least the preeminent part of it-Article
6) hinges the temporal effects of a new law on that law's classification, in
particular, on whether the law is substantive, procedural, or interpretative. The
interpretation that the jurisprudence and, to a lesser degree, the doctrine have
placed upon these terms leaves much to be desired. The deficiencies in this
interpretation spring from lapses in formulative technique.
a. Substantive v. Procedural
To date the courts' efforts to delineate the boundaries of the complementary
categories "substantive" and "procedural," it seems fair to say, have largely
failed. The trouble is that the boundaries, as described by the courts, are simply
too "fuzzy" to be of much use either to judges or to lawyers. In any case in
280. See supra text accompanying notes 212-216.
281. See Roubier, Transitoire, supra note 1, § 29, at 136-37.
282. See supra text at pp. 89-90.
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which it's worthwhile to raise the categorizationquestion, those descriptions are
too indeterminate to force the judge to resolve the question one way or the other.
And, as a result, lawyers have great difficulty predicting how, in such a case, the
judge's categorization decision will come out. '
To see just how fuzzy the lines are does not require much effort: one has
only to compare the definitions of "substantive" law and "procedural" law. As
we observed earlier,283 the former "either establish[es] new rules, rights, and
duties or change[es] existing ones" or "imposes new duties, obligations or
responsibilities upon parties," whereas the latter "prescribe[s] a method for
enforcing a previously existing substantive right and relate[s] to the form of the
proceeding or the operation of laws." For anyone who understands the English
language it should be patently obvious that these two definitions "overlap" to a
considerable degree. Consider, for example, a new law that, for the first time,
permits litigants in a certain class of civil cases to demand a trial by jury. No
one would deny that such a law fits the definition of "procedural" law: it clearly
"relates to the form of the proceeding" and concerns a "method for enforcing a
previously existing substantive right" (namely, the right to bring suit). But does
that law not, at the same time, fit the definition of "substantive" law: doesn't it
clearly "establish [a] new rule[ ]" and, what's more, "establish [a] new ...
right[ ]" (namely, the right to elect a jury trial)? Or imagine a new law that
requires, for the first time, that litigants submit in writing proposed "findings of
fact and conclusions of law" immediately in advance of trial (as is now required
in federal court). This law, too, fits the definition of "procedural" law: it clearly
relates to the form of the "proceeding" and concerns a "method for enforcing a
previously existing substantive right" (namely, the right to bring suit). But does
this law not, as well, fit the definition of "substantive" law: doesn't it "establish
[a] new rule[ ]" and "impose new duties, obligations or responsibilities upon
parties" (namely, the duty to prepare and submit the required documentation)?
Indeed, if the truth be told, every conceivableprocedural awfits thejurispruden-
tial definition of substantive law.
One might object, however, that this argument puts too much emphasis on
the courts' verbal formulas considered in the abstract-that if one looks, instead,
at how the courts use them in practice, one would find that the courts are able,
with little difficulty, to keep the categories distinct. If only that were true.
Anyone who doubts it should consider the recent case of Chance v.
American Honda Motor Co.2 ' At issue was the applicability of a new
prescriptive statute--one that extended the original prescriptive period-to a
claim that, at the moment at which the new law took effect, had already
prescribed under the original prescriptive statute. The effect of so applying the
new law would have been to "revive" the prescribed claim, for the new
prescriptive period, reckoning from the date on which the claim had originally
283. See supra text accompanying notes 102-106.
284. 635 So. 2d 177 (La. 1994).
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accrued, had not yet run.2" Though a majority of the supreme court ultimately
concluded that the old law rather than the new law should be applied the
members of that majority could not agree on the appropriate rationale. A
plurality of three justices, led by Justice Marcus, concluded that the amendment
was substantive and that, since the legislature had not indicated otherwise, Article
6 forbade applying the amendment retroactively." Justice Marcus explained
his rationale as follows:
Although prescriptive statutes are generally procedural in nature, the
revival of an already prescribed claim presents additional concerns. For
while the defendant does not acquire anything during the running of the
prescriptive period, once the time period has elapsed, the legislature
grants the defendant the right to plead the exception of prescription in
order to defeat the plaintiff's claim. Because the defendant acquires the
right to plead the exception of prescription, a change in that right
constitutes a substantive change in the law as applied to the defen-
dant.2 7
To support his conclusion that the amendment produced a "substantive change"
in the law, Justice Marcus cited the definition of "substantive" law found in St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith:211 "'Substantive laws either establish
new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones." 29 Justice Hall, joined
by Chief Justice Calogero, agreed with the plurality's proposed result, but
rejected the plurality's proposed rationale.29 0 For Justice Hall, the characteriza-
tion of a statute as "substantive" or "procedurar'has nothing to do with its effect
on pre-existing rights:
The majority opinion correctly states the settled jurisprudential
rule that prescriptive statutes are procedural and thus generally
retroactively applied. Yet, the majority then implies that because
the retroactive application of the instant amendment would deprive
certain defendants of their right to plead the peremptory exception
of prescription, the amendment in question must be reclassified as
substantive. I respectfully disagree with this step in the majority's
line of reasoning....
The amendment at issue is to a prescriptive statute and is thus a
procedural one, despite that applying it retroactively may upset vested
rights....
285. Id. at 179.
286. Id. at 177.
287. Id. at 178 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
288. 609 So. 2d 809 (La. 1992).
289. Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178 (quoting Smith, 609 So. 2d at 817).
290. Id. at 179 (concurring opinion).
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According to Justice Hall, the solution to this "problem" (that is, a procedural
statute that, as applied, would deprive someone of a vested right) lies not under
Article 6 (which, in his view, is impotent to solve the problem), but rather under
the "due process" clauses of the federal and state constitutions:
Louisiana courts have consistently dealt with the latter problem by
applying a well-settled exception to the general rule that amendments
to procedural laws are retroactively applied; under that exception, even
amendments to procedural laws are not retroactively applied if doing so
would unconstitutionally disturb vested rights.29'
Because, in his view, the right to file an exception of prescription is a "vested
right" and because applying the amendment to Article 3492 in this case would
deprive Honda of that vested right, Justice Hall concluded that the constitutions
prohibited the courts from so applying that amendment.292
This decision provides conclusive proof (as if any were needed) that the
jurisprudential definitions of "substantive" and "procedural" are profoundly
malleable, so malleable, in fact, that even the judges themselves can't say for
sure into which of those categories any particular piece of legislation must be
placed. Both the plurality and the concurring minority were able, evidently in
good faith, to justify their respective characterizationdeterminations by reference
to one definition or the other. It would seem, then, that even in practice the line
between the two categories is hopelessly blurred.293
b. Substantive v. Interpretative
In their efforts to delineate the boundaries of the complementary categories
"substantive" and "interpretative," it must be admitted, the courts have met with
"relative" success. As we noted earlier, they have identified several factors that
are indicative and several others that are contra-indicative of "interpretative"
character.294 These lists of factors, one would suppose, are better than nothing.
Thanks to them, drawing the substantive-interpretativeline is perhaps a tad easier
than drawing the procedural-substantive line (at least at the level of conceptual
291. Id. at 180 (citation omitted).
292. Id.
293. One might object, of course, that one group or the other-the plurality or the concurring
majority-got it wrong. And, from my perspective, that's entirely true: the plurality blundered.
Underlying that opinion is the assumption that the categories of procedural and substantive are
"relative" rather than "absolute," that is, one-and-the-same statute can be procedural as to oneperson
and substantive as to another. That assumption not only finds no support in the text of Article 6 (or
its predecessors), but also is utterly inconsistent with the history of that article. But that the plurality
erred does not undermine my critique of the jurisprudential account of the substantive-procedural
dichotomy, that is, that it's too blurred to be of any real use. To the contrary, that three supreme
court justices were so easily led astray tends to prove my point.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 107-112.
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formalism). Still, the boundary between substantive, on the one hand, and
interpretative, on the other, remains frustratingly fuzzy. The trouble is three-
fold.
The first problem is that some of the courts' factors are, to put it kindly, not
terribly helpful. Consider, for example, the requirement that the interpreted law
have been "ambiguous." Since the definition of "ambiguous" is "susceptible of
more than one reasonable interpretation," one is entitled to ask when, if ever, this
requirement would not be satisfied. Just try to imagine a case in which a lawyer
would even think to make the "interpretative laws" argument, much less devote
time and energy to it, in which there had not been considerable disagreement,
prior to the enactment of the new law, regarding the meaning of the purported
interpreted statute. It's a task fit for Sisyphus.29
The second problem is that a few of the courts' factors are just plain wrong,
either as a matter of law or as a matter of legal theory. Let's start with the
requirement that the new law not have changed "settled law." If by the term
"law" as used in the expression "settled law" the courts meant "the interpreted
statute," this requirement would, of course, be open to the charge of circularity:
to determine whether the new law "changes settled law" one must first determine
whether the statute is substantive or interpretative. But that doesn't seem to be
what the courts mean by "law" here. Consider, for example, this interesting
passage in Smith, which first announced this supposed requirement:
[T]he amendment... does not merely overrule a single decision of this
court... with which the legislature disagreed, but rather an established
line of jurisprudence .... Indeed, by the time the legislature enacted
this amendment, the law had become well-settled under Brooks,
Fontenot, and their progeny .... The well-settled nature of this line
of jurisprudence is evidenced by the large number of appellate, as well
as federal, cases which have applied the apportionment rules as defined
not only by Brooks, but also by Fontenot. As we have recognized, [a]
statute that changes settled law relative to substantive rights only has
prospective effect.
2 96
To the same effect is this passage from Segura, in which this supposed
requirement formed the linchpin of the court's rationale:
[P]rior to the 1990 amendment.... the Hickerson court's interpretation
... had been the law of this state for over a decade. For these reasons,
295. For various acts of defiance against the Greek gods, Sisyphus was condemned to
"ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back down of its
own weight" Albert Camus, The Myth of Sysiphus and Other Essays 88 (Justin O'Brien trans.,
1955).
296. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 820 (La. 1992) (citations
omitted) (quotations omitted).
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we concluded the 1990 amendment changed settled law relative to
American's and Allstate's substantive rights .... 
If these passages mean what they say, then the courts understand the term "law,"
as used in the expression "settled law," to mean not so much the original
legislation itself as the established jurisprudential interpretation of that
legislation. That, however, is not what "law" is. In Louisiana, as in other civil
law systems within the French tradition, the only official sources of law are
"legislation" and "custom."29 s  Jurisprudence, including even established
jurisprudence (or, as the civilians call it, jurisprudence constante'"), isn't on
the list. And its omission from the list is not the result of an oversight."
Next, let's consider the notion that the parties' "reliance" on the established
jurisprudence militates against qualifying the law as interpretative. To see what's
wrong with this notion it suffices to recall my critique of the rationale of the
majority opinion in Chance, which appears in the margins of the discussion of
that opinion.3"' That rationale, it will be recalled, rests on the flawed assump-
tion that the categories of procedural and substantive are "relative" rather than
"absolute," that is, one-and-the-same statute can be procedural as to one person
(the one whose vested rights are not threatened by the statute) and substantive
as to another (the one whose vested rights are threatened by the statute) rather
than only one or the other as to everyone. The "reliance" factor rests on a
similar and likewise flawed assumption, namely, that the categories of interpreta-
tive and substantive are "relative" rather than "absolute," that is, one-and-the-
same statute can be interpretative as to one person (the one who "relied" on the
prior interpretation) and substantive as to another (the one who did not "rely")
rather than only one or the other as to everyone. That assumption (like the one
at work in Chance) not only finds no support in the text of Article 6 (or its
predecessors), but also is utterly inconsistent with the history of that article.
The third and most profound problem is that the courts' recitation of factors
stops well short of what's really needed. For one to be able to determine, with
some measure of reasonable assurance, whether a particular thing fits into a
certain class, one must know what are, to use the language of introductory logic,
the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for so classifying such a thing.
Necessary conditions are those that must be satisfied if the thing is to be eligible
297. Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 725 (La. 1994) (emphasis added).
298. La. Civ. Code art. I ("The sources of law are legislation and custom.").
299. N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 La. L Rev. 1265, 1278
(1994); Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, §35, at 53 & 55-56; Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A
Reappraisal Appraised: A Brieffor the Civil Lav ofLousiana, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 12, 15-26 (1937);
Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 296,236 So. 2d 216,218 (1970), rev'don other
grounds by Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
300. La. Civ. Code art. 1, cmt. (b). See also Symeonides, supra note 50, at 268 (relating-via
an ostensible hypothetical problem-part of the legislative history of new Article I).
301. See supra note 293.
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for admission to the class; sufficient conditions, those that, if satisfied, will
justify actually admitting it to the class. What the courts have provided thus far
is, at most, a list of the necessaryconditions for classifying statutes as interpreta-
tive (an ambiguity in the interpreted statute, a prompt legislative response to an
interpretative controversy, etc.). That's good, but it's not enough. All that those
conditions permit one to do is to make the "negative" determination that this or
that candidate for admission to the class of interpretative laws is or is not
excluded from the class: if the candidate fails to meet even one of those
conditions, it's excluded from the class, that is, it's substantive, not interpretative,
whereas if the candidate meets all of those conditions, it's not excluded from the
class, that is, it may be, but is by no means certainly, interpretative. Those
conditions do not permit one to make the "affirmative" determination that this
or that candidate for admission to the class of interpretative laws belongs to the
class: even if the candidate meets all of the conditions, one can't be sure that
it's interpretative; it still might be substantive. To be sure of that, of course, one
needs a list of sufficient conditions for "interpretativeness." Unless and until the
courts or the legislature come up with one, the interpretative-substantive
boundary will remain unfixed.
The courts themselves have even acknowledged this problem. In a welcome
(if all too rare) display of candor, the supreme court, in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Smith," 2 made the following observation:
The suggested distinction between interpretative legislation
"clarifying," and substantive legislation "amending" or "changing,"
existing law is an obscure one. There is "no bright line between
substantive laws which change existing standards and interpretative laws
which change existing standards by redefining and returning to their
ostensible 'original' meaning." In the same vein, we have describedthe
line between this intention of the lawmaker to "clarify" existing laws
and the enactment of new substantive provisions as tenuous .... "
One would have hoped that the justices, having confessed the sin, would have
made the appropriate penance, namely, would have "brightened up" the line by
positing a clear definition of "interpretative law" or, in other words, setting out
a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for classifying a particular law as
interpretative. This hope, however, was not fulfilled. To the contrary, the
justices merely trotted out the established necessary conditions for making such
a classification and, upon finding that most of those conditions were not satisfied,
ruled that the statute before it was not interpretative. °
302. 609 So. 2d 809 (La. 1992).
303. Id. at 819 (citations omitted).
304. Out of fairness to the justices, one must acknowledge that it was not necessary for the court
to provide such a definition or list of conditions, given the court's conclusion that the statute in
question was non-interpretative. Indeed, had the court done so, its statements, technically speaking,
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V. CONCLUSION
A. The Past and the Present
For many years now, Louisiana has been stuck with an intertemporal
conflicts law that can't do the job. The problem, as we have seen, stems from
an unfortunate failure of juridical technique.
1. The Legislation
The problem starts in the legislation itself, which exhibits a few lapses in
formulative technique. First, there's the apparent antimony between Article 6
and Section 2, which set out seemingly contradictory directives regarding the
permissible temporal effects of new laws. Then there's the equivocation in the
use of the term "substantive" in Article 6. Finally, there are the multiple
breakdowns in efficacy. The legislative scheme as a whole fails even to
recognize, much less to provide for, any temporal effects phenomena other than
retroactivity and prospectivity, for example, what we've called "postactivity."
And the exception to the anti-retroactivity rule that Article 6 carves out for
"procedural laws" raises concerns on two fronts: it (i) fails to stand in the way
of results that reasonable legislators would find unacceptable and (ii) attacks a
problem that, on close analysis, turns out to be chimerical.
2. The Interpretation
The real problem, however, lies in the interpretation of this legislation, in
particular, the jurisprudencetial interpretation. This interpretation can be faulted
on at least three counts.
First, though it's an admittedly minor annoyance, the courts' handling of the
apparent antinomy between Article 6 and Section 2 is less than fully satisfying.
The results of this effort are difficult to square with established interpretative
norms and fly in the face of accepted principles regarding the scope of implied
abrogation.
Second, the interpretation that the courts (and to some extent the doctrine)
have placed on the legislative terminology of temporal effects, in particular, the
term "retroactive," is deficient in countless respects. In most judicial opinions,
of course, there's no interpretation to be found: the court somehow manages to
apply the rule of Article 6 or Section 2, as the case might be, without ever
defining or setting up a criterion for retroactivity. On those all too rare
would have amounted to obiter dicta. Stil one could hardly have charged the court with
unwarranted judicial activism had it taken the initiative to close (at least in some small measure) the
"circle of the indeterminate" that surrounds the category of interpretative laws. See Jean Dabin,
Technique, supra note 113, at 11 I.
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occasions on which the courts have bothered to define that term or, failing that,
have at least given some hint of how they understand it, the results have hardly
been salutary. Through those decisions, the courts, no doubt unwittingly, have
ended up with two rather different definitions of retroactivity, one tied to the
notion of "vested rights" and the other, to the notion of "completed acts."
Neither definition has much to commend it.
The vested rights theory is an affront to sound juridical technique. First,
there are the problems of formulative technique. Plagued by radical indetermina-
cy and guilty of distorting and oversimplifying the phenomena it is supposed to
describe, it constitutes a case study in bad style. Not only that, but it makes a
mess of the exceptions to the anti-retroactivity rule that Article 6 creates in favor
of procedural and interpretative laws, reducing them to near nonsense and
bringing them into conflict with the provisions of the federal and state
constitutions that require due process. Perhaps more disturbing, the theory is at
an utter loss to explain a good measure of the establishedjurisprudence. Finally,
the theory, on close analysis, turns out to have only a tenuous connection with
the very task that intertemporal law must perform, namely, to fix the temporal
boundaries of successive laws.
The vested rights theory's assault on juridical technique does not end there.
To these deficiencies of formulative technique, the theory adds a few deficiencies
of socio-political technique. Rooted, as it undoubtedly is, in radical individual-
ism, the theory ignores or at least improperly undervalues the collective interests
at stake in intertemporal conflicts, in particular, the community's interest in
promoting social progress and social justice. And thanks to its links to
economism, the theory improperly privileges material over "spiritual" interests,
that is, interests that can't be reduced to monetary terms. As a result of its
associations with these deviant socio-political philosophies, the theory tends to
produce results that reflect an improper balance or equilibrium of interests, one
that fails to serve the common good.
The completed acts theory, though admittedly an improvement over its
counterpart, nevertheless will not win any awards for juridical technique. Like
the vested rights theory, it exhibits several formulative deficiencies. For one
thing, it suffers from indeterminacy at a number of levels. But worse than that,
it is, by nature, ill-suited to handle certain common classes of intertemporal
conflicts cases. It's not cut out for "dispersed fact" cases, that is, those in which
the "act"in question in fact consists of multiple acts, some of which antedate and
others of which postdate the new law's effective date. Nor does it work in cases
that involve juridical situations "in course of effect," that is, ongoing situations
that are neither coming into or going out of existence. To these problems with
the theory there are no sure solutions. The easiest and perhaps most obvious
solutions-to treat dispersed fact cases and cases of juridical situations in course
of effect either as instances of completed acts or as instances of uncompleted
acts-flunk the test of socio-political technique.
The third and final flaw in the interpretation concerns the terminology that
the legislation, in particular, Article 6, uses to describe the categories of laws to
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which different temporal effects may be attached, namely, substantive,
interpretative, and procedural laws. It is at this point, perhaps, that one finds the
most profound breakdown in juridical technique. The definitions that the courts
have so far supplied for these terms are indeterminate in the extreme and, still
worse, even overlap to a significant degree. As a result, predicting into which
of these categories the courts will place a particular law is not far from outright
gambling.
B. The Future
If Louisiana's intertemporal conflicts law is "broke," then it must, of course,
be "fixed." The question is "How?" Drawing upon the technical critique set
forth above, one can, I think, begin to formulate an answer to that question. At
the very least, one should be able to come up with a rough sketch of what the
"fixed" law will look like.
"1. The Legislation
The sketch of this "fixed" law begins with the legislation itself. To start off,
the legislature needs to eliminate the embarrassing antimony between Article 6
and Section 2. Precisely how the antinomy is resolved-by the formal
abrogation of Section 2 or by a legislative affirmation that Section 2 means what
it says-is of secondary importance. The important thing is for the legislature
to put an end to its Doublespeak.
Beyond that, the legislature should reconsider its decision to except
procedural laws from the general anti-retroactivity rule of Article 6. This
exception, as I demonstrated above, 0 5 produces a multitude of problems,
among them that it leaves the courts with no choice but to resolve a good
number of intertemporal conflicts cases on constitutional grounds and puts
Louisiana out of step with the rest of the civil law world. Furthermore, because
the courts and the doctrine seem to be unwilling or unable to sharpen up the
lines that divide procedural from substantive laws, this exception, understandably
enough, generates a fair amount of litigation, litigation that, but for the
exception, would not exist. These inconveniences, of course, might be worth
tolerating if the exception were essential to the realization of some important
public good. But, as I demonstrated earlier,306 that is not the case. The truth
is that the exception is unnecessary.
If the exception for procedural laws in Article 6 is retained, then the
legislature or, in default thereof, the courts and legal scholars, should work to
eliminate the equivocation in the meaning of the term "substantive" as it's used
in that exception and the complimentary exception for "interpretative" laws.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 116-128.
306. See supra text at pp. 42-43.
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Though the risk that this equivocation will cause confusion is slight, it is
nonetheless real. The solution is simple enough: retain "substantive" as the
correlative of "procedural" and then find a new correlative for "interpretative,"
perhaps something like "originative" (to indicate that the law, instead of
interpreting the rule of another law, originates a new rule of law) or, more
simply, "noninterpretative."
Finally, the legislature may wish to consider supplementing Article 6 (and
Section 2, if it is retained) with another law to address the temporal effects
phenomenon that the current legislative scheme ignores, namely, postactivity.
At this juncture, however, such an enterprise is probably premature. The trouble
is that the doctrine on postactivity, at least domestic Louisiana doctrine, is still
at what can be charitably described as a "primitive" stage. Unlike their
counterparts in some countries abroad, Louisiana civil law scholars have not even
begun to consider, much less started to form, a consensus on either (i) the socio-
political question of when, if at all, postactivity ought to be mandated (or
permitted) or (ii) the formulative technical question of how rules mandating (or
permitting) postactivity should best be framed. Legislative action should
probably be deferred until that consensus develops.
2. The Interpretation
The sketch of the "fixed" law continues with the interpretation of the
legislation. This part of the sketch requires considerably more work than the
other. Unfortunately the work demanded here is more difficult.
For the jurisprudential component of Louisiana's intertemporal conflicts law
to be fixed, two things must happen. First, the courts, either on their own or
with the help of legal scholars or under legislative order, must settle on a single
definition of or criterion for retroactivity. Maintaining multiple definitions of the
term (as the courts now unwittingly do) not only is intellectually sloppy, but also
breeds uncertainty. Second, the courts must then use that definition, that is,
recite it and apply it. The present situation, wherein the courts (and sometimes
scholars) routinely state (or worse yet, merely assume) that this or that proposed
application of a new statute is "retroactive," without explaining what that term
means (and, one suspects, without having any clear idea of what it means), can
no longer be tolerated.
But not just any definition of or criterion for retroactivity will do. What is
needed is a definition or criterion that both overcomes the technical deficiencies
from which the vested rights and completed acts theories suffer and has no
serious technical deficiencies of its own. That means, among other things, that
the new definition or criterion must-
(1) be relatively free of vague and uncertain terms;
(2) mesh conceptually with the entirety of the legislation, including, in
particular, the exceptions to the anti-retroactivity rule established in
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Article 6 (not to mention the time-related provisions of the federal and
state constitutions);
(3) be capable of explaining all of the existing jurisprudence that is
socio-politically sound;
(4) be sufficiently nuanced to permit one to draw distinctions among
the different varieties of non-prospective temporal effects, in particular,
that between maximum and moderate retroactivity, on the one hand, and
ambiactivity, on the other;
(5) be sufficiently sophisticated to recognize and then to allow
appropriate treatment of the most complex intertemporal conflicts
phenomena, in particular, "dispersed fact" cases and cases that involve
"juridical situations in course of effect";
(6) be either socio-politically neutral (if that's possible) or, at least, be
tied to a socio-political philosophy that recognizes all of the dimensions
of human being (individual and collective, material and spiritual) and
is directed toward the attainment of the common good;
(7) produce results that, if not in all cases then at least in the over-
whelming majority of cases, are acceptable as a matter of socio-political
technique or, in other words, that bring about an equilibrium among the
competing interests in play that is conducive to the common good.
To be sure, these desiderata are themselves a bit "vague and uncertain." But
they at least reveal, if only in outline form, what a workable definition of
retroactivity looks like.
Yet one more task lies before the courts and legal scholars: to clarify the
distinctions among the categories of laws to which different temporal effects are
attached, namely, substantive, procedural, and interpretative laws. The first step
belongs to the courts. They must say "no more" to the practice of unthinkingly
and uncritically repeating the established "boilerplate" definitions of these terms,
definitions that, as we have seen, border on the meaningless and, at least in the
case of the definition of interpretative laws, reflect a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of Louisiana's law of sources of law. Having repudiated those definitions,
the courts, with the aid of doctrine, must develop new definitions or criteria that
draw relatively sharp lines around each of the categories. To do that, of course,
the courts and legal scholars must do something that they have thus far been
unwilling or unable to do, namely, specify not just the necessary but also the
sufficient conditions for membership in each of the categories.
The tasks that I've just outlined, especially those that entail addressing the
difficulties in the jurisprudence (as opposed to those in the legislation), may seem
daunting. And they are. But the good news is, we're not alone. Legal scholars,
courts, and in some instances even legislatures in various civil law jurisdictions
abroad have devised a number of alternative approaches to resolving intertem-
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poral conflicts of laws.3 7 These approaches, in my judgment, successfully
avoid most, if not all, of the problems that beset Louisiana's current inter-
temporal conflicts law. If we take those approaches as our own point of
departure, we should have no trouble meeting the challenge that now faces
us-creating a new intertemporal conflicts law that is "up" to the job.
307. See, eg., C6digo Civil do la Reptblica Argentina art. 3 (Argentine legislation); Decreto-Lei
n
0 4.657, art. 6 (Sept. 4, 1942) (Lei de Introduelo ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro), reprinted in D.O.
(Sept. 9 & 17, 1942) (Brazilian legislation); Travaux de ]a Commission de Riforme du Code Civil
326-27 (1948-49) (proposed French legislation); 1992 S.Q. ch. 57, reprinted in Gaudet, supra note
1, at XXXV (Qu6becois legislation).
To those who are disappointed that I have not explored the solutions to intertemporal conflicts of
laws that are to be found in these and other sources, I simply say "be patient." As the Teacher once
said, "To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:... a time to
break down and a time to build up;.. ." Ecclesiastes 3:1 & 3 (KJV). Now is the time to "break
down." There will be plenty of time to "build up" in the future.
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